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INTRODUCTION

The fundamental truth which is the basis for this article is
that the bankruptcy caseload in many districts in this country is
so overwhelming that the bankruptcy judges are sorely pressed in
the struggle to cope with it.' This situation creates pressures that
threaten both the quality and the speed of justice in the bankruptcy courts. This article addresses the question of what can be
done to make the bankruptcy judges' workload more manageable, other than reducing the rate of bankruptcy filings or increasing the number of bankruptcy judges. While those options
may be desirable in important respects, they are also very difficult
to achieve. The rate of bankruptcy filings is a complex and intractable problem, and additional judges are expensive in a time
of fiscal austerity in government. 2 Therefore, it is appropriate to
I The volume of cases is so large in some bankruptcy courts that motion day
sometimes resembles a battlefield triage scene, in which the surgeons are required
to make difficult choices in setting priorities among the wounded, and then perform
emergency surgery under conditions that are far from ideal. The dockets of many
bankruptcy judges are so congested that they are unable to attend to all matters
requiring their attention in a timely manner. For example, my docket is such that I
must inform parties on matters requiring trial that unless they can convince me that
the matter is a dire emergency, they will probably have to wait up to two years after
the filing of the complaint for a trial date.
2 The judiciary is facing an "unprecedented funding crisis" with an estimated
shortfall of approximately $200 million this fiscal year. Judiciary Faces Broad Spending
Reductions, 25 THIRD BRANCH 1 (Admin. Off. U.S. Cts.) Jan. 1993, at 1. There are
insufficient funds for the compensation of court-appointed lawyers, the funds to
pay jurors are expected to run out before the end of the fiscal year, and no money
has been appropriated for the 35 new bankruptcy judgeships established in 1992.
Id. at 7. The Judiciary recently requested a $98.4 million supplemental appropriation for this year, which initially included $12.3 million for the as yet unfunded
bankruptcy judgeships. Judiciary FY 93 and FY 94 Appropriations Requests on Center
Stage, 25 THIRD BRANCH 3 (Admin. Off. U.S. Cts.) Mar. 1993, at 1, 3. The supplemental appropriations bill was enacted into law in July, 1993, but the request for
the funding for the bankruptcy judgeships was not included. The judiciary's
budget situation is not likely to improve in fiscal year 1994, See id.
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consider what else can be done about the situation.3 This article
addresses the subject from a bankruptcy judge's perspective. After this Introduction, Section II describes the extent of the problem. The article then raises questions in Sections III through VII
as to whether the bankruptcy system as presently structured is
using the time of the bankruptcy judges wisely. Sections VIII and
IX make suggestions from the collective experience of one hundred twenty bankruptcy judges (myself included) as to how to resolve disputes and perform other functions of a bankruptcy judge
swiftly and efficiently, without sacrificing due process or the quality of justice.
To gather information for this article, I developed a questionnaire regarding the use of time saving practices by bankruptcy judges, and sent it to every bankruptcy judge in the
country.4 One hundred nineteen of my colleagues, constituting
approximately forty percent of the bankruptcy bench, completed
the questionnaire. I am extremely grateful to them for having
done so. Their responses included an abundance of valuable information which I have summarized in this article. Their generosity in completing the questionnaire has helped me in various
ways already, and will continue to do so as I attempt to implement their suggestions. I hope to remain teachable and to continue to improve in the art of judging for as long as I am
privileged to remain on the bench. I am also hopeful that by
summarizing the judges' comments, others will benefit as well.
II.

THE BANKRUPTCY EXPLOSION

Since the Bankruptcy Code became effective in 1979, the
number of bankruptcy cases filed annually in this country has increased substantially.5 The rate of increase has been dramatic
3 It must be emphasized, however, that the time conservation measures dis-

cussed herein are not a substitute for additional judgeships. The caseload per
judge in many bankruptcy courts is so large that as an ultimate solution, time conservation measures would be, to borrow a phrase from my colleague judge Novalyn
L. Winfield, akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. See also infra notes

5 & 6 for further discussion of rate of increase in caseloads.
4 As is probably obvious from certain deficiencies in the questionnaire, I never
wrote one before, and I am not a social scientist. I appreciate, however, that my
colleagues overlooked those deficiencies and took the time to complete the questionnaire. I am confident that the information in the judges' answers to the ques-

tions is very valuable in spite of any shortcomings of the questionnaire itself.
5 Bankruptcy filings have nearly tripled since 1984. Growth in Bankruptcy Filings

Eases, 25 THIRD BRANCH 4 (Admin. Off. U.S. Cts.), Apr. 1993, at 12. The national
rate of increase, however, slowed during 1992. See id. (explaining that "[diuring
1992, the national increase in bankruptcy case filings was less than 3 percent, the
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since 1989. Not all of the ninety-four judicial districts, however,
have experienced this phenomenon. Some districts have experienced little or no increase in filings since January 1, 1989, while
in others, the rate of increase has been explosive. 6 The District
of New Jersey, in which I sit, is one of the latter. In 1988, there
were 8000 bankruptcy cases filed in this district, and in 1992
there were more than 25,000 cases filed.7 Our caseload in this
district, therefore, tripled in the four years from January 1, 1989,
through December 31, 1992. Other districts have had comparable or greater rates of increase.8 The situation has become so
oppressive in many districts that the 1992 President of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, Chief Judge Paul Mannes, of the bankruptcy court for the district of Maryland,
commented that "[w]hat's happening is that the pathological is
becoming the norm" in the caseload of bankruptcy judges in
many districts. 9
A closer look at the impact of these statistics on the workload
of the bankruptcy judge is illuminating. I will provide some examples from my own experience, which is typical of the bankruptcy judges in this district. I suspect that judges, court
personnel and lawyers from many other districts will see some
familiar figures in these examples as well. In fact, I know that the
caseload of some bankruptcy judges is heavier than that which I
am about to describe.
In 1992, a typical weekly motion calendar for chapter 7 and
11 cases consisted of between seventy and one hundred motions.
Two additional half days per month in chapter 13 cases consisted
of thirty to sixty motions apiece. An additional full day once a
month for chapter 13 confirmation hearings and motions had an
average of 150 to 200 matters on the calendar. I ruled on an
average of seventy-five fee applications per month. I signed an
smallest increase in the last eight years"). The rate of increase, of course, varied
from district to district.
6 See appendix 1 for statistical chart on per judge weighted caseloads in bankruptcy courts. See also Gordan Bermant et al., A Day in the Life: The FederalJudicial
Center's 1988-1989 Bankruptcy Court Time Study, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 491, 492 (1991)
(defining the term "weighted caseloads" as "an estimate of the total amount of time
required to complete the judicial work imposed by the court's annual filings" and
further explaining that "weighted caseloads" are calculated by "multiply[ing] the
court's annual filings in each case type by the weighting of that case type, and then
sum[ming] up the resulting products").
7 See appendix 1.
8 See id.
9 ChiefJudge Paul Mannes Says Goodbye, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) No. 15, at A5
(Oct. 15, 1992).
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average of approximately 860 orders per month. There are, of
course, numerous other proceedings required in a given month,
including trials. I began 1992 with 558 pending adversary proceedings, and 361 were terminated. There were, however, 360
new adversary proceedings commenced in my cases during 1992,
and nine were transferred or reopened, leaving a total of 566
pending at the close of the year. The average time from the filing
of a complaint commencing an adversary proceeding to the trial
date went from less than a year on my docket in 1988, to close to
two years by the end of 1992. I began 1992 with 292 pending
chapter 11 cases, several of which involved estates of more than
$100 million. I was assigned 184 new chapter 11 cases during
1992, and ended the year with 313 pending chapter 11 cases. I
also had 3096 chapter 7 cases and 1657 chapter 13 cases pending
on December 31, 1992.10 The average number of hours per

week which I spent on all judicial duties increased from approximately forty-five to fifty hours per week in 1988, to approximately sixty hours per week in 1992.
The two statistics cited above which are the most troubling
to me are the average length of time waiting for trial in an adversary proceeding, and the average number of hours per week
which I am working. It is my goal to see both of those averages
reduced. One result of the pressure created by such a caseload is
that it tends to cause scrutiny of all procedures in terms of their
necessity and efficiency, and to open one's mind to question fundamental premises and assumptions as to how every aspect of
court business is conducted.
One obvious way to make the caseload of bankruptcy judges
more manageable is to increase the number of bankruptcy
judges. Since 1979, Congress has done so several times, but the
rate of increase in case filings has greatly exceeded the rate of
increase in bankruptcy judgeships." The process of obtaining
10 Moreover, I am certain that because of periodic sweeps through the caseload
which we conduct by orders to show cause to clear out inactive matters, as well as
prompt motions by the U.S. trustee and chapter 13 and 7 trustees to dismiss or
convert cases for lack of prosecution, none of these statistics are inflated.
tt Recently, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts released a
compilation of bankruptcy statistical information which compared the rate of increase in bankruptcy judges to the rate of increase in cases filed. Specifically, the
compilation maintained:
The number of authorized bankruptcy judgeships increased from 232
to 284 in late 1986, to 291 in late 1988, and to 326 in August 1992
*...

Despite these increases in judgeships, the average per judge

caseload is much higher now than it was during the early 1980's. To-
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additional judgeships has been slow, and the outcome uncertain.
One inevitable result of these circumstances has been greater delay in the resolution of bankruptcy cases, which is detrimental to
the public interest.
Because Congress has not authorized and funded additional
bankruptcy judgeships quickly enough,' 2 the existing bankruptcy
judges have largely been left to rely on our own resources to
cope with the excessive caseload. Many bankruptcy judges have
developed time-saving case management practices and other
practices which expedite matters. Bankruptcy judges often share
such practices with their colleagues within a district. We occasionally do so with judges from other districts as well when circumstances permit. I have heard of some intriguing differences
in case management practices at judicial conferences and seminars. This article attempts to summarize some of those practices.
As several judges noted in response to the questionnaire, eftal case filings increased by 193% between 1980 and 1992, but the
number of bankruptcy judges increased by only 41% during the same
time. The per judge annual case load increased from 1,427 in 1980 to
2,980 in 1992 (based on 232 judges in 1980, and 326judges in 1992).
ADMIN. OFF. U.S CTS. BANKR. STAT. INFO. 1993, at 5.
In 1992, the total nationwide number of bankruptcy case filings was just below
one million. Id. at 6. See also Magic One Million Mark Proves Elusive, 23 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) No. 38, at A-1 (Apr. 8, 1993) (providing that the total filings for 1992
were 971,517). By contrast, total bankruptcy case filings in 1980 were 331,098. Id.
12 While Congress has recognized that there has been a "dramatic increase" in
bankruptcy filings, overloading courts in certain districts which are in need of additional resources, funding for additional judgeships has been extremely slow. See
H.R. REP. No. 825, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
855, 856 (citing to the Honorable Lloyd D. George, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System). Specifically,
Judge George maintained that the "dockets in many ... courts are so congested
that ... it takes several months for matters to be heard in court ....
It is not only
the number of cases, but also the size and complexity of the cases that is increasing." H.R. REP. No. 825, supra, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 857. Moreover, Judge George posited that "[b]ankruptcy judges in many districts are ...
unable, [due to] the sheer volume of work to administer . . . their assigned
caseloads . . . [and] [iut is clear that only additional judgeships in selected districts
can address the problems caused by the staggering caseloads." Id.
The most recent approval of new bankruptcy judges was in the Bankruptcy
Judgeship Act of 1992, which authorized 35 new judgeship positions. The BankruptcyJudgeship Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-361, 106, Stat. 965 (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 152); Act of Nov. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-587, 102 Stat. 2982 (codified as
28 U.S.C. § 152); Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified
as 28 U.S.C. § 152). Of the 35 judgeships, 25 of them were intended to create
permanent positions while the remaining 10 created temporary positions. H.R.
REP. No. 825, supra, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 855-56. As of August,
1993, however, none of the funding for judgeships provided by the Act has been
appropriated. See supra note 2.
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ficient case management depends upon a number of variables,
including various aspects of the practice of law generally in a district, how other courts in the district operate, the characteristics
of each judge, differences in the types of cases which
predominate in a district, and so on. Therefore, there is no one
set of case management practices which is ideal for all judges.
Moreover, even if I thought that there was one such ideal, I
would not be so presumptuous or foolish as to attempt to convince my colleagues to see it that way. Most judges develop very
clear and firm ideas as to how to do their jobs, and I have no
desire to change anyone's mind on that score. This article will
simply note practices that many bankruptcy judges from districts
across the country find useful. My colleagues are invited to take
anything that they like, and leave the rest.
It should also be noted that several judges reminded me in
their questionnaires that the judiciary should be at least as concerned about conserving the time of the bar and the public as it is
concerned about conserving judicial time. I could not agree
more. The judiciary exists, after all, to serve the public. While
the subject of saving the public time (and therefore money) in the
judicial process is extremely important, and is indirectly addressed herein in various ways, it is not the paramount focus of
this article. Because of the shortage of bankruptcy judges in
many districts, it is inevitable that the public will have to wait in
some lines to receive a judge's attention and services. The ultimate purpose of this article, in a sense, is how to make those lines
move faster without reducing the quality of judicial service
rendered.
Lastly, to the extent that the burdens on our bankruptcy
courts and judges are matters of public interest, it is my hope
that this article may stimulate discussion regarding solutions.
III.

THE ROLE OF THE BANKRUPTCY JUDGE AND ITS

RELATIONSHIP TO THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRUSTEE

There is reason to believe that many bankruptcy judges are
performing certain important duties of the United States trust-

ees, because of the failure of United States trustees to do so.
One way to conserve judicial time is to refrain from doing the
jobs of others. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the nature
of the bankruptcy judge's duties and their relationship to those
of the United States trustee.
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It is axiomatic that the ultimate duty of a bankruptcy judge is
to administer justice in bankruptcy cases.' 3 The bankruptcy
judge administers justice largely through the resolution of disputes in the adjudicative process. The adjudication of disputes is
the essential role of all judges. 4 The bankruptcy judge, however, has traditionally had other, nonadjudicative duties which
are unique to the bankruptcy process. 15 Some of these
13 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (stating in relevant part that "[t]hese rules
shall be construed to secure thejust... determination of every case and proceeding") (emphasis added). See also FED. R. EVID. 102 incorporated by reference
through FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017 (providing that "[t]hese rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration ... and promotion of growth and development of
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined").
14 The essence ofjudicial power is the ability to decide "cases or controversies."
See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (stating
that "[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to
actual cases or controversies"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (maintaining
that "[t]he jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the
Constitution.... [Tlhejudicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted
to 'cases' and 'controversies' "); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911)
(explaining that the United States Constitution requires a "case or controversy" to
be present before judicial power may be exerted). See also Northern Pipeline Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (holding that there is no "persuasive
reason, in logic, history, or the Constitution, why the bankruptcy courts established
here lie beyond the reach of Art. III").
15 Congress noted that the extra-judicial duties of the bankruptcy judge under
the Act were unusual in comparison with the duties of most judges:
The situation is in marked contrast to most litigation, in which the
parties themselves manage the progress of the case. The judge does
not become involved in the case, and if a party fails to take action, the
judge does not intercede on his behalf. Instead, the party is
foreclosed.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6049. A bankruptcy judge's duties are a result of the simple fact that the
nature of bankruptcy litigation is somewhat different than that of other litigation.
Specifically:
The practice in bankruptcy is different for several reasons. First,
there is a public interest in the proper administration of bankruptcy
cases. Bankruptcy is an area where there exists a significant potential
for fraud, for self-dealing, and for diversion of funds. In contrast to
general civil litigation, where cases affect only two or a few parties at
most, bankruptcy cases may affect hundreds of scattered and ill-represented creditors. In general civil litigation, a default by one party is
relatively insignificant, and though judges do attempt to protect parties' rights, they need not be active participants in the case for the
protection of the public interest in seeing disputes fairly resolved. In
bankruptcy cases, however, active supervision is essential. Bankruptcy affects too many people to allow it to proceed untended by an
impartial supervisor.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra, at 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6050.
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nonadjudicative duties are very time-consuming. Because the
bankruptcy judges in many districts simply do not have enough
time to go around, it is useful to examine the nonadjudicative
duties of the bankruptcy judge and their role in the system.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act), the predecessor
to the Bankruptcy Code of 1979 (the Code),' 6 bankruptcy judges
had nonadjudicative duties in addition to their judicial duties,
7
which primarily required the judge to act in a supervisory role.'
Historically, this role was considered necessary to prevent abuse
in bankruptcy cases. 1 8 The potential for such abuse exists in a
16 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116 (1984);
Pub. L. No. 98-271, 98 Stat. 163 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-299, 98 Stat. 214 (1984);
Pub. L. No. 98-454, 98 Stat. 1745 (1984); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088
(1986).
17 The legislative history of the Code explains that referees under the Act were
required to "take an active role in supervising and administering a bankruptcy
case." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 4, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5965.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States noted that bankruptcy referees' extensive involvement with supervising and administering bankruptcy cases resulted in a situation where it was "obviously difficult [for the referee]
to resolve questions arising in a proceeding to determine whether the debtor ought
to be discharged or even whether a particular debt is dischargeable, without being
influenced by information and impressions gained during his previous contact with
the debtor and the papers in the case." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I,
at 93 (1973). When the Act was replaced by the Code, most supervisory functions
were removed from the bankruptcy judge's responsibilities. H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 15, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5966. By removing judges
from the supervision of bankruptcy cases, the drafters of the Code intended that
the bankruptcy court "become a forum that is fair in fact and appearance as well."
Id.
18 Historically, the bankruptcy system was plagued with a variety of problems
which resulted in abuses:
[These] conditions were caused by two main features of the Act which
were not adapted to present business conditions: (1) slow-moving
procedural machinery laid down by the Act; (2) the theory underlying
the administrative structure of the Act, that of creditor control, had
broken down for many reasons, some of which were that: (a) administration could not wait until creditors could be called together to elect
a representative; (b) the elections were manipulated by irresponsible
outsiders for their own ends; (c) courts had to take on administrative
duties for which they were not competent; (d) attorneys were to play a
minor role, but due to the legalistic development rather than business
development of the system, attorneys had dominated, due to the 'formalities of procedure laid down by the courts in their efforts to prevent abuses and partly to the low compensation of receivers and
trustees'; (e) in small and no-asset cases, which constituted the great
bulk of bankruptcies, creditors were not interested in policing the Act,
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number of different contexts.' 9
For example, there is a potential for excessive compensation
to case professionals from the debtor's assets. Representation of
a debtor in bankruptcy is often the last, and perhaps the only,
relationship the professional will have with the debtor because
the debtor either will not continue in business thereafter or because the case professional is a specialist who does not render
services after bankruptcy. Similar factors apply to other case professionals, such as the attorneys and accountants for a trustee or
a creditors' committee. Moreover, fees and expenses of case professionals are afforded administrative priority2 ° and are paid out
of the bankruptcy estate,2 ' which often, although by no means
always, contains large amounts of money and other property.
The confluence of these factors means that case professionals
often lack the incentive which exists in other contexts to keep
fees and expenses down in the interests of keeping the client's
business in the future, because there often is not any future business to obtain. This undoubtedly accounts for the fact that historically there has been a tendency for abuse in bankruptcy cases
by certain professionals seeking to gouge the estate for excessive
fees. One response to that tendency has been to give the bankruptcyjudge certain supervisory functions, including a degree of
so that criminal and discharge provisions had become largely ineffective; and () creditors had not supervised and directed administration
and this had been shifted to the courts, which were not adequate to
handle the problem.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 97, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6058-59.
19 The legislative history to the Code contains a study known as the "Donovan
Report" which describes the abuses that were occurring in the bankruptcy system
under the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 96-99, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6057-61. The report stated that "the administration of the bankruptcy law was characterized by serious abuses and malpractices on the part of attorneys, receivers, trustees, appraisers, custodians, auctioneers and other persons
and associations." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 96, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6058. The study focused on the bankruptcy practice in New York
City. See id. Specifically, in reference to the abuses among bankruptcy attorneys,
the Report stated:
These abuses led to others and to conflicts; outright theft occurred.
Twelve attorneys were indicted; one absconded and then committed
suicide; two pleaded guilty and received jail sentences. The Report
found that the condition in New York City was not an isolated condition; based on studies in six different cities it was concluded that "fundamental defects in administration are not restricted to New York, but
exist generally throughout the country."
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 97, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6058.
20 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) & 507(a)(1).
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
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control over employment and payment of case professionals
which is unique in the law.22
Another area with a significant potential for abuse in bankruptcy cases involves efforts by some unscrupulous creditors to
deny honest debtors the benefits of the discharge which Congress intended. 2 3 Conversely, some debtors file bankruptcy petitions in bad faith, i.e., knowing that they do not meet the criteria
24
for relief in bankruptcy, or without needing such relief.
Although creditors are the parties whose interests are most at
risk in bankruptcy cases, it is an unfortunate fact that most creditors decline to participate in the case. 5 Bankruptcy judges under
22 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 326-331, 1103(a). See also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 40 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5826 (explaining that when
the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1938, bankruptcy courts were given authority
to control compensation and fee collection "to guard against a recurrence of 'the
many sordid chapters' in 'the history of fees in corporate reorganizations' ").
23 A discharge of debts in bankruptcy is designed to give "honest debtors a lawful 'fresh start' in their financial dealings." H.R. REP. No. 1085, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1992). Providing the debtor with a "fresh start" is a primary objective of
the bankruptcy system. For example, it has been noted that:
The uniform national bankruptcy system, as provided in the United
States Constitution, is designed to achieve two equally important
objectives. The first is to provide honest debtors who have fallen on
hard times the opportunity for a fresh start in life, after they have
made a good-faith attempt to pay what they can. This not only helps
honest debtors from being relegated to a lifetime of destitution or the
functional equivalent of financial indentured servitude from which
they can never hope to recover, but also helps reinforce the incentives
for healthy business entrepreneurship which are the lifeblood of economic growth in a free market system.
H.R. REP. No. 996, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1992).
Debts that are dischargeable in bankruptcy can, however, be "reaffirmed" by
the debtor, in which case the debt in question is not discharged. 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(c). To prevent abuse by creditors of debtors who are not represented by an
attorney, the court must approve reaffirmation agreements by such debtors. Id.
§ 524(c)(6). Because these agreements are not contested by the parties, the court is
performing a supervisory function in approving such agreements. While such review is important, consideration should be given to transferring it from the court to
the United States trustee.
24 Code section 707(b) allows ajudge to protect the rights of creditors when the
debtor's filing represents a significant abuse of the bankruptcy system. See 11
U.S.C. § 707(b). Section 707(b) provides:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion
of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts
if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the
provisions of this chapter.
Id.
25 One underlying premise of the Act was to give creditors a degree of control
over the estate by allowing them to elect a trustee or appoint a creditors' committee
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the Act therefore had a supervisory function in addition to their
adjudicative function, to prevent such abuses by case professionals, creditors and debtors.
When the Code was enacted, it was the stated intention of
Congress to relieve the bankruptcy judge of the supervisory function to provide more time for adjudication. 26 Accordingly, Congress created the position of United States trustee to take over
the supervisory function which had previously been performed
by the bankruptcy judge.27
Unfortunately, however, the United States trustee system
has generally not been performing well in the opinions of the
Judicial Conference of the United States and many members of
the bankruptcy community. 28 This is evident in the inconsistent
to monitor and supervise the debtor's activities. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15,
at 91-92, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6052-53. Unfortunately, however:
The notion of creditor control, while still theoretically sound, has
failed in practical terms. Creditor control in bankruptcy cases is a
myth. Creditors take little interest in pursuing a bankrupt debtor.
They are unwilling to throw good money after bad. As a result creditor participation in bankruptcy cases is very low.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6053.
26 Congress decided that the bankruptcy judge should no longer perform a supervisory function, in part because it took time away from performance ofjudicial
duties. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 88, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6049. The legislative history expressly recognized that it was "enough of a reason
for change that these [supervisory] functions and duties of the bankruptcy judge
constitute no part of his judicial responsibilities, and divert him from the important
judicial and legal work that must be done in bankruptcy cases." H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 15, at 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6050.
27 The legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code explained:
[A] major change proposed by the [Code] is the creation of a Government officer to supervise the conduct of bankruptcy cases, and to
serve as trustee in bankruptcy cases when private trustees are unwilling to serve. Many of the functions assigned to the new official, called
the United States trustee, are currently performed by bankruptcy
judges. Under the proposed system, the bankruptcy judges will be
handling only judicial matters in bankruptcy cases. The proposed
United States trustee will be the repository of many of the administrative functions now performed by bankruptcy judges, and will serve as
bankruptcy watch-dogs to prevent fraud, dishonesty and overreaching
in the bankruptcy arena.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6049.
28 See appendix 2, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. INFORMATION MEMORANDUM OUTLINING THE POSITION OF THE JUDICIARY ON THE PLACEMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF THE
UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM (Nov. 1, 1989), at 3 [hereinafter INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM] (asserting that "[tihe consensus among the bankruptcy judges and

clerks of court and many representatives of the bankruptcy bar is that the United
States trustee system is not well administered on a national basis, while local offices
vary greatly in quality"). The findings and conclusions in the Information Memorandum remain as correct today as they were in 1989. Two points, however, must
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and irregular performance of the supervisory functions assigned
to the United States trustee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3).2 9 The
best example of this noncompliance is the United States trustee's
review of fee applications under 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A). ° In
some districts, there has been little or no review of fee applications by the United States trustee. 3 ' In others, the United States
trustee's objections to fee applications have been criticized as
be emphasized. First, the bankruptcy courts in some districts are satisfied with the
performance of the United States trustee. Second, the dissatisfaction which has
been expressed in other districts is not necessarily a reflection on the quality of
performance by United States trustee attorneys, analysts, staff and even assistant
United States trustees, many of whom perform their duties admirably under very
difficult conditions. The dissatisfaction is more with the policy decisions of those
who control the United States trustee system.
29 Id. at 10-11. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A)-(H). This section enumerates some
of the specific functions that the United States trustee shall perform in all cases,
when appropriate, under chapter 7, 11, or 13 of title 11. These functions include:
(A) monitoring applications for compensation and reimbursement
filed under section 330 of title 11 and, whenever the United States
trustee deems it to be appropriate, filing with the court comments
With respect to any of such applications;
(B) monitoring plans and disclosure statements filed in cases under
chapter 11 of title 11 and filing with the court, in connection with
hearings under sections 1125 and 1128 of such title, comments with
respect to such plans and disclosure statements;
(C) monitoring plans filed under chapters 12 and 13 of title 11 and
filing with the court, in connection with hearings under sections 1224,
1229, 1324, and 1329 of such title, comments with respect to such
plans;
(D) taking such action as the United States trustee deems to be appropriate to ensure that all reports, schedules, and fees required to be
filed under title 11 and this title by the debtor are properly and timely
filed;
(E) monitoring creditors' committees appointed under title 11;
(F) notifying the appropriate United States attorney of matters which
relate to the occurrence of any action which may constitute a crime
under the laws of the United States and, on the request of the United
States attorney, assisting the United States attorney in carrying out
prosecutions based on such action;
(G) monitoring the progress of cases under title 11 and taking such
actions as the United States trustee deems to be appropriate to prevent undue delay in such progress; and
(H) monitoring applications filed under section 327 of title 11 and,
whenever the United States trustee deems it to be appropriate, filing
with the court comments with respect to the approval of such applications ....
Id.
30 See id.
31 New Jersey is one of those districts. Although the United States trustee used
to review fee applications in this district, to my knowledge there has been little or
no such review in recent years.
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"too often reflexive, rather than based on merit ' 3 2 or "rote.13 3

The United States trustee's failure to fulfill its duty to review fee
applications in some districts has resulted in a situation in which
the bankruptcy judge is often the only person in the case who is
willing to review fee applications and raise objections which
should be raised. The potential for abuse in the awarding of
bankruptcy fees is sufficiently great that a general failure to review fee applications would undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy system.3 4 Bankruptcy judges therefore typically review
such applications and raise sua sponte objections.
The problem from the perspective of this article is that review of all fee applications can be very time-consuming.3 5 If the
court could rely on the United States trustee to perform its duty
under 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A), the amount of time which the
bankruptcy judges spend on reviewing such applications could be
substantially reduced. It is not desirable, however, to eliminate
all sua sponte court review and objections to fee applications, because there are cases in which the court will observe questionable
professional performance which should result in reduced compensation, but which the United States trustee has not observed
and which is not apparent from review of the fee applications. In
such cases, the public interest requires that bankruptcy judges
have the right to raise sua sponte objections.
With that exception, however, the primary responsibility for
reviewing and objecting to fee applications is, and should be, the
United States trustee's, and not the court's. The lack of confidence by the court in many districts in the extent and quality of
United States trustee review of fee applications can be remedied
by good-faith efforts on the part of the court and the United
States trustee to agree on uniform standards in each district for
fee and expense applications. Numerous variations in local practice probably make it impossible and undesirable to implement
national standards on many measures of compensation. If standards. for each district are developed jointly by the court and the
United States trustee, however, and an agreement is reached on
32 See appendix 2, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, at 4.

33 Id. at 11.
34 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
35 See Bermant, supra note 6, at 513-14 (maintaining that bankruptcy judges, on
average, spend 62 hours per year, or 4.9% of all case-related time, reviewing fee
applications, but noting further that the judges vary greatly in the time spent reviewing such applications, ranging from a low of 5.2 hours to a high of 208 hours
per year).
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enforcement, the court should be able to rely on the United
States trustee to review and raise any appropriate objections.
With such a system, the court could dispense with sua sponte review and objection except in the circumstances noted above.
This would result in fulfillment of the United States trustee's statutory supervisory function and reduction of the time now spent
by many bankruptcy judges doing the job of the United States
trustee in this area.
Another statutory duty which the United States trustee has
failed to fulfill in many districts is the duty under 28 U.S.C.
§ 586(a)(3)(B) to review disclosure statements in chapter 11
cases. 36 In some districts, there has been little or no review by
the United States trustee of disclosure statements in cases which
have no creditors' committee, where such review is needed, and
unnecessary review by the United States trustee in cases with
creditors' committees.37 As a general rule, the United States
trustee should review disclosure statements in cases which have
no creditors' committee, and decline such review in cases which
have a creditors' committee.38 In either case, the court should be
able to rely on such review. This would also conserve judicial
time in the manner Congress intended.3

9

As with fee applica-

tions, the court and the United States trustee could develop joint
standards in each district for such review, reducing or eliminating
the necessity for sua sponte court review.
The problems with the United States trustee system are pervasive and severe, and part of the ultimate solution may well be
to transfer the system to the Judicial Branch.4" Regardless of
36 See supra note 29 for full text of § 586(a)(3)(B). To my knowledge, the
United States trustee does not ordinarily review disclosure statements at all in New
Jersey. I do not recall ever seeing the United States trustee in this district object to
or comment on a disclosure statement.
37 See appendix 2, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, at 4, 5 & 11.
38 It is in the interests of the estate to have either a creditors' committee or the
United States trustee supervising a debtor in possession, but it is duplicative to
have both of those parties performing such supervision. As the Judicial Conference
of the United States has explained:
When U.S. trustees are involved in chapter 11 cases, the focus of involvement has too frequently been on large chapter 11 cases with active creditors' committees. This allocation of scarce resources is
unjustified given the enormous need to monitor smaller chapter 11
cases in which there is frequently little or no creditor interest and a
significant possibility of abuse.
See appendix 2, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, at 5.
39 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text for discussion of Congress's
intent.
40 See appendix 2, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, at 14. The legislative history to
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where the United States trustee system is placed, however, the
Congressional intention to remove the bankruptcy judge from
supervision of bankruptcy cases will not be fulfilled until the
United States trustees assume such responsibility. To the extent
that the United States trustees do so, the bankruptcy judges will
be able to devote more of their scarce time to their primary function of dispute resolution.
It should also be noted that the Code left the court with certain supervisory functions which are more appropriate for the
United States trustee.4 ' Consideration should be given to
amending the Code and Rules to further the transfer of supervisory functions from the court to the United States trustee.
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CODE §

102(1) AND THE ROLE

OF THE BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Another aspect of the role of the bankruptcy judge which
merits discussion is the nature and extent of the judge's responsibility to review uncontested motions.4 2 There is no clear answer
to this question in the Code and its jurisdictional provisions. Indeed, there are to some extent conflicting messages in the law on
this issue.4 3 It should therefore not be surprising that there is
considerable variety among the bankruptcy judges in their approach to this basic question. The question is a very important
one, because the majority of motions in bankruptcy court are uncontested. The process of reviewing these uncontested motions
can be very time-consuming, and can detract substantially from
the ability of the bankruptcy judges in overworked districts to rethe Code states that the placement of the office of the United States trustee in the

Department ofJustice was the "result of thorough deliberations" and premised on
a desire to separate the administrative and judicial functions of the bankruptcy sys-

tem. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 107-15, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6068-76. It is time, however, for Congress to reconsider that decision. Transfer of
the United States trustee program to the judicial branch "could be accomplished
with minimal disruption while maintaining the desirable separation of judicial and

administrative functions in processing bankruptcy cases." See appendix 2, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, at 14.
41 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (6) (providing for sua sponte review of reaffirmation
agreements by pro se debtors); 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (providing for sua sponte review
by the court, or by the United States trustee of chapter 7 cases for substantial abuse

by debtors of the provisions of chapter 7). See also infra note 111.

42 See infra note 163 and accompanying text regarding the nature of a motion.

To the extent that the Code provides for "notice and a hearing" on matters which
are not raised by motion, such as court approval of disclosure statements under
Code section 1125(b), the analysis in this section applies to such matters as well.
43 See infra note 51 and accompanying text for discussion of this conflict.
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solve contested matters expeditiously. This section discusses this
problem and suggests possible changes to the Code and/or
Rules to address it, as well as measures which are within the control of bankruptcy judges.
It was the stated intention of Congress in enacting the Code
that bankruptcy judges were to be relieved of administrative,
clerical and supervisory functions so that they could focus primarily on the judicial function.4 4 The essence of the judicial
function is the resolution of disputes.45 American notions of due
process require notice to litigants of proposed actions which may
affect their interests and adequate opportunity to raise objections
and obtain a ruling from the court. 46 This Constitutional requirement is addressed in § 102(1) of the Code, which requires
that many actions in bankruptcy cases may take place only "after
notice and a hearing." ' 47 Specifically, § 102(l)(A) provides that
notice and an opportunity for a hearing are required throughout
48
the Code "as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.
Section 102(l)(B) authorizes an act without a hearing if notice is
proper and if a hearing is not timely requested or there is not
sufficient time to conduct a hearing. 49 Thus, the Code makes it
clear that a hearing will not be required in every instance.50
44 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
45 See supra note 14.

46 Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The Mullane
court explained that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to
convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time
for those interested to make their appearance.
Id. (citations omitted).
47 See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1).
48 Id. § 102(1)(A). Code § 102, "Rules of Construction," defines the phrase "after notice and a hearing" as "mean[ing] after such notice as is appropriate in the
particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in
the particular circumstances .... Id.
49 Id. § 102(l)(B). Code § 102(l)(B) limits the requirement of providing a hearing "ifsuch notice is given properly and if- such a hearing is not requested timely by a party in
interest; or there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such act
must be done, and the court authorizes such act ...." Id. (emphasis added).
50 Even though "hearings" may be disposed of, the requirement of "notice" remains an essential element of due process and a final order cannot be entered,
consistent with the United States Constitution, in any case where a party whose
interests are directly affected has not been afforded notice. See In re Sullivan Ford
Sales, 2 B.R. 350, 355 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (maintaining that "[a]lthough section
102(1) dispenses with an evidentiary hearing in certain circumstances, nowhere
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The Code also contains fifty-two other sections that contain
the phrase "after notice and a hearing. ' 5 1 If not read in conjunction with § 102(1), these sections could be interpreted to mean
that the court must rule on all motions under these Code sections, even those to which no objection is filed. As a matter of
statutory construction, however, § 102(1) must be considered
when determining when a "hearing" is required on motions
under any of these Code sections.
The question is, what is the bankruptcy judge's duty regarding motions which do not require a "hearing" because they are
uncontested? Must the judge review such motions at all? Must
does it expressly annul the requirement of 'notice ... appropriate in the particular
circumstances' ").
51 Six of those Code sections which contain the phrase "after notice and a hearing" provide that the trustee may take action on certain conditions. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(b)(1) (maintaining that trustee "after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or
lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate"); 11
U.S.C. § 505(b)(2) (providing debtor with a discharge for unpaid tax liability "upon
payment of the tax determined by the court, after notice and a hearing..."); 11
U.S.C. § 554(a) (allowing trustee "after notice and a hearing" to "abandon any
property of the debtor estate that is burdensome to the estate ... or is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate"); 11 U.S.C. § 725 (prescribing that "after
notice and a hearing" the trustee "shall dispose of any property in which an entity
other than the estate has an interest"); 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (stating that "after notice
and a hearing.., the trustee may operate the debtor's business"); 11 U.S.C. § 1206
(permitting trustee "after notice and a hearing" to "sell property... free and clear
of any interest").
Forty-four of the sections containing such phrase provide that the court shall
take such action on request of a party in interest after notice and a hearing. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 303(e), (g) & (j); 11 U.S.C. § 305; 11 U.S.C. § 324(a); 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a); 11 U.S.C. § 331; 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), (e) & (f); 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(2)(B)
& (c)(2)(B); 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(b), (c) & (d)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 366(b); 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(b); 11 U.S.C. § 510(c); 11 U.S.C. § 523(c); 11 U.S.C. § 542(e); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 543(c) & (d); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); 11 U.S.C. § 554(b); 11 U.S.C. § 706(b); 11
U.S.C. § 707(a); 11 U.S.C. § 723(d); 11 U.S.C. § 727(d); 11 U.S.C. § 921(c); 11
U.S.C. § 930(a); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a) & (b); 11 U.S.C. § 1105; 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b);
11 U.S.C. 33 11 13(d)(l) & (e); 11 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(c)(1), (c)(2), (d), (e)(l)(A), (h)(1),
(k)(1) & (k)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d); 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b); 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e); 11
U.S.C. § 1127(b); 11 U.S.C. § 1144; 11 U.S.C. § 1169(D); 11 U.S.C. §§ I170(a), (c)
& (d)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 1174; 11 U.S.C. § 1201(c); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1204(a) & (b); 11
U.S.C. §§ 1208(c) & (d); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(b) & (d); 11 U.S.C. § 1230(a); 11
U.S.C. § 1301(c); 11 U.S.C. 33 1307(c) &(d); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(b) &(e); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a). Three of the sections do not expressly require the court or the trustee
to take an action for the relief in question to be granted. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)
(providing for the allowance of certain administrative expenses "[a]fter notice and
a hearing"); 11 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(2) (stating that "[t]he [chapter 12] plan as modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a hearing, such modification is disapproved"); 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2) (maintaining that "[t]he [chapter 13] plan as
modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a hearing, such modification is
disapproved").
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he or she review some such motions, but not others? If so, which
ones? What are the criteria? What is the purpose of such review? What is the judge looking for when reviewing uncontested
motions? To answer these questions it is necessary to consider
the relationship between Code § 102(1), its legislative history
and authorities regarding the nature of a hearing.
The legislative history to Code § 102(1) explains the relationship between the phrase "after notice and a hearing" and the
role of the bankruptcy judge.52 It clearly expresses Congress's
intent that when a party proposes to take action under a section
of the Code that requires notice and a hearing, after appropriate
notice the bankruptcy judge will become involved only if an objection is raised which creates a dispute.53 Congress explained
that dispensing with a hearing unless an objection was voiced or
52 Knowledge of the Code's legislative history is essential to understanding the
Code:
[A]s is the situation with the Bankruptcy Code throughout, one must
be thoroughly acquainted with the legislative history of the Code in its
entirety and of a particular section in order to understand - and that
is the paramount need, understand - what the Congress sought to
effect. That it is difficult to put into the wording of a statute the complete understanding is obvious. Legislative intent is so vastly important. A Court by a surface reading and understanding of so many
statutes could easily, too easily, concoct its own shallow interpretation
from it.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Cunha (In re Cuhna), 1 B.R. 330, 332 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1979).
It is recognized, however, that although a statute's legislative history is important in statutory construction, the express statutory language is of course
controlling.
53 Congress's desire to limit the role of the bankruptcy judge to the adjudicative
function is clear from the legislative history of section 102(1):
Paragraph (1) [of Code § 102] defines the concept of "after notice
and a hearing." The concept is central to the bill and to the separationof the
administrative and judicial functions of bankruptcy judges. The phrase
means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances [to be prescribed by either the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
or by the court in individual circumstances that the Rules do not
cover. In many cases, the Rules will provide for combined notice of
several proceedings], and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances. Thus, a hearing will not be necessary in every instance. If there is no objection to the proposed action, the action
may go ahead without court action. This is a significant change from present
law, which requires the affirmative approval of the bankruptcy judgefor almost
every action. The change will permit the bankruptcyjudge to stay removedfrom
the administration of the bankruptcy or reorganization case, and to become involved only when there is a dispute about a proposed action, that is, only when
there is an objection.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 315, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6272
(emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at'! 10, reprintedin 1978
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a hearing was requested was "central ...to the separation of the

administrative and judicial functions of bankruptcy judges. 54
Unlike prior law, which required an affirmative action by the
bankruptcy judge for nearly every aspect of a bankruptcy case,55
Code § 102(1) requires bankruptcy judges to become involved in
bankruptcy proceedings only where judicial involvement is necessary, i.e., when a Code section or rule expressly requires or
when a controversy arises.56 Thus, the legislative history of
§ 102(1) clearly reflects congressional intention to separate bankruptcyjudges'judicial duties from many of the largely ministerial
administrative duties that are an unavoidable part of bankruptcy
proceedings.57 Moreover, the legislative history indicates that
the drafters of § 102(1) were concerned with proper and effective
uses of judicial time.
Because the legislative history of § 102(1) instructs bankruptcy judges to provide a hearing only when one is specifically
required 58 or where there is a contested matter requiring adjudication, the question of what constitutes a "hearing" under
§ 102(1) and other sections of the Code is an important one.
Stated differently, the question is whether judicial review of uncontested motions is a form of "hearing" within the meaning of
Code § 102(1). The Code unfortunately does not define the
term "hearing", and there are few reported cases which attempt
to define it as the Code uses it. 59 As the term ordinarily is used, it
has a meaning which is well-known:
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6071 (asserting that "[t]he courts' duties relate solely to resolving
disputes that arise in bankruptcy cases").
54
55
56
57
58

Id.

See id.
See supra notes 24 & 26.
Id.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (stating that "after notice the court shall hold a
hearing on confirmation of a plan") (emphasis added).
59 One court attempted to define the term "hearing" as it is used in the Code.
See In Re Rennels, 37 B.R. 81, 86 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984). The Rennels court looked
to Black's Law Dictionary to define the term "hearing" as used in Code section
524(d) and defined such term as:
Proceeding of relative formality, generally public, with definite issues
of fact or of law to be tried, in which parties proceeded against have a
right to be heard, and is much the same as a trial and may terminate in
final order. ... Synonymous with trial, and includes reception of evidence and arguments thereon.
Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (4th ed. 1968)).
The definition of hearing which is suggested in this article is broader than the
one used in Rennels. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. Because the term
hearing is not defined in the Code, reasonable minds may differ on the definition.
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A "hearing" is the hearing of evidence and argument, and has
reference to the tradition ofjudicial proceedings in which evidence is received and weighed by the trier of facts and the issue determined uninfluenced by extraneous considerations
which might not be exceptionable
in other fields involving
60
purely executive action.
No fixed procedure, however, is required.6 1 Moreover, there are
many potential variations in the nature and form of a hearing. 6 2 For
instance, oral argument is not necessarily required.6 3 Nor is it required that a hearing take place in a courtroom, as telephonic hearings are authorized where appropriate. 64 Therefore, the essence of
a hearing is the judicial examination of a request for relief, whether
contested or uncontested.6 5 When the judge reviews moving papers
60
61

16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 841 (1979).
Id.

62 Id.
63 Id. See also 39A C.J.S. Hear § 157 (1976) ("It has been said that the word
'heard' does not necessarily indicate an oral presentation of a controversy, or require listening to an oral argument, but may be used in the sense of 'review,' or as
meaning considered and determined as submitted, with or without oral argument."). In determining that oral argument was not required for the purpose of
deciding an appeal, the court in Groendyke Tramp., Inc. v. Davis, held:
As with the demands of statutes and rules, nothing in the constitutional concept of due process forbids special, summary disposition
without all of the marks of a traditional submission. Parties are normally assured a 'hearing' but that term does not demand that the communication be oral and audible. By long practice, and frequently by
express rules important substantive or procedural issues are fully and
finally disposed of by the highest of tribunals wholly on written papers
without oral argument of any kind. The requisites of that portion of
due process described as 'hearing' are satisfied by providing the parties with the opportunity of affirmatively advancing argument with
supporting authority and a like opportunity for response and counterargument by the adversary. This may be done by briefs without oral
argument. Oral argument, as such, is rarely, if ever, so essential to
elemental fairness as to orbit to a constitutional apogee. Indeed the
practice of Courts of disposing of cases in a variety of situations on
the papers, reflects the experience of mature judges that oral argument in many, many cases adds nothing to the process of enlightenment. In these times of exploded and exploding dockets every effort
must be made to allow Courts to hear and decide more cases more
expeditiously.
Groendyke Transp., Inc., v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
64 Of the survey respondents, judges from two jurisdictions reported local rules
permitting telephonic hearings. New Jersey Local Bankruptcy Rule 3(f) provides
that "[t]he Court, on its own motion or on a party's request, may direct argument
of any motion by telephone conference without Court appearance." D.N.J. BANKR.
CT. R. 3(f). See also D. ALAsKA BANKR. CT. R. 70(h)(5) (maintaining that "[i]n appropriate cases, hearing by phone conference may be requested by a party or held on
the court's own motion").
65 C.J.S., supra note 63, § 157.
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and any opposing papers and decides the matter on the papers
alone, the judge has, in fact, conducted a form of "hearing," because the judge has listened to the written arguments of the parties.
The interplay between § 102(1) and the other sections containing the phrase "after notice and a hearing" presents another important question: if Congress intended that the bankruptcy judge
should generally not review uncontested motions, but the Code requires that the court shall grant such motions on request of a party
in interest, what form should the court authorization take? An order
is the customary means of expressing court authorization, whether
the matter in question is contested or uncontested. Bankruptcy
judges generally sign most or all orders bearing their name, and
they generally will not do so without first reviewing the motion in
question to see what they are approving.6 6 The legislative history to
§ 102(1), however, states that court orders are not necessary under
the Code on motions which are uncontested after notice and an opportunity for a hearing.6 7
Many bankruptcy judges, myself included, spend a great deal of
their time reviewing uncontested motions and signing orders ruling
on them. 6 8 If Congress intended that relief would be granted without an order on uncontested motions made pursuant to the Code
sections requiring "notice and a hearing," the Code and/or Rules
should be amended to clarify that intention and to explain how a
party can obtain evidence of court authorization without an order. 69
See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § IX, Nos. 1 & 2.
See 124 Cong. Rec. 32393 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (maintaining that "[in
those circumstances, the court may take action 'after notice and a hearing,' if no
party requests a hearing ... [and that] fin that event a court order authorizingthe action
to be taken is not necessary as the ultimate action taken by the court implies such an authorization") (statement of Representative Don Edwards) (emphasis added).
It is unclear what was meant in this passage by "the ultimate action taken by
the court" in lieu of an order. It may simply have contemplated entry of proof of
service of the motion on the docket as evidence of notice, combined with proof that
no objections were filed. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text regarding
"certificates of no objection" as evidence of court authorization.
68 Bermant, supra note 6, at 512 (maintaining that approximately 15% of a bankruptcy judge's case-related time is spent reviewing and signing orders). In a commentary to this startling statistic, Bermant stated:
The impression one gets from reviewing all the data is that bankruptcy judges often begin the day with a large stack of orders to be
reviewed and signed. As the day progresses the stack is periodically
replenished so that it is as high at the end of the day as it was at the
beginning. In conversation, judges confirm the reality of that
impression.
Id.
69 A number of cases have held that a trustee can sell or abandon property without an order. See, e.g., In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding
66
67
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Unless and until such changes are made, the majority view will probably continue to be that an order is required on such motions, and
that the judge should ordinarily sign it. Most judges will continue to
review the moving papers even if the matter is uncontested before
signing the order. For the reasons stated above, however, reasonable minds can differ regarding the validity of that view.
The responses to the questionnaire gave examples of substantial differences among bankruptcy courts in resolving these issues.
For instance, bankruptcy courts in several districts have local rules
that provide for entry of "default orders" if no objection is filed to
certain types of motions. 70 The movant must file a certification or
declaration that service was proper and no objections were filed,
and the court will enter the default order. Most such rules, however, do not state whether the judge or the court clerk signs such
orders. Another method is utilized in the Western District of Pennsylvania, where neither the judge nor his or her staff review the moving papers on certain types of motions. Instead, the clerk signs or
stamps the default order on behalf of the court. 7 ' In other districts,
that a trustee may abandon property without court involvement if there are no objections by a party in interest); Geller v. Int'l Club Enter. Inc. (In re Int'l Club), 105
B.R. 190, 193 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1989) (finding that if no party objects, a trustee may
abandon property of the debtor's estate without court order or approval); In re F. A.
Potts & Co., 86 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (positing that although a
trustee must follow the 'after notice and hearing' mandate of § 363(b), a court order is not required for the trustee to sell property); In re Wideman, 84 B.R. 97, 101
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (ruling that "hearing need not ... actually be set with
respect to [a motion to compel trustee to abandon] so long as appropriate parties
are afforded due notice and an opportunity for a hearing").
In New Jersey, the trustee can obtain a "certificate of no objection" to the sale
or abandonment from the clerk as evidence of authority to sell or abandon. No
reported opinion has held, however, that action by the court, as opposed to the
trustee, after notice and a hearing under Code sections other than 363 and 554 is
effective without an order. See supra note 51 for the difference in the language of
other Code sections requiring "notice and a hearing" and the effect of that difference on the role of the court.
70 See D. ALASKA BANKR. CT. R. 70(a)(1); D. ARIZ. BANKR. CT. R. 4001(E); C.D.
CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 11 1(7)(a); E.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 914(i)(3); N.D. GA. BANKR.
CT. R. 755-2; N.D. ILL. BANKR. CT. R. 12(P); W.D. LA. BANKR. CT. R. 2.2(D); D. MD.
BANKR. CT. R. 41(d)(2); D. MASS. BANKR. CT. R. 26(3)(a); E.D. MicH. BANKR. CT. R.
2.08(d) & 2.19; D. MINN. BANKR. CT. R. 1210(a); N.D. Miss. BANKR. CT. R. 13(a)(4);
W.D.N.Y. BANKR. CT. R. 33; N.D. OHIO BANKR. CT. R. 4:0.8(a)(6); S.D. OHIO
BANKR. CT. R. 5.4(b); W.D. OKLA. BANKR. CT. R. 12(d); E.D. PA. BANKR. CT. R.
4008.1(e) & 4008.3(e); W.D. PA. BANKR. CT. R. 9013.4(5); D.R.I. BANKR. CT. R.
10(d); D.S.D. BANKR. CT. R. 306(A)(3); M.D. TENN. BANKR. CT. R. 1.41(e); W.D.
TENN. BANKR. CT. R. 6(b)(3)(v); N.D. TEX. BANKR. CT. R. 4001(b); W.D. TEX.
BANKR. CT. R. 9013(b)(3) & (4); E.D. VA. BANKR. CT. R. 302(G)(2); W.D. WASH.
BANKR. CT. R. 9013(j)(2).
71

See appendix 4, W.D.

PA. BANKR. CT.

R. 9013.4(5)(a) (authorizing the clerk to

sign orders entering default "[i]f no written response, or a written response which
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judges reported that they do not review the moving papers on certain motions if no opposition is filed, but the law clerk or other staff
member will review them. Such systems are, however, a form of judicial review because the person reviewing the papers is doing so on
the judge's prescribed criteria. Because it avoids judicial involvement entirely if no objection is filed, the default order system in the
Western District of Pennsylvania appears to come closest at the moment to implementing Congressional intention regarding these issues, at least as to the types of motions covered by that rule.7 2
One possible solution to the problem of what form of authorization is required on uncontested motions may be to amend the
does not object to the Motion, is received timely by the Movant by the date specified in the Notice"). This procedure is allowed for the following motions or matters: 1) relief from automatic stay; 2) abandonment; 3) lien avoidance under Rule
4003(d); 4) objections to claims (where the required 30 days' notice was given); 5)
objections to claim of exemption; 6) appointment of a chapter 11 trustee when not
filed by the debtor; 7) motion to determine secured status under § 506(a) when
only the value of collateral is at issue; 8) motion to redeem property. See id.
72 It must be remembered that whether a judge signs an order or the clerk signs
it under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9021, the order can still be vacated
or modified in appropriate circumstances. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9021. For example, if a party who did not contest a motion subsequently moves to vacate or modify
the order, the standards for relief from such orders are not so stringent as to cause
harsh and unjust results.
There are no reported decisions on whether a motion to vacate an order granting a motion which was uncontested should be governed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(2) and its "excusable neglect" standard or by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), incorporated by reference in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055, on setting aside default judgments, and the nonbankruptcy
case law thereunder. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pioneer
Inv. Servs., Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership,the decision as to which rule applies could have been quite significant because there were substantial differences
between the two standards. See Pioneer Inv. Servs., Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 113 S.Ct. 1489 (1993). The Pioneer case eliminated these differences.
See id.
Specifically, before Pioneer, the "Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits [had] taken a narrow view of 'excusable neglect'
under Rule 9006(b)(1), requiring a showing that the delay was caused by circumstances beyond the movant's control." Id. at 1494 n.3 (citations omitted). This
high standard stood in stark contrast to the standard for reopening a default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. In Hitz v. Woma Corp., the Third
Circuit laid out a framework for the evaluation of whether a default judgment
should be reopened: "The trial court must consider three factors: (1) whether the
plaintiff will be prejudiced if the default is lifted; (2) whether the defendant has a
meritorious defense; and (3) whether the default was the result of the defendant's
culpable misconduct." Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984).
Accord Mechan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981); United Coin Meter v.
Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983); Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d
461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984); Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., Inc., 627
F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Thus, prior to Pioneer, the choice of whether to
employ the 9006(b)(1) standard or the Rule 55 standard was quite important as the
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Code and/or Rules to explicitly provide that except in specified situations, the court will generally not review uncontested motions, and
that authorization for the requested relief will be reflected in a clerical certificate of no objection, or default order signed by the clerk.
This could probably be done by changing the Rules, without changing the Code.
In light of the overwhelming demands on the time of many
bankruptcy judges, such changes could save time without sacrificing
justice, since aggrieved parties can move for reconsideration. Such
changes would allow bankruptcy judges to devote most of their time
to their primary function, which is the resolution of disputes.
V.

THE VOLUME OF BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDERS

Closely related to the question of whether bankruptcy judges
are reviewing uncontested motions unnecessarily is the question
of whether they are signing orders unnecessarily. Many bankruptcy judges spend too much time reviewing and signing orders.75 In New Jersey, the bankruptcy judges each signed an
average of approximately eight hundred sixty orders per month
in 1992. Many of those orders were the result of routine, uncontested motions or applications. One judge from another district
stated in the questionnaire that orders are "the bane of my existence," a sentiment which I share.74 It is a ridiculous waste of the
Rule 55 standard had a much lower threshold than Rule 9006(b)(1) and the choice
of standard, therefore, would have an impact on the disposition of the motion.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Pioneer resolved the circuit conflict
over the proper interpretation of "excusable neglect" by adopting a flexible standard based on a multi-factor balancing test. See Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1498. Specifically, the Court stated:
Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for determining
what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable," we conclude
that the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account

of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission. These
include .

.

. the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the

delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for
the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of

the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.
Id. The Pioneer balancing test for determining excusable neglect more closely resembles the Rule 55 standard embraced by the Third Circuit in Hritz than did the

prior excusable neglect standard that required a showing that the delay was caused
by circumstances beyond the movant's control. Because the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1) and the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 standards
are now similar, the question of which standard to apply has become less important
in the disposition of these motions.
73 See supra note 68.
74 The judge in question declined permission to disclose the judge's identity.
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scarcest judicial resource, which is the judge's time, to have a system in which fifteen percent of the judges' case-related time is
spent reviewing and signing orders.7 5 That statistic also highlights the extent to which the bankruptcy judge is still expected
to perform a supervisory function, since the majority of orders
reflect decisions on uncontested motions and other applications.
There are several questions which require scrutiny regarding
the volume of orders. The first question is whether bankruptcy
judges are signing orders which are clearly not required under
the Code or Rules. One example of a transaction in bankruptcy
court which does not require an order, but which is sometimes
the subject of an order, is the withdrawal of an application or
motion.7 6 Other transactions which are sometimes the subject of
unnecessary orders are uncontested applications by a trustee or
debtor in possession for use, sale, lease or abandonment of property.7 7 A chapter 12 or chapter 13 case is converted to chapter 7
without court order when the debtor files a notice of conversion,7 8 but an order is often submitted and entered anyway. In
addition, if the court has directed an order to be submitted reflecting a ruling and the parties fail to do so, it is usually unnecessary for the court to pursue the matter further or prepare the
order itself. If the parties don't feel they need an order, the court
ordinarily can dispense with one. 79 Adversary proceedings can be
dismissed without order by a stipulation signed by all parties to
the action, 0 but the parties often request an order anyway. A
subpoena is sufficient authorization to conduct an examination
under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 in most cases, 8 ' but an order is
often requested instead. In all of the foregoing situations, and
perhaps others, courts which are overburdened with orders can
examine their practices to ensure that they are not entering or75 See supra note 68.
76 See 90 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. INFO. AND MGMT. BULL.

No. 2, at 3 (Feb. 1990)

(positing that the "court[s'] practice of entering orders dismissing pending motions
is unnecessary and is probably creating additional work for the clerk's office").
77 See supra note 69.
78 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(d).
79 With regard to orders terminating cases and adversary proceedings, however,
the court may need to enter an order for administrative purposes. See infra note 80
and accompanying text for one situation in which dismissal of an adversary proceeding does not require an order.
80 FED.

R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(ii), incorporated by reference in

FED.

R.

BANKR.

P.

7041.
81 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(c) (authorizing examination or document production by subpoena). See also appendix 4 for copy of D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 16 (incorporating FED. R. BANK. P. 2004(c)).
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ders unnecessarily.8 2
To the extent orders are necessary, the bankruptcy court can
utilize Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9021 (Bankruptcy
Rules) to reduce the burden of such orders upon the bankruptcy
judges.8 3 Bankruptcy Rule 9021 incorporates by reference Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 (Federal Rules), which provides
in pertinent part that the clerk shall prepare and sign a judgment
(a) for a sum certain, (b) denying all relief or (c) upon a general
verdict of a jury.8 4 Federal Rule 58 provides that in all other
cases, the court shall "approve the form" of the judgment.85
Federal Rule 58 provides further that attorneys shall not submit
forms of judgment except upon direction of the court, and that
such directions shall not be given as a matter of course.86 Bankruptcy Rule 9002(5) defines "judgment" to include any appealable order.87 Therefore, the court is authorized, if not required,
to prepare its own forms of orders and judgments to the extent
possible.
Utilization of standard forms of orders and judgments serves
several salutary purposes. First, it expedites entry because there
is no need to wait for attorney preparation and submission of
such orders, and less court review and processing is required.88
Second, it promotes uniformity and lessens the possibility of an
order becoming lost in the mail, being misplaced in the clerk's
office or being misdesignated by a party submitting the order.
82 The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey has reduced the volume
of orders over the last several years as a result of review of the aforementioned
practices.
83 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9021
84 See FED. R. Civ. P. 58
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9002(5).
88 This purpose was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of Federal Rule 58.
Rule 58 is designed to encourage all reasonable speed in formulating
and entering the judgment when the case has been decided. Participation by the attorneys through the submission of forms ofjudgment
involves needless expenditure of time and effort and promotes delay,
except in special cases where counsel's assistance can be of real value.
Accordingly, the amended rule provides that attorneys shall not submit forms of judgment unless directed to do so by the court. This
applies to the judgments mentioned in clause (2) as well as clause (1).

6AJEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

58.01(8) (2d ed. 1987)

(citing Committee Note of 1963 to Amended Rule 58). See also Matteson v. United
States, 240 F.2d 517, 518 (2d Cir. 1956) (recognizing that the Advisory Committee
to Rule 58 had repeatedly advocated rules mandating "prompt entry ofjudgments
without that delay which is occasioned by awaiting the action of counsel").
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Third, and perhaps most important for purposes of this article, it
saves a substantial amount of the judges' time because it is unnecessary for judges to review and sign routine, standard form
orders where the judges have approved the standard orders, and
where the judges direct entry of particular standard orders on a
case-by-case basis. 8 9 Use of standard orders in such situations
both reduces the time the judge spends on this ministerial function and eliminates the possibility that the clerk will inadvertently
sign an order that does not accurately reflect the court's decision.
The clerk's duty to prepare and sign orders and judgments is
ministerial and may be performed by a deputy clerk in the name
of the clerk. 90 The court may issue standing instructions to the
clerk to enter judgment in certain situations without any formal
interposition by the court. 9 ' The preparation, signing and entry
of the judgment is ministerial and not a usurpation of the court's
judicial powers.92
The Administrative Office of the Courts employs the proce89 Under NewJersey Local Bankruptcy Rule 4(b) and similar rules, a bankruptcy
judge may direct the clerk to stamp the judge's signature to a particular, preapproved standard order on a case-by-case basis. See appendix 4 for copy of D.NJ.
BANKR. CT. R. 4(b). The stamp is thus the official and lawful signature of the judge.
The essential purpose of a signature is to express the signer's agreement to or
approval of an instrument. 80 C.J.S. Signatures, § 1(a) (1955) (citations omitted). A
signature is affixed to a writing "for the purpose of authenticating it or to give
notice of its source, and for the purpose and with the intent that the individual
signing the writing shall be bound thereby". Id. § 1(c). In State v. Hickman, the
court considered an argument that an arrest warrant was invalid under Florida law
because a rubber stamp facsimile of the justice of the peace's signature had been
affixed under the authorization of the justice. State v. Hickman, 189 So. 2d 254,
256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cited with approval in United Bonding Ins. Co. v.
Banco Suizo-Panameno, S.A., 422 F.2d 1142, 1147 (5th Cir. 1970). The Hickman
court held that the justice's physical presence was not required to validate the use
of the rubber stamp. Id. at 257. The court reasoned that "presence" is a variable
term; it may be actual or constructive, depending on the circumstances of a particular case. Id. at 258. Moreover, since the issuance of the warrant was based on the
invocation and exercise of the justice's judgment, "[t]he affixing of the signature,
even in the form of a rubber stamp and in the hand of his chief clerk, constituted an
attestation that it was his act ... his issuance [and] his commands." Id. at 259.
But see Daniels v. Stovall, 660 F. Supp. 301, 303 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (asserting in
dicta that the "use of a rubber stamped signature is acceptable only when used in
the presence of the judge and under the direction of thejudge"). The court's dicta
in Daniels v. Stovall cannot be reconciled with the express language of Rule 58,
which is not cited or discussed in the opinion. In addition, if Daniels v. Stovall were
correct, the practice of the Administrative Office of the Courts of issuing an order
of discharge in every bankruptcy case without a judge's signature would be invalid.
See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
90 6A MOORE ET AL., supra note 88,
58.01(8).
91 Id.
58.04(1) (citations omitted).
92 Id.
58.04(4.2) (citations omitted).

1993]

USE OFJUDICIAL TIME

1357

dure provided by Bankruptcy Rule 9021 for all bankruptcy courts
for the most common form of order, the order providing for the
discharge of the debtor. 93 That order is generated by computer
in all appropriate cases on behalf of the bankruptcy court without
the signature of any bankruptcy judge.
Bankruptcy courts in four judicial districts - i.e., the Northern District of Alabama, the District of New Jersey, the District of
Utah, and the Eastern District of Virginia - reported local rules
regarding signing of orders by the clerk. 94 In addition, bankruptcy courts in seven other judicial districts - i.e., the Eastern
District of California, the Western District of Michigan, the
Northern District of Ohio, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of
Texas, and the Western District of Texas - reported general orders authorizing the clerk to sign certain orders on behalf of the
court. 95 Moreover, judges responding to the questionnaire from
five other districts also reported procedures permitting the clerk
to sign routine orders on their behalf without a local rule or general order to that effect. 9 6 Bankruptcy judges responding to the
questionnaire reported a general reluctance to allow their secretary or law clerk to sign orders on their behalf, and usually limited such authorization to emergencies. 97
One very common form of order is an order terminating the
automatic stay under Code § 362(d). 98 The District of New
93 The official form for the discharge of the debtor is Official Bankruptcy Form
No. 18.
94 See N.D. ALA. BANKR. CT. R. 12; D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 4(b); D. UTAH BANKR.
CT. R. 535; E.D. VA. BANKR. CT. R. 106. See also appendix 4 for copies of these
local rules.
95 See E.D. CAL. SPECIAL ORD. 87-1; W.D. MICH. GEN. ORD. 2; N.D. OHIO GEN.
ORD. 588-28; E.D. PA. OMNIBUS ORD.; M.D. PA. ADMIN. ORD. 92-01; N.D. TEX.
GEN. ORD. 91-2, 91-3; W.D. TEX. AMEND. ORD. AUTH. CLERK TO SIGN ADMIN. ORDS.

See also appendix 5 for copies of these orders.
96 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § IX, No. 9.
97 Only thirty-three percent of the judges reported that they allow their chambers staff to sign orders as a means of conserving time. Additionally, two percent of
the judges reported that their staff is permitted to sign orders only if the judge will
be out of town for more than three days and the orders are routine. See appendix 3,
Questionnaire, § IX, No. 2
98 Code section 362(d) provides that the court shall grant relief from the automatic stay, upon request of a party in interest, "for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest" or with
regard to a stay of an act against property, if "the debtor does not have an equity in
such property; and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization."
11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
The Committee on the Judiciary, in reporting upon the proposed Bankruptcy
Code stated:
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Jersey has recently provided for the clerk to sign orders terminating the automatic stay on behalf of the court in certain circumstances.9 9 These standard orders are used whether the motion
was contested or uncontested. It also appears possible, however,
to use Code § 362(e) to avoid orders altogether if a motion
under 362(d) is uncontested. Section 362(e) provides that the
automatic stay terminates thirty days after a request for relief
under § 362(d), unless the court orders otherwise within such period. 0 0 Thus, because § 362(e) provides for termination of the
automatic stay by operation of law if no contrary order is entered
within thirty days of the filing of a motion under § 362(d), the
clerk could issue a certification after the expiration of such period
stating that the automatic stay has terminated by operation of law
because a motion and a certification of service were filed, there
were no objections filed and there were no orders entered extending the automatic stay. There is no reason why an order is
legally necessary under such circumstances, or why such certification from the clerk would not be sufficient evidence of termination of the automatic stay.' 0 ' This procedure could substantially
reduce the volume of orders granting relief under § 362(d) because most such motions are uncontested. There would be a corThe automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and
all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment
or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 22, at 54-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-41.
99 See appendix 4, D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 4 & D.N.J. GEN. ORD. Mar., 1993. Standard orders vacating the automatic stay are used as directed by the judge, and such
orders cannot include any provision supplementing or modifying the standard order. This order is employed only in cases where the automatic stay is vacated without qualification, condition or other relief.
100 Code section 362(e) provides in pertinent part:
Thirty days after a request . . . for relief from the stay of any act

against property of the estate.., such stay is terminated with respect
to the party in interest making such request, unless the court, after
notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect pending the
conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination
under subsection (d).... The court shall order such stay continued in
effect pending the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection
(d) of this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party
opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such
final hearing.
11 U.S.C. § 362(e).
101 See supra note 69 regarding the usage of certificates of no objection on applications to sell or abandon property of the estate.
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responding conservation of judicial time, without any detriment
to parties in interest.
There undoubtedly are other means available to reduce the
volume of orders in bankruptcy court without causing harm.
While reasonable minds may differ on details, it cannot reasonably be disputed that it is a waste ofjudicial time to require bankruptcy judges to spend fifteen percent of their case-related time
reviewing and signing orders. Therefore, all available means to
reduce such volume warrant consideration, including any appropriate amendments to the Code and/or Rules.
VI.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CODE § 102(1) AND SUA
SPONTE ACTION UNDER CODE § 105(A)

Code § 105(a) is instrumental in defining the role of the
bankruptcy judge. Section 105(a) is the primary source of the
equitable powers of the bankruptcy court. °2 Specifically,
§ 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an
102 Section 105(a) has been described as "an omnibus provision phrased in such
general terms as to be the basis for a broad exercise of power in the administration
of a bankruptcy case." Exquisito Servs. Inc. v. United States (In re Exquisito Serv.
Inc.), 823 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Charles & Lillian Brown's Hotel, Inc.,
93 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). The primary purpose of section 105(a) is to
empower the bankruptcy court with the ability to act in a manner which is appropriate or necessary to facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v.
Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir. 1986) (positing that section 105(a) "authorizes bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions and take other necessary steps in aid of
their jurisdiction"); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Brada Miller Freight Sys. Inc.
(In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 16 B.R. 1002, 1013 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (maintaining that "[t]he language of § 105(a) conveys Congress's intent to enable the
bankruptcy court to do whatever is necessary to aid its jurisdiction"); In re Trails
End Lodge, Inc., 45 B.R. 597, 601 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (opining that "[t]he basic
purpose of [§ 105(a)] is to enable the bankruptcy court to do whatever is necessary
to aid its jurisdiction, i.e., anything arising in or relating to a bankruptcy case");
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Brown (In reJames), 20 B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1982) (asserting that "[tlhe basic intention of [§ 105(a)] is to enable the
bankruptcy court to do whatever is necessary to aid its jurisdiction, i.e., anything
arising in or relating to a bankruptcy case").
Bankruptcy courts have also historically been regarded as courts of equity with
broad equitable powers. See In re Wilnor Drilling Inc., 29 B.R. 727, 729-30 (S.D. Ill.
1982) (noting that "[i]t is well established that 'the courts of bankruptcy are courts
of equity and exercise all equitable powers unless prohibited by the Bankruptcy
[Code]' ") (citations omitted); In re Wellman, 89 B.R. 880, 883 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1988) (emphasizing that "[tihe Bankruptcy Court has long been recognized as a
court of equity"); James, 20 B.R. at 149 (stating that "[a] bankruptcy court is a court
of equity .

.

. as guided by equitable doctrines and principles").
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issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the
court from, sua sponte,10 3 taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement
04
court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.'
The significance of the court's express grant of sua sponte authority
under § 105(a) for purposes of this article is that sua sponte objections to requests for relief often take time. For example, if a court
raises an objection to a motion when no one else has, because the
court feels an objection should have been raised, the court may have
to perform research, conduct a hearing and develop a record which
parties in interest have chosen not to do.' 0 5 Thus, a careful exami103 Sua sponte is defined as "[o]f his [or her] own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (5th ed. 1979). A
judge can act sua sponte when "it is in the interests of orderly procedure and to
prevent confusion of the issues." 60 C.J.S. Motions & Orders § 2 (1969).
104 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Congress added the second sentence of section 105(a) as
part of the 1986 Amendments to provide a clear statutory expression of its intent in
allowing the bankruptcy court to act or to make a determination on its own volition.
132 CONG. REC. S5092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986). Senator Orrin Hatch stated that
"[the amendment] allows a bankruptcy court to take any action on its own, or to
make any necessary determination to prevent an abuse of process and to help expedite a case in a proper and justified manner." Id. (statement of Senator Hatch). See
also Gibbons v. Haddad (In re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 949 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)
(positing that the addition of the second sentence in the 1986 amendments granted
clear statutory authority of a bankruptcy court's power to act sua sponte).
105 Sua sponte objections may create additional work for the district and circuit
courts on appeal as well. In In re Love, Judge A.Jay Cristol poetically addressed the
subject of sua sponte motions. 61 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986). The court's
entire opinion in that case consisted of the following:
Once upon a midnight dreary, while I pondered weak and weary
Over many quaint and curious files of chapter seven lore
While I nodded nearly napping, suddenly there came a tapping
As of some one gently rapping, rapping at my chamber door,
"Tis some debtor" I muttered, "tapping at my chamber doorOnly this and nothing more."
Ah distinctly I recall, it was in the early fall
And the file was still small
The Code provided I could use it
If someone tried to substantially abuse it
No party asked that it be heard.
"Sua sponte" whispered a small black bird.
The bird himself, my only maven, strongly looked to be a raven.
Upon the words the bird had uttered
I gazed at all the files cluttered
"Sua sponte," I recall, had no meaning; none at all.
And the cluttered files sprawl, drove a thought into my brain.
Eagerly I wished the morrow-vainly I had sought to borrow
From BAFJA, surcease of sorrow-and an order quick and plain
That this case would not remain as a source of further pain.
The procedure, it seemed plain.
As the case grew older, I perceived I must be bolder.
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nation of § 105(a) is necessary to ascertain the criteria for deciding
when a bankruptcy judge should take an action sua sponte.
Although the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court under
§ 105(a) are broad, they are not unlimited.' 0 6 Section 105(a) cannot
be used to contravene other provisions of the Code.' 0 7 It can also
And must sua sponte act, to determine every fact,
If primarily consumer debts, are faced,
Perhaps this case is wrongly placed.
This is a thought that I must face, perhaps I should dismiss this case.
I moved sua sponte to dismiss it for I knew I would not miss it.
The Code said I could, I knew it.
But not exactly how to do it, or perhaps some day I'd rue it.
I leaped up and struck my gavel.
For the mystery to unravel
Could I? Should I? Sua sponte grant my motion to dismiss?
While it seemed the thing to do, suddenly I thought of this.
Looking, looking towards the future and to what there was to see
If my motion, it was granted and an appeal came to be,
Who would be the appellee?
Surely it would not be me.
Who would file, but pray tell me, a learned brief for the appellee
The District Judge would not do so
At least this much I do know.
Tell me raven, how to go.
As I with the ruling wrestled
In the statute I saw nestled
A presumption with a flavor clearly in the debtor's favor.
No evidence had I taken
Sua sponte appeared forsaken.
Now my motion caused me terror
A dismissal would be error.
Upon consideration of § 707(b), in anguish loud I cried
The court's sua sponte motion to dismiss under § 707(b) is denied.
Id. at 558-59.
106 Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank of Bethany (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling Inc.), 97
B.R. 77, 82 (W.D. Okla. 1988). See also Amatex Corp. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 102
B.R. 411, 413 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (emphasizing that a bankruptcy court's powers under
§ 105(a) should be used with extreme caution); Nasco P.R., Inc. v. Chemical Bank
(In re Nasco P.R. Inc.), 117 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1990) (cautioning that the
broad powers under § 105(a) should be used sparingly); GAF Corp. v. Johns-Mansville Corp. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 405, 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(opining that the broad powers of § 105(a) are not unrestricted); James, 20 B.R. at
149 (maintaining that limitations do exist on a bankruptcy court's exercise of equitable powers under § 105(a)).
107 See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (asserting
that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only
be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code"); Piccolo v. Dime Savings
Bank of New York, 145 B.R. 753, 757 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that "[t]hough Congress drafted section 105(a) in broad terms, a Bankruptcy Court's discretion is not
unbridled... the power must and can be exercised only within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code"); Finney v. Smith, 141 B.R. 94, 98 (E.D. Va. 1992) (finding that
"[a]lthough § 105(a) does grant the bankruptcy court general equitable powers to
issue necessary and appropriate orders, these powers are not a license for the court
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be inferred from comparison of the first and second sentences of
§ 105(a) that the sua sponte 105(a) power is only a sub-class of the
entire 105(a) power, and is not co-extensive with the entire 105(a)
power. A close examination of the statutory language supports this
conclusion. The first sentence of § 105(a) provides a broad authorization of the court's general equitable power to "issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title."'1 ° 8 In contrast, the second sentence of
§ 105(a), which authorizes the court's sua sponte powers, limits such
authorization to two situations, i.e., enforcing or implementing court
orders or rules, and preventing an abuse of process. Accordingly,
under the principles of expressio unius est exclusio alterius109 and noscitur
a sociis,1 0 it can be inferred that Congress intended that the bankto disregard the clear language and meaning of the bankruptcy statutes and rules");
In re PHM Credit Corp, 110 B.R. 284, 288 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (opining that the
court's power under section 105(a) does not include the power to enter an order
which is in conflict with other Code provisions); Amatex, 102 B.R. at 413 (noting
that "powers [under § 105] must and can only be exercised within the confines of
the Bankruptcy Code"); In re Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 72 B.R. 245, 247
(D.S.D 1987) (stating that section 105(a) does not grant the court authority to enter
orders sua sponte where the Code expressly provided for the contrary); JohnsManville, 26 B.R. at 415 (positing that section 105(a) "does not permit [a judge] to
ignore, supersede, suspend or even misconstrue the express language of the
Code").
108 See supra note 104 and accompanying text for full text of § 105(a).
109 This well-known maxim of statutory interpretation means that the "[m]ention
of one thing implies [the] exclusion of another." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 521 (5th
ed. 1979). Although courts have found this maxim helpful in interpreting legislative enactments, some courts have noted that it should be applied with caution. See
also S.E.C. v.Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (maintaining that this statutory maxim shall be used as a mere aid in statutory construction); In re Eaton, 130
B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1991) (providing that "[wihile merely an aid to construction that should not defeat legislative intent, the force of this maxim . . . is
strengthened when a particular thing is provided in one part of the statute and
omitted in another").
110 As a principle of statutory construction, courts have interpreted the phrase to
mean that "words take meaning based on their context or their association with
other words in the statute." DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey in the Hills,
706 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (M.D. Fla. 1989). See BLACK's Lw DICTIONARY 956 (5th
ed. 1979) (translating the phrase to mean "[i]t is known from its associates"). In
utilizing this interpretive maxim, courts have explained that "[w]here one of the
enumerated terms [in a statute] is a general one, it may be restricted to a narrower
sense or less general meaning by the context in which it is used." DeSisto College,
706 F. Supp. at 1495. See also United States v. 88 Cases Etc., of Bireley's Orange
Beverage, 5 F.R.D. 503, 504 (D.N.J. 1946) (explaining that "[g]eneral language of a
statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply
to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment") (citation
omitted). Accordingly, when faced with the general-specific term dichotomy when
interpreting statutes, it has been held that a statute stating "school" in general,
followed by a list of specific schools, did not include colleges within its scope where

1993]

USE OFJUDICIAL TIME

1363

ruptcy court limit its use of sua sponte power to the two explicit authorizations in the second sentence."' Analysis of those explicit
grants of power to act sua sponte discloses the limits on that power.
The first of the two explicit authorizations in § 105(a) for sua
2
sponte actions is to enforce or implement court orders or rules."
The meaning and purpose of this authorization is self evident. If
the court is to function effectively, it must have the authority to enforce its own orders." 3 While many or most failures to comply with
an order will be raised by a party, the court's effectiveness as an
institution requires the residual authority to enforce its orders on its
own motion in appropriate circumstances. For example, the court
college was not part of the specific list. DeSisto College, 706 F. Supp. at 1496. In
addition, courts have applied noscitur a socis in construing the old Bankruptcy Act of
1898. See, e.g., In re Rouse, Hazard & Co. 91 F. 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1899) (stating that
the specific provisions will govern "in respect to that subject as against general
provisions contained in the same act"). See generally Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285
U.S. 204 (1932) (utilizing noscitur a sociis in construing Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
1 '1 Further evidence of this intent is that there are other Bankruptcy Code sections and rules which expressly provide that the court can take action sua sponte or
on its own motion or initiative. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (stating instances in which
bankruptcy judge can, sua sponte, deny public access to records); 11 U.S.C.
§ 557(c)(1) (mandating that court may, sua sponte, expedite grain elevator bankruptcies); 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (explaining that bankruptcy judge may dismiss case sua
sponte where debtor is subject to consumer debts for the most part and granting
relief would be an abuse of the bankruptcy process); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006(f)
(stating that court may sua sponte determine if there were infirmities with solicitation
or voting of a proxy); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2017(a) & (b) (authorizing bankruptcy
judge to examine, sua sponte, transactions between debtor and attorney); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2019(b) (permitting bankruptcy judge to sua sponte scrutinize representation occurring during a chapter 9 or 11 proceeding and invalidate same if exigencies so require); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3022 (providing that bankruptcy judge court
can, on its own motion, enter final decree closing a bankruptcy case); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4001 (d)(3) (maintaining that a bankruptcy judge can, sua sponte, approve
or disapprove agreements regarding use of cash collateral or postpetition financing
without conducting a hearing if no objection is filed); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(a)
(permitting court to impose sanctions sua sponte); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(b) (authorizing bankruptcy judge, after notice and hearing, to determine sua sponte
whether party should be held in contempt). See also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (providing
that the bankruptcy judge shall determine whether a proceeding is core or related
on the judge's own motion). Thus, because Congress has expressly authorized sua
sponte power under the above specific provisions and rules, it appears that cases
holding that the court may take any action sua sponte to enforce any Code requirement may be mistaken. See In re Gulph Woods Corp., 83 B.R. 339, 344 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988) (holding that "the 1986 amendment to § 105(a) vests in us the power to
take any action necessary to enforce Code requirements sua sponte, without any finding of harm to any interested party arising from the Code violation").
112 See supra note 104 for the full text of section 105(a).
1 13 Courts may enforce orders by various means, including striking the non-complying party's pleadings or by utilizing contempt proceedings, if necessary. 56 AM.
JUR. 2D Motions, Rules, and Orders § 41 (1971).
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sometimes needs to issue orders to ensure the orderly processing of
papers or the timely closing of cases. The ability of the court to
function smoothly requires that the court have the ability to issue
sua sponte orders enforcing such requirements.
Similar considerations undoubtedly formed the basis for the authorization in § 105(a) for sua sponte actions to enforce or implement
court rules."t 4 There could be chaos if a court did not have the authority to control its own processes. There are various circumstances in which the court may raise objections on its own motion to
rule violations in the interests, for example, of uniformity, or orderly processing of papers. Other more serious concerns may be
involved as well, where, for example, an applicant hasn't proven service of the application upon affected parties as required by court
rules.
The second express authorization in § 105(a) for sua sponte action is "to prevent an abuse of process.""' 5 The Code, however,
does not define the term "abuse of process." The few reported
cases on its meaning in § 105(a) essentially define it as "maneuvers
or schemes which would have the effect of undermining the integrity
of the bankruptcy system,"' 16 but fail to clarify the circumstances
which constitute such abuse. "Abuse of process" is a term of art in
nonbankruptcy contexts referring to a species of tort. Under
nonbankruptcy law, abuse of process is a misuse of properly issued
judicial process." 7 This tort definition is not broad enough for pur114 Enforcement of local rules is vested in the discretion of trial courts. RJ.
Berke & Co., Inc. v.J.P. Griffin, Inc., 388 A.2d 1260, 1262 (N.H. 1978). Court rules
may be enforced by censuring or otherwise sanctioning the transgressor. See In re
Tenure Hearing of Cowan, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 753, 541 A.2d 298, 306 (App. Div.
1988) (characterizing an explanation of court rules as an "unpleasant exercise," the
court stated that violators of court rules "risk censure, sanctions, and suppression"
and that in extreme cases, an appeal could be dismissed) (citations omitted). See
generally 21 C.J.S. Courts § 21 (1953) (explaining further the operation and effect of
court rules).
115 See supra note 104 for the full text of § 105(a).
116 In re Calder, 93 B.R. 739, 740 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988). See also In re Burrell, 148
B.R. 820, 824 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (characterizing abuse of process as a situation
where "[i]naction by the court ... would undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy
system").
117 See Captran Creditors Trust v. North American Title Ins. Agency, Inc. (In re
Captran Creditors Trust), 116 B.R. 845, 853 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (maintaining
that "[a]buse of process does not deal with the issuance of process; instead, it deals
with the use of process after its issuance for an improper purpose"). The essential
elements of a cause of action for an abuse of process generally include: "1) [the]
issuance of process; 2) an ulterior purpose; and 3) a willful act in the use of process
not proper in the regular course of the proceeding." Meyers v. Ideal Basic Indus.
Inc., 940 F.2d 1379, 1382 (10th Cir. 1991). Some courts also require an additional
element of the showing of damages to the plaintiff as a result of the abuse. See, e.g.,
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poses of § 105(a), because certain actions could have the effect of
undermining the integrity of the bankruptcy system without constituting the tort of abuse of process. Gouging on fee applications
comes to mind as one example." 8 It follows that the definition of
abuse of process for purposes of sua sponte action under § 105(a) will
require further development in the bankruptcy case law.
Ascertaining the limits of the sua sponte power in § 105(a) also
requires reference to the Congressional intention regarding the role
of the court as reflected in § 102(1).'"9 When the court rules on an
uncontested motion, any ruling other than unconditional approval
is a form of sua sponte objection. As previously noted, however, Congress intended that the role of the bankruptcy judge under the Code
would primarily be to resolve disputes. 20 Congress clearly expressed in the legislative history to § 102(1) that a bankruptcy judge
should "become involved only when there is a dispute about a proposed action, that is only when there is an objection."' 12 1 It follows

that if the interested parties do not see fit to object to a motion, then
the bankruptcy judge ordinarily should not object sua sponte because
Enlow v. Tishomingo County, Mississippi, 962 F.2d 501, 512 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a demonstration of the damages resulting from the alleged abuse is an
essential element in the cause of action); Refuse & Envtl. Sys. Inc. v. Indus. Serv. of
America Inc., 932 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that a resulting damage to the
plaintiff is an essential element in the cause of action); Vahlsing v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., Inc., 928 F.2d 486, 490 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that damage to the
plaintiff is an essential element in the cause of action). To establish the above elements, the plaintiff must demonstrate "some definite act or threat by the defendant not
authorized by the process." Meyers, 940 F.2d at 1382. See also W. KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 121 (5th ed. 1984) (asserting that
"[s]ome definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process is required"). An action for abuse of
process, therefore, cannot be established if the process is utilized for no other purpose than that for which it was intended by law. 1 AM. JUR. Abuse of Process § 4
(1962). Accordingly, if the process is used in the manner for which it was intended,
even if the user is driven by spite or ill will, there has been no abuse. Vahising, 928
F.2d at 490.
118 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
119 See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (1991) (noting that it is appropriate for a court to inquire into a statute's legislative history where the statutory language is ambiguous); Blum v. Stenson, 465, U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (opining that
"where . . .resolution of a question . . .turns on a statute and the intention of
Congress, we look . . . to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear"); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16 (1979)
(looking to a statute's legislative history after reviewing the statutory language);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (stating that when called upon
to interpret legislation, "the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature").
120 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
121 Id.
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to do so is to do the job of a party who has chosen to default. Accordingly, bankruptcy judges should exercise their power to raise
sua sponte objections with restraint. Free-wheeling exercise of the
power to object sua sponte amounts to resumption of the supervisory
122
role which Congress wanted the United States trustee to assume.
I have been an advocate of sua sponte objection in certain circumstances where such action is expressly authorized by the Code
or Rules. 123 In these sections, the language of the statute or rule
clearly expresses Congress's intent to have the judge act in such capacity, and thus helps define the limits of such power. As my workload has increased, however, I have paid proportionately closer
attention to the effect of sua sponte objections on my time. One survey question asked the bankruptcy judges if they find that they are
less likely to raise objections or bring up issues sua sponte as their
workload increases.' 2 4 Some of my colleagues reported that response to their workloads, but a greater number answered that
there has been no such reduction in their willingness to raise sua
sponte objections. I freely admit, however, and make no apology that
I have become more reluctant to raise objections or bring up issues
sua sponte as my workload has become more and more oppressive. If
our primary duty as judges is the resolution of disputes, then any
action, including sua sponte action, which detracts from that duty
should be subjected to close scrutiny.
The questionnaire responses to the frequency of sua sponte objections to specific types of requests for relief were most interesting,
and illustrate the range of opinion on the propriety of such actions.
The questionnaire asked the judges to state whether they are
ordinarily willing to raise sua sponte objections to certain types of requests for relief.' 25 The answers were as follows:
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 for a list of these specific statutory sections and rules. See
also STEPHEN A. STRipp, Balancingof Interests in Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 562, 564 (1991) (positing that "the bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, has the right and obligation to modify
[consensual cash collateral] orders [which contain provisions that violate creditors'
rights to fair treatment and due process] sua sponte in order to balance the interests
of all parties in the case"). Time constraints, however, play a major role in connection with some of these explicit authorizations for sua sponte action. For example, I
simply do not have the time to review every chapter 7 case file looking for cases that
should be dismissed sua sponte under section 707(b) because of substantial abuse of
chapter 7. Moreover, the United States trustee also has the ability to raise such
objections, and it is the United States trustee who should ordinarily exercise that
supervisory function, rather than the court.
124 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § X, No. 3
125 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § X, No. 1. As used here, the term "request
122
123
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Type of Request for Relief

Yes

No

No Response

fee applications
motions to vacate the automatic stay
motions to avoid liens
chapter 13 plans
chapter 11 plans
chapter 12 plans
motions to sell assets
default judgments
other (specify) 12 6

82%
42%
51%
54%
67%
45%
64%
63%
15%

14%
51%
42%
33%
27%
35%
33%
33%
2%

4%
7%7
7%.
13%.
6%.
207
37
4%
83%

The questionnaire also asked the judges to describe the circum1 27
stances under which they will raise such objections sua sponte.
Although there was considerable variation in the terms used, there
appeared to be two common themes. First, many judges stated essentially that they will raise sua sponte objections where the applicant
fails to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to the relief requested. Second, other judges stated that they will raise sua sponte
objections where their "conscience is shocked" because of a perception that the applicant is taking unfair advantage of others, the estate will be harmed, or for similar reasons.
The essence of an objection based upon the shocking of the
judge's conscience or similar description is probably what Congress
had in mind when it used the term "abuse of process" in section
105(a). That is, the request in question is so egregious that it
threatens the integrity of the bankruptcy process or of the bankruptcy court itself. Excessive fees really fall into this category, because they offend creditors and other parties in interest who feel
helpless to stop the offense, thereby engendering extensive public
resentment against the bankruptcy court and process.
Sua sponte objection based merely upon failure to make a prima
facie case, however, is more problematic. Reasonable minds can differ over the fundamental question of whether bankruptcy judges
must or should review most uncontested motions and other requests for relief which have been served upon affected parties, and
raise sua sponte objections based upon failure to make a prima facie
for relief" means any request to the bankruptcy court for an order or other evidence of court authorization or approval.
126

The types of matters identified in response to this question were agreements

regarding use of cash collateral, agreements regarding adequate protection,
reaffirmation agreements, objections to discharge, venue changes, enforcement of
deadlines, failure to timely file plans, notice deficiencies and any matter requiring
entry of an order.
127 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § X, No. 2.
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showing. If the United States trustee and other parties in interest
who receive notice of a motion or application do not choose to object, a serious question exists as to the circumstances under which
the overburdened bankruptcy courts should do the parties' jobs for
them by raising such objections. Again, in those bankruptcy courts
which are not overburdened, the question may be academic. The
question assumes importance, however, in direct proportion to the
degree of any docket congestion.
In addition, with the exception of fee applications, it is difficult
to discern any inherent differences among the types of requests for
relief listed above of sufficient significance to explain the differences
in the percentage of judges willing to raise sua sponte objections to
each type. For example, forty-two percent of judges are ordinarily
willing to raise sua sponte objections to motions to vacate the automatic stay, but sixty-seven percent are willing to raise such objections to chapter 11 plans. And yet, relief from the automatic stay
often has as much significance to a case as confirmation of a plan
has. For that matter, vacating the automatic stay and confirming a
plan often have a more significant effect on parties in interest than
allowance of a professional fee. The explanation for the willingness
of some judges (including myself) to object more readily to some
types of requests for relief than others is therefore not immediately
apparent from the nature of the request.
It follows that it might be beneficial to engage in a study of the
question of when bankruptcy judges should raise sua sponte objections. Further articulation of the reasons for the differences among
judges could prove enlightening. Indeed, the extent of the differences is best highlighted by noting that some judges stated that they
are ordinarily willing to raise sua sponte objections to every type of
request for relief, while other judges stated that they are not ordina1 28
rily willing to raise sua sponte objections to any type of request.
Greater understanding of and agreement on the criteria for such
objections is desirable.
Lastly, it should be noted that my ultimate conclusion is not
that the power to raise sua sponte objections under § 105(a) should be
narrowly construed, but rather that such power should be exercised
128 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § X, No. 1. Thirty-four percent of responding
judges stated that they are ordinarily willing to object sua sponte to every type of
request for relief listed. By contrast, 10% of responding judges stated that they
ordinarily do not object sua sponte to any such requests. Fifty-six percent of the
judges (including myself) reported that they will raise sua sponte objections to some
of the listed requests, but not others. Two percent had no response.
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with restraint, informed by an awareness of the differences between
the first and second sentences of the statute.

VII.

BANKRUPTCY COURT TIME CONSTRAINTS AS A FACTOR IN
DECISIONS To PERMIT LITIGATION IN ALTERNATIVE
FORUMS

Another question which becomes significant in bankruptcy
courts with overburdened dockets is whether controversies over
which the bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction 2 9 can
be adjudicated in an alternative forum without harming the bankruptcy case or its parties in interest. One way matters can be adjudicated in another forum is to grant a party's motion for per129 In defining the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, section
1334 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under
title 11.
28 U.S.C. § 1334. The bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 151. The district court may refer all bankruptcy cases and matters arising therein
or related thereto to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
In Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins (In re Pacor), the Third Circuit analyzed the meaning of
the term "related to" as used in section 1334. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins (In re Pacor),
743 F.2d 984, 985 (3d Cir. 1984). After reviewing the congressional intent behind
section 1334, the court set forth a test for determining whether a proceeding is
related to a title 11 case:
The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy ....

An action is related to bankruptcy if

the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or
freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any
way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt
estate.
Id. at 994 (emphasis omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has also commented on the meaning of "related to" as used
in section 1334 positing that the circuit courts of appeals "have uniformly adopted
an expansive definition of a related proceeding under section 1334(b) .... ."
Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co. Inc., 918 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1990).
After noting that the Pacor test for determining whether a proceeding is related to a
title 11 case had been adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the
court stated that "[wie too have accepted the Pacor articulation albeit with the caveat that 'situations may arise when an extremely tenuous connection to the estate
would not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.' " Id. at 584 (citations omitted).
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missive abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) 3 0 or mandatory
abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2). 3 '
130

Section 1334(c)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in pertinent

part:
Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State
law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).
131 Section 1334(c)(2) of Title 28 provides in pertinent part:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but
not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of
the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district
court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2).
If all of the requirements set forth in section 1334(c)(2) are met, the court must
abstain from hearing the proceeding. Nationwide Roofing & Sheet Metal Inc. v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co. (In re Nationwide Roofing & Sheet Metal Inc.), 130 B.R. 768,
778 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991). The requirement that "the state court action can be
timely adjudicated," dictates that bankruptcy judges must decide what is "timely."
The burden of a particular proceeding on the bankruptcy court's docket is a relevant factor in determining what is "timely," as the judge must compare how long it
will take to adjudicate the matter in state court to how long it will take in bankruptcy court. The intensity of the competition for judicial time on the bankruptcy
court's docket will affect the answer to this question.
The requirement of timely adjudication was scrutinized in Allard v. Benjamin (In
re DeLorean Motor Co.), in which the bankruptcy court denied a motion for
mandatory abstention based on the finding that the case could not be adjudicated
in a timely fashion on the state level. See Allard v. Benjamin, (In re DeLorean Motor
Co.), 49 B.R. 900 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). The DeLorean court posited that analysis of the timely adjudication requirement necessitates "an examination by the
Court of the state court's calendar, the status of the bankruptcy proceeding, the
complexity of the issues, and whether the state court proceeding would prolong the
administration, or liquidation of the estate." Id. at 911.
Commentators have also addressed the timely adjudication requirement for
mandatory abstention:
The final requirement for mandatory abstention is that the state court
action can be timely adjudicated. This requirement probably derives
from section 57 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided that if
adjudication, estimation, or liquidation of contingent or unliquidated
claims would unduly delay the administration of the estate, the claims
should be disallowed. The court should consider the state court calendar and the status of the Code case. Some considerations for the
bankruptcy court's determination whether to mandate abstention and
await state court adjudication are the type of case, that is, if it is a
Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 reorganization case, if it is a
complex case, and if it is going to take long to close the case, to administer it, or to confirm a plan.
Lawrence P. King,Jurisdiction& Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38
VAND. L. REV. 675, 702 (1985).
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Section 1334(c) (1) grants the bankruptcy court discretion to
32
abstain from hearing a matter within the court's jurisdiction
and to permit the matter to be heard in another forum. The
bankruptcy court is required to consider and balance certain factors when deciding whether it should exercise its discretion to
abstain. '33
The burden of a particular proceeding on the court's docket
is a proper consideration on motions for permissive abstention
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).13 4 In fact, two of the relevant facSee supra note 130.
The relevant factors for permissive abstention analysis are as follows:
(1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the estate if a court recommends abstention,
(2) the extent to which state law issues predominate over bankruptcy
issues,
(3) the difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable law,
(4) the presence of a related proceeding commenced in state court or
other nonbankruptcy court,
(5) the jurisdictional basis, if any, other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334,
(6) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the
main bankruptcy case,
(7) the substance rather than form of an asserted "core" proceeding,
(8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core bankruptcy
matters to allow judgments to be entered in state court with enforcement left to the bankruptcy court,
(9) the burden of the bankruptcy court's docket,
(10) the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in
bankruptcy court involves forum shopping by one of the parties
(11) the existence of a right to a jury trial, and
(12) the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor parties.
Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162,
1167 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Republic Reader's Serv., Inc., 81 B.R. 422, 429
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987)).
See also Eastport Assocs. v. City of Los Angeles (In re Eastport Assocs.), 935
F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the district court [in deciding not to
abstain] effectively engaged in the sort of balancing contemplated in Tucson
Estates").
134 A case's burden on the bankruptcy court's existing docket is one of the factors
the judge should consider when deciding whether to exercise its discretion to abstain. Tucson Estates, 912 F.2d at 1167. In detemining whether to abstain, the court
in Southmark Prime Plus L.P. v. Southmark Storage Assocs. Ltd. Partnership (In re
Southmark Storage Assocs.), maintained that it:
[M]ust be mindful of its crowded docket, its limited resources, and the
need to expeditiously address matters which require the expertise of
132
133

the bankruptcy court .... Even if there is a delay attendant upon ab-

stention, it "must be compared with the effect adjudicating the proceeding has upon the allocation of a court's scarce resources to
essential matters concerning administration of all estates."
Southmark Prime Plus L.P. v. Southmark Storage Assocs. Ltd. Partnership (In re
Southmark Storage Assocs.), 132 B.R. 231, 233 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (citations
omitted). See also Shop & Go, Inc. v. D.K. Patterson Constr. Co., Inc. (In re Shop &
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tors in deciding whether it is appropriate to abstain under
§ 1334(c)(1) focus on the issue of time and whether abstention
would hinder or expedite the administration of justice. Those
factors are: (1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the estate if the bankruptcy court abstains; and (2) the
existing burden of the bankruptcy court's docket. These factors
are of course interrelated. The length of time it will take to adjudicate a matter in state court and whether that will slow down the
administration of the estate must be compared to how long it
would take to resolve the matter in bankruptcy court. If the
bankruptcy court's docket is very congested, the state court may
provide a more expeditious forum and therefore further the in13 5
terests of justice.

Most of the bankruptcy judges who responded to the questionnaire reported that the amount of time which it will take to
adjudicate a matter has no bearing on their decision on motions
for abstention or for relief from the automatic stay to permit litigation in another forum.1 6 Similarly, most of the respondents
Go, Inc.), 124 B.R. 915, 918 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (maintaining that "docket
congestion does not permit [this court] to determine the merits of the state court
action in any reasonably foreseeable time in the future, leaving the state court
pending action here will affirmatively harm the administration of the... bankruptcy
case").
In determining to exercise its discretion to abstain from hearing a case, the
court in Millsaps v. United States (In re Millsaps), eloquently expressed the need to
consider the court's docket:
The docket of this court can only be fairly described as in crisis. The
number of cases filed, the complexity of the cases, the larger-thanaverage percentage of Chapter 11 cases, and the lack of new judgeships to keep up with the load, have all operated to prevent this court
from hearing and determining cases, contested matters, and adversary
proceedings promptly as contemplated by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code and as the parties litigant have every right to expect and
demand. Although this court regularly holds hearings well into the
evenings and on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and despite the
welcomed assistance of visiting judges from both within and outside
our circuit, there is simply much more to do than this court can complete with dispatch.
Millsaps v. United States (In re Millsaps), 133 B.R. 547, 555-56 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991).
135 For example, New Jersey presently has 400 state superior court trial judges, in
comparison to seven bankruptcy judges. NEW JERSEY LAWYERS DIARY AND MANUAL
503-10 (Skinder-Strauss Assocs. 1993). The backlog in the bankruptcy court system
can sometimes be alleviated by allowing state courts to aid in the adjudication of
certain matters, especially where the outcome is determined solely by state law.
136 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § VIi, No. 2. Sixty percent of responding
judges answered that time considerations have no bearing on such decisions, and
37% replied that time is a factor. Id. Three percent had no response. Id.
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stated that they do not abstain sua sponte because of time considerations.' 7 When the docket load is very heavy and the time required to adjudicate a matter is substantial, however, those
factors can properly be given sufficient weight as to call for

abstention. 138
See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § VII, No. 1. Sixty-five percent of responding
judges replied that they never abstain sua sponte because of time considerations, and
41% (including myself) replied to the contrary. Id. One percent of the judges did
not respond. Id.
Note that unlike § 1334(c)(1), the statutory language of § 1334(c)(2) specifically requires a "timely motion [requesting mandatory abstention] of a party in a
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2). Under the legislative construction maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, (the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another), it could be inferred that the requirement of a motion by a party in a
proceeding under § 1334(c)(2) precludes the judge from abstaining sua sponte
under that section. See supra note 109 for a discussion expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The language of § 105(a) and its legislative history, however, lead to the conclusion that notwithstanding such requirement, the judge may abstain sua sponte.
See Naylor v. Case and McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 563 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that
court can abstain sua sponte); Scherer v. Carroll, 150 B.R. 549, 552 (D. Vt. 1993)
(maintaining that "questions regarding abstention and remand may be addressed
sua sponte by the Bankruptcy Court"); In re Ramada Inn-Paragould General Partnership, 137 B.R. 31, 33 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (advocating that bankruptcy court can
abstain and remand to state court sua sponte); In re Southmark Storage Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 132 B.R. 231, 233 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (positing that "abstention
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) may be raised by the court sua sponte"). Specifically,
the language of § 105(a) states that "[n]o provision of this title providing for the
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court
from sua sponte, taking any action ...... 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). This language was
added to § 105(a) in the 1986 Amendments to the Code to clarify the court's sua
sponte powers. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUvrcy LAw & PRACTICE 85
(1992-1993 ed.) [hereinafter NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE]. While § 1334
is in title 28, not title 11, it is generally thought of as part of "the Code" (i.e. title
11) because it provides the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.
138 Recently, the Third Circuit in First Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Brown (In re Brown),
raised an issue sua sponte as to whether the bankruptcy court should decide damages
in a case where the state court had determined liability. See First Jersey Nat'l Bank
v. Brown (In re Brown), 951 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1991). After noting that no prejudice
would result to the debtor in permitting the litigation to conclude in state court, the
Brown court stated "[n]or can we overlook the impact of the flood of litigation pouring in on the bankruptcy courts, a development that requires that they carefully
husband their resources." Id. at 570. The Brown court concluded that it would be
inconsistent with sound exercise of discretion by the bankruptcy court to displace
the New Jersey court's exercise of jurisdiction. Id. See also Packerland Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Griffith Brokerage Co., et al. (In re Kemble), 776 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir.
1985) (positing that judicial economy is a key factor to be considered when lifting
the automatic stay); Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505, 508-09
(7th Cir. 1982) (maintaining that moving the civil action forward did not prejudice
debtor and was in interest ofjudicial economy); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Olmstead
(In re Olmstead), 608 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that the bankruptcy court could stay its decision of dischargeability until claim was liquidated by
a court of competent jurisdiction-assuming no debtor prejudice-because "it
[was] obvious ... that the bankruptcy court will save considerable time, effort and
137
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SETTLEMENT AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
VIII.
PROCEDURES AS MEANS OF RELIEVING BANKRUPTCY
COURT DOCKETS

Bankruptcy court dockets can also be relieved through settlement of controversies and alternative dispute resolution procedures. The importance of these avenues increases in
proportion to the degree of docket congestion.
The overwhelming majority of controversies which become
the subject of litigation are resolved consensually by the parties
before trial, a result often referred to as "settlement."' 3 9 The
threat of resolution by the court is often sufficient to get the parties to resolve the controversy themselves. The parties' perception of how the judge may rule typically has a significant
money by awaiting the outcome of the liability proceeding and reviewing facts there
presented to liquidate and determine dischargeability of the debt"); Banker's Trust
Co. v. Carlinsky (In re Lebow), 397 F. Supp. 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (concluding
that where a bankruptcy proceeding hinges upon liability in a state court action, the
bankruptcy court has the discretion to defer consideration of the matter because if
the court was to find "that [it was] mandated by the statute to hear and determine
dischargeability of all claims, no matter how contingent or unliquidated, the potential of wasted judicial activity would be enormous") (emphasis in original); In re Pro
Football Weekly, Inc., 60 B.R. 824, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (maintaining that "modification of the stay will promote judicial economy by resolving all claims between...
[the parties] in a single proceeding").
139 The term "settlement" is defined as a "meeting of [the] minds of parties to [a]
transaction or controversy; an adjustment of differences or accounts; a coming to
an agreement .... Agreement to terminate or forestall all or part of a lawsuit."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1372 (6th ed. 1990).
The sentiment that settlement is preferable to litigation is ingrained in American jurisprudence as evidenced by the Supreme Court's statements that
"[c]ompromises of disputed claims are favored by the courts" and that "settlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without recourse to litigation, are generally favored." Williams v. First Nat'l Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 595
(1910) (citation omitted); St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co.,
171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898).
Not only do the courts favor settlement as a means of ending litigation, they
often encourage it:
The courts have considered it their duty to encourage rather than to
discourage parties in resorting to compromise as a mode of adjusting
conflicting claims .... The resolution of controversies and uncertain-

ties by means of compromise and settlement is generally faster and
less expensive than litigation; it results in a saving of time for the parties, the lawyers, and the courts, and it is thus advantageous to judicial
administration, and, in turn, to government as a whole.
15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 5 (1979).
See also Ahern v. Central Pac. Freight Lines, 846 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1988)
(noting that "settlement agreements are judicially favored as a matter of sound
public policy [and that such] agreements conserve judicial time and limit expensive
litigation").
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influence on the likelihood and terms of settlement. Such perceptions are based on factors including the judge's prior decisions in similar cases, reputation and statements or rulings which
he or she makes as the case progresses. Astute counsel and parties scrutinize such indicia closely to form a sense of the likely
decision of the court.
Judges can, therefore, influence the likelihood and terms of
settlement in various ways. One of many such ways is to require
the parties to discuss settlement. 4 ° This approach can be useful
in cases in which settlement might not otherwise be achieved for
reasons including posturing by the parties and fear of being perceived as weak for bringing up settlement.
Judges from twelve judicial districts responding to the questionnaire reported local rules which are intended to facilitate settlement. 4 ' One hundred two out of 120 bankruptcy judges
responding to the questionnaire, or eighty-five percent, reported
that they actively encourage settlement as a means of conserving
judicial time. 4 2 Fifty-three judges, or forty-four percent, reported other practices which are intended to encourage settlements. 4 3 Seventy-four judges, or sixty-two percent of those
responding, reported that they will sometimes participate in settlement negotiations if all parties consent.' 44 Twenty-one of
those judges, or seventeen and one-half percent of those responding, however, said that they will only do so on rare occa140 The bankruptcy court in the District of New Jersey recently adopted Local
Rule 3(1), entitled "Duty to Confer," which states that "if a motion is contested, the
movant shall confer with the respondent prior to the hearing to determine whether
a consent order may be entered disposing of the motion, or, in the alternative, to
stipulate the resolution of as many issues as possible." D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 3(1). A
few other districts reported similar rules. See C.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 11 1(3)(a)
(providing that "[pirior to the filing of any motion relating to discovery, counsel for
the parties shall meet ... in a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute");
S.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 4001-10 (mandating that counsel meet and confer on all
disputed discovery issues before the court entertains any motion regarding discovery); S.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 7026-1 (stating that the "parties shall make every
effort to meet and confer telephonically [on contested motions] prior to the hearing
to discuss the potential for resolving the matter"); S.D. TEX. BANKR. CT. R.
1016.7(5)(e)(1) & (2) (requiring that "[r]esponses [to an objection to a motion]
shall include . . . a certificate that [a] conference was held, a good faith effort to
resolve the dispute was made ... or [i]t was not possible for the required conference to be held"); E.D. VA. BANKR. CT. R. 109(E) (maintaining that "[b]efore requesting a hearing date on any motion, the proponent shall confer with opposing
counsel... on a good faith effort to narrow the area of disagreement").
141 See appendix 3, Questionnaire § VI, No. 6.
142 See appendix 3, Questionnaire § VI, No. 1.
143 See appendix 3, Questionnaire § VI, No. 5.
144 See appendix 3, Questionnaire § VI, No. 2.
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sions. 1 5 Other judges reported other qualifications on their
willingness to participate.146 The differences in the judges' opinions on their personal participation in settlement discussions reflects conflicting concerns as to the desirability of settlement on
the one hand, and the importance of judicial impartiality on the
other.' 47 Many judges and litigants are concerned that once a
judge learns the details of settlement negotiations, he or she will
not be able to remain impartial if adjudication is required. Because judges should not participate in settlement discussions
without the consent of all parties, the degree of such consensual
See id.
146 See id. Some districts have a procedure in which the judges conduct settlement conferences in each other's cases, and not in their own cases. See id. Those
judges who do conduct settlement conferences in their own cases often prefer not
to make specific recommendations, but rather to make general comments regarding
matters such as their impressions of the likelihood of success if the matter is tried,
intended rulings on points of law, and so forth. If all else fails, however, I will
occasionally ask the parties if they want me to suggest settlement terms, and if they
respond affirmatively, I will make suggestions. On other occasions, parties have
taken that initiative and asked me to propose settlement terms, and I have then
done so. Such matters are within the discretion of each judge.
147 Such concern is especially justified in cases in which the judge is the trier of
fact. See United States v. Pfizer, Inc. 560 F.2d 319, 322-23 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding
that the district court abused its discretion in granting a motion for a bench trial
where the court had already "participated in settlement negotiations to an extraordinary degree ... (and had] express[ed] strong opinions on the merits of the
case..."); First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Rice Lake v. Klapmeier, 526 F.2d 77, 80
n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) (recognizing the law's favorable policy towards settlement of
litigation, the court noted that "where the judge sits as trier of fact, the judge
should avoid recommending an actual settlement figure before or during trial")
But see Honorable Noel P. Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D. 129 (1972) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages ofjudicial
involvement in the settlement process). Specifically, Judge Fox, in advocating judicial involvement in settlement discussions, stated:
Some commentators feel that the judge might become prejudiced
against a party because of intransigence or unreasonableness in bargaining or that his comments to the parties might appear to favor one
side and convey the impression of bias. Anxious to avoid any real or
imagined threat to their clients, counsel will then abandon positions
held on good faith and make undesirable concessions in order to
145

avoid possible judicial displeasure ....

This view is extreme and inac-

curate. Obviously a judge's control over the course of trial gives him
the power which if misused, can emaciate the settlement process.
However, experience as both a management-labor mediator and trial
judge convinces me that such results are more theoretical than real,
and assume a built-in bias in the situation which, in reality, does not
exist. .

.

. If the judge demonstrates through participation in settle-

ment and conduct at trial that his objectivity and impartiality are unassailable, any danger of hostility on the part of counsel will disappear.
Id. at 144-45.
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participation is within the discretion of each judge.'4 8
When matters scheduled for hearing are settled, it is imperative that the parties inform the court as soon as possible. Seventy-six of the judges responding, or sixty-three percent,
reported the existence of procedures for prompt notification to
the court of settlements or withdrawal of applications, to avoid
wasting the court's time preparing for hearing on matters which
have been resolved.' 4 9 Judges from five districts reported local
rules regarding such notification. 5 °
A related problem that can cause a substantial waste ofjudicial time arises from the fact that settlement negotiations often
are not concluded, and sometimes are not even commenced, until the date of the trial or hearing or a day or two before it. In
such cases, the judge and law clerk may be expending time in
preparation for hearing which will have been wasted when the
matter settles. To avoid this, several judges reported that a staff
member calls counsel prior to the hearing to ascertain the status.
If settlement discussions are imminent or under way, the judge
can then be guided accordingly in terms of his or her
51
preparation.

1

148 The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge may, with consent of
the parties, confer separately with the parties and their counsel in an effort to mediate or settle pending matters." 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY AND PROCEDURES,
CODE OF CONDUCT FORJUDGES ANDJUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, Canon 3(a)(4) (1992). See
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7016 (maintaining that "[i]n any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties . . . to appear before it . . . for such
purposes as ... facilitating the settlement of the case"). See also Bank of America
Nat. Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339, 350 (3d Cir. 1986) (recognizing that "an activist role for judges in managing cases-and encouraging their settlement-has expressly been provided for under the federal rules"). I personally
will participate in settlement discussions with the consent of all parties, if time
permits.
149 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § VI, No. 4.
150 See id; see also C.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 114(2)(a) (providing that "[p]arties
shall notify the Courtroom Deputy immediately ... when a matter set for hearing
has been scheduled"); E.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 74 1(1) (maintaining that "it is the
duty of the plaintiff or moving party to promptly notify the calendar clerk of...
[m]atters or proceedings that have been settled"); E.D. MICH. BANKR. CT. R. 2.17
(requiring that "counsel shall notify the Court immediately upon the settlement of
an adversary proceeding"); D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 3(m) (mandating that "[i]f a motion is settled.., the movant shall inform the Court immediately by telephone, and
send written confirmation promptly thereafter"); E.D. PA. BANKR. CT. R. 7041.2
(asserting that "counsel shall notify the clerk or the judge to whom the action is
assigned that the issues between the parties have been settled . . .") and W.D.
WASH. BANKR. CT. R. 9013(d)(5) (setting forth that "[plarties shall notify the court
as soon as practicable if a matter has been settled").
151 As a result of this helpful suggestion from several judges, I have adopted a
version of this procedure which has been working well. My secretary calls counsel
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Another way in which bankruptcy courts can save time and
move calendars is by use of alternative dispute resolution procedures. Thirty-five judges, or twenty-nine percent of those responding, reported employing arbitration, mediation or other
alternative dispute resolution procedures.'
In addition, a
number of judges who are not presently employing such procedures expressed interest in doing so. Bankruptcy courts in five
districts presently have formal mediation programs.'
When the
docket congestion becomes severe enough, well-developed alternative dispute resolution procedures can become essential to
avoiding a large-scale breakdown of the court's ability to cope
with its caseload. For this reason, development of such programs
may be the wave of the future in many bankruptcy courts.
IX.

CONSERVATION OF JUDICIAL TIME IN THE ADJUDICATIVE
PROCESS

Prior sections of this article have considered questions relating to means by which demands on judicial time which compete
with the adjudication of disputes can be reduced, including the
extent to which the bankruptcy judges should be involved in uncontested matters, 54 the inordinate volume of orders in the
bankruptcy court, 55 and the use of alternative forums or procedures to resolve contested matters. 156 This section presents various procedures that judges can use to conserve time while
in contested matters several days before hearing and inquires about settlement discussions. If there have been no such discussions yet or they have not been concluded, I will then adjourn most such matters sua sponte until negotiations are
concluded. The point is to avoid settlement "on the courthouse steps" after the
court has expended time in preparation.
152 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § VI, No. 3.
153 See Mediation: Boon or Bane?, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR), No. 30, at Al (Feb. 11,
1993). Bankruptcy mediation was first implemented by Judge Louise DeCarl Adler
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California. Id. at
A4. Presently, Texas, Florida, Oregon and Virginia are also using bankruptcy mediation. Id. at Al. Moreover, those courts have addressed and resolved the concerns surrounding mediation. Id. The American Arbitration Association and the
American Bankruptcy Institute are scheduled to meet in August of 1993 to discuss
implementation of three mediation pilot programs throughout the country. Id. at
A4.
In New Jersey, Chief Bankruptcy Judge William H. Gindin has undertaken a
comprehensive study of mediation procedures in preparation for proposing such a
procedure here.
154 See supra sections III, IV & VI.
155 See supra section V.
156 See supra sections VII & VIII.
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57
performing their adjudicative role in the bankruptcy court.'
Conservation of time in adjudication is a stated goal of the law.' 58
It is also one measure of the quality of justice.' 5 9
The questionnaire asked for time conservation techniques in
four areas of bankruptcy litigation which collectively consume a
substantial amount of most bankruptcy judges' time:' 60 motions,
adversary proceedings, valuation of property,' 6 1 and chapter 13
cases. This section summarizes and discusses the merits of many
62
of the reported measures for time conservation in these areas.1

1. Motion Practice
A motion is essentially a request for an order which requires
notice and opportunity for hearing. 63 Unless made during a
157 In addition, occasional reference will be made to practices which may not necessarily conserve judicial time, but which conserve the time of litigants. As previously noted, conservation of litigants' time is of great importance, but is not the
principal focus of this article.
158 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1001, in pertinent part, states that the
bankruptcy rules "shall be construed to secure the ... speedy ... and inexpensive
determination of every case and proceeding." FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 See also FED.
R. EvID. 102 (providing that "[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure... elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay").
159 Hence the axiom that "justice delayed is justice denied." SIR EDWARD COKE,
SECOND INSTITUTE 55-56 (4th ed. 1671).
160 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, §§ II, III, IV & V.
161 A number of Code sections and Bankruptcy Rules use the term "value" or
"valuation" which often results in the court having to make a determination on the
value of certain property or services. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(17)(B)(i), (31)(A) &
(31)(B)(ii), (31)(B); II U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(1) & (g); II U.S.C. § 329(b); II U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 346(j)(7)(b)(ii); I I U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(3), (b)(4) & (j); 11
U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(4) & (b)(5); I I U.S.C. §§ 506(a) & (b); I1 U.S.C. §§ 508(a) & (b);
II U.S.C. §§ 522(a)(2), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(6), (d)(8), (j) &
(k)(1); I I U.S.C. § 542(a); I I U.S.C. §§ 547(a)(2), (c)(1)(A), (c)(4), (c)(4)(B), (c)(5),
(c)(5)(B) & (d); I I U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2)(A), (c), (d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(B) & (d)(2)(C); I I
U.S.C. §§ 549(b) & (c); I I U.S.C. §§ 550(a), (b)(1) & (d)(1)(B); I I U.S.C. §§ 554(a)
& (b); II U.S.C. § 557(h)(2); II U.S.C. § 560; 11 U.S.C. § 741(7); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 761(9)(B)(ii)(I), (9)(C)(ii)(I), (9)(E)(ii)(I), (17)(B) & (17)(C); 11 U.S.C. §§ 766(c)
& (d); 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(i); 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), (a)(7)(B), (a)(9)(B)(i), (a)(9)(C), (b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (b)(2)(B)(i) &
(b)(2)(C)(i); 11 U.S.C. § 1173(a)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3)(A); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1205(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) & (b)(4); II U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(4), (a)(5)(B)(ii) &
(b)(1)(A); 11 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(2)(A); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1325(a)(4), (a)(5)(B)(ii) & (b)(1)(A); 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P.
2015(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 and FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(d).
162 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, §§ II, III, IV & V for other reported
measures.
163 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9013 ("A request for an order, except when an application is authorized by these rules, shall be by written motion, unless made during a
hearing."). The Bankruptcy Rules do not define the terms "motion" and "application." NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAw & PRACTICE, supra note 137, at 617. There are,
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hearing, a motion must be in writing.' 64 Motions which are opposed in bankruptcy are "contested matters.'

65

There is a

heavy volume of motions in most bankruptcy courts. It is not
uncommon for some bankruptcy judges to rule on more than one
hundred motions per week, in addition to the numerous other
proceedings which require their attention. Bankruptcy courts
with a high volume of motions therefore tend to develop practices for swift and efficient disposition of motions. Some exam166
ples of such practices are discussed below.
One way to conserve time is to limit the time allowed for oral
arguments on motions 167 or to eliminate oral argument altogether.168 Whether such limits are appropriate will typically depend upon the significance and complexity of the issues.
Generally, though, if the parties have stated their arguments adequately in the papers, oral argument is often duplicative and
therefore unnecessary. There are, of course, many instances
however, at least eight types of requests for relief which are designated as applications by specific rules. See id. at 618. The term "application" appears to be limited
"to proceedings involving no apparent adverse party but requiring some judicial
consideration and application of statute or rule and a resulting action." Id. at 620.
By contrast, requests for relief by motion presumptively require notice to affected
parties. See id. at 621. It should also be noted that a complaint commencing an
adversary proceeding or a plan under chapters 9, 11, 12 and 13 of the Code are
requests for relief in forms other than motion or application. In addition, the filing
of a disclosure statement is a request for approval thereof which is neither a motion
nor an application. It is fair to say in summary that most requests for relief in
bankruptcy court are by motion, with a substantial minority of such requests by
application, and with several other types of requests for relief in other forms.
164 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9013. The type of "hearing" mentioned in the rule is an
evidentiary hearing, in which oral motions are permitted.
165 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014. "Whenever there is an actual dispute, other than an
adversary proceeding, before the bankruptcy court, the litigation to resolve that
dispute is a contested matter." NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAw & PRACTICE, supra note
137, at 621. For example, the filing of an objection to a disclosure statement creates a contested matter. Id. Thus, not all contested matters are motions, and not
all motions are contested matters. Contested matters are "essentially items that
call for the court to determine questions of law and fact that are of a sufficiently
straightforward nature as to enable their resolution on a short cause basis without
offending requirements of due process." In re Applin, 108 B.R. 253, 257 n.5
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989). Bankruptcy Rule 9014 requires that the "party against
whom relief is sought" be given "reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
heard." See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
166 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II.
167 Fifty-eight percent of responding judges reported that they will set time limits
on oral arguments on motions. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 2.
168 Fifty-eight percent of bankruptcy judges reported that they do not refuse to
permit oral argument on motions because of time considerations, while 42% reported that they sometimes do. I am one of the latter. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 1.
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where oral argument assists the court because the correct ruling
is unclear from the papers. Oral argument on written motions,
however, is not a matter of right; it is within the discretion of the
court. 169
70
Testimony is typically presented by affidavit on motions.
The affidavit is filed with the motion and served upon all interested parties.'71 There are, however, circumstances under which
due process requires oral testimony on motions, such as where
the credibility of the affiant is material to the outcome and cannot
be ascertained summarily from review of the papers.
An additional method that is used in some bankruptcy courts
to save time is to not set uncontested motions on the calendar for
hearing at all.' 72 Instead, such motions are summarily granted.
Of those courts that do set uncontested motions for hearing,
some judges will grant them en masse at the inception of the calen-

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Bankruptcy Rule 9017 incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e),
which gives the judge broad discretion to decide whether or not oral testimony
should be heard on a motion. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017. Specifically, Rule 43(e)
provides that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record ... the
court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
deposition." FED. R. Civ. P. 43(e). See also Miles v. Dep't of the Army, 881 F.2d
777, 784 (9th Cir. 1989) (maintaining that the "court has wide discretion in deciding whether oral testimony shall be heard in support of a motion"). Fifty-six percent of responding judges reported that they will generally permit oral testimony
on motions, and 42 percent (including myself) reported that they generally will not.
See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 3. Of those judges who generally permit
testimony on motions, one-half will set limits on such testimony because of time
considerations, and one-half will not. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 4.
Rule 43(e) further provides that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 43(e). See Miles, 881 F.2d at 784 (ruling that it is
within the trial court's discretion to decide a motion based only on a party's declaration submitted in support of its motion).
Disposition of motions on affidavits conserves judicial time. In re Applin, 108
B.R. 253, 257 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989). The process of constructing a record from
affidavits and depositions prior to a hearing on a motion allows the court to identify
and dispose of matters that are not genuinely in dispute. Id. This approach permits the court to focus its attention upon actual areas of dispute and to better allocate the limited time available for hearings. Id. In this process, the court must
balance the tremendous volume of motions against the dictates of due process. Id.
171 Similarly, temporary injunctive relief can be granted on affidavits. See Federal
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that it is
within the discretion of the court to grant an injunction based on evidence obtained
from affidavits).
172 The most common local rule employed by bankruptcy courts to conserve time
permits an order to be entered if the opposing party fails to file a timely objection
to the motion. See supra note 70.
169

170
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17 3
dar to expedite disposition.

One aspect of motion practice that can be extremely timeconsuming for judges is reviewing moving and responding papers before the hearing date. 174 Deciding which papers to review
or not review in advance of the hearing date can save a judge
considerable amounts of time. Some judges will review virtually
all motion papers prior to the hearing date, while other will review the papers for only certain types of motions. The reasons
for these differences are varied. For instance, motions vary enormously in complexity and difficulty, and some require no advance
review or preparation by the judge. In addition, many motions
are settled or withdrawn immediately before or on the hearing
date. If the judge has already reviewed the papers, the judge has
wasted his or her time when a motion is then withdrawn or settled. As previously noted, in the interest of minimizing such
waste, I have recently instituted a measure that was suggested in
several of the responses to the questionnaire. My secretary calls
counsel for the parties prior to my review of the papers on contested matters to ascertain whether the parties have initiated settlement discussions and what the prospects for settlement are. If
the parties have not attempted to discuss settlement or if the discussions have not been concluded, the matter is adjourned sua
sponte to complete the discussions, unless they represent that
there is no chance for settlement. This procedure is saving me
countless hours of reviewing papers on motions that would have
ultimately settled on or slightly before the hearing date.
Responding judges also reported a number of practices regarding the scheduling of hearings on motions which are aimed
at conserving judicial time or expediting the disposition of motions.1 75 A large number of jurisdictions employ a calendar sys173 Twenty-three percent of responding judges (including myself) grant uncontested motions en masse at the inception of the calendar to expedite disposition, and
72% do not. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 7. See also supra note 53 and
accompanying text for discussion on whether bankruptcy judges should generally
rule on uncontested motions at all.
174 Seventy-nine percent of responding judges reported that they generally review these papers before the hearing date, and 18% responded that they generally
do not. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 8. Thirty-eight percent of the
judges reported that they ordinarily review the papers in advance for certain types
of motions, but not for others. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 9.
175 A number of districts reported local rules for the purpose of conserving judicial time in hearings on motions. See S.D. ALA. BANKR. CT. R. 362(b); D. ALAsKA
BANKR. CT. R. 70(f); D. ARIZ. BANKR. CT. R. 4001(D) & (E); C.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R.
111(7)(a); E.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 401(n), 914(f); D. COLO. BANKR. CT. R. 23(G);
N.D. GA. BANKR. CT. R. 755-2; W.D. LA. BANKR. CT. R. 2.2(D); D. MD. BANKR. CT.

19931

USE OFJUDICIAL TIME

1383

tem that sets similar motions on a particular day. For example,
separate dockets are set for chapter 13 matters in a number of
districts. Additionally, many courts place all motions on one or
two specified motion days.
Finally, another practice which can conserve judicial time relates to motions on which more than one fact or point of law
must be established before the party can obtain relief. In reviewing and ruling on the motion, the court can address the least time
consuming element first, and then go through the others in ascending order of lengthiness. In this manner, if the movant fails
to prove any conjunctive element of entitlement to relief, the
court will have spent the least possible time in disposing of the
motion.
2.

Adversary Proceedings

An adversary proceeding is a formal lawsuit within a bankruptcy case. 176 The types of matters which require an adversary
proceeding are those which typically require the procedural and
discovery rules which are applicable for civil litigation in the district courts. 17 7 Unlike "contested matters" under Bankruptcy
R. 41(b)(5), (d)(2)(A) & (B); D. MASS. BANKS. CT. R. 26(A)(3)(a); E.D. MIcH. BANKR.
CT. R. 2.08(d), 2.10(b), & 2.22(b); D. MINN. BANKR. CT. R. 1210 & 1215; E.D. Mo.
BANKR. CT. R. 7007(a); D. NEB. BANKR. CT. R. 9014(D) & 9017(B)(1); D.NJ. BANKR.
CT. R. 3(E) & (G); W.D.N.Y. BANKR. CT. R. 38(A)(3); E.D.N.C. BANKR. CT. R.
9014.1(f); N.D. OHIo BANKR. CT. R. 4:0.8(a)(1); S.D. OHIo BANKR. CT. R. 5.4(b) &
5.5; W.D. OKLA. BANKR. CT. R. 12(d) & (e); E.D. PA. BANKR. CT. R. 4008.2 (b)
4008.3(d) & (e) & 9019.2; W.D. PA. BANKR. CT. R. 9013.4(1); D.R.I. BANKR. CT. R.
10(d); D.S.D. BANKR. CT. R. 306(A)(3); M.D. TENN. BANKR. CT. R. 1.41(e); N.D.
TEX. BANKR. CT. R. 4001(b), 9007(b) & (d) & 9014(a); W.D. TEX. BANKR. CT. R.
2016(b), 4001(b)(1)-(3) & (e), 7016, 9013(3) & 9014(c); E.D. VA. BANKR. CT. R.
109(K) & 302(G)(2); W.D. WASH. BANKR. CT. R. 9013(j)(2)(B). See also appendix 4.
176 A separate file is opened by the clerk for each adversary proceeding.
177 Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which apply in adversary proceedings, incorporates by reference most of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. An adversary proceeding is:
[A] proceeding (1) to recover money or property... (2) to determine
the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property
...(3) to obtain approval ... for the sale of both the interest of the
estate and of a co-owner in property, (4) to object to or revoke a discharge, (5) to revoke an order of confirmation of a chapter 11, chapter
12 or chapter 13 plan, (6) to determine the dischargeability of a debt,
(7) to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief, (8) to subordinate
any allowed claim or interest, except when subordination is provided
in a chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 plan, (9) to obtain a declaratory judgment
relating to any of the foregoing, or (10) to determine a claim or cause
of action removed pursuant to 28 USC § 1452.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. Many of the rules in Part VII apply to contested matters as
well. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
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Rule 9014, in which the court may hear the matter on affidavits,178 adjudication of issues of material fact in an adversary proceeding requires a trial in which witnesses testify orally in open
court." 7 9 This section considers techniques for expediting reso-

lution of adversary proceedings, which is a stated goal of the
80

law. 1

Most judges use pretrial conferences to expedite matters.,8
Pretrial conferences tend to narrow the issues and encourage settlement. Indeed, it has been my experience that merely scheduling a pretrial conference causes a good number of adversary
proceedings to be settled before the conference to avoid the
preparation and court appearance required for it.
Another time-saving device used by some judges is to schedule multiple trials in adversary proceedings on the same date, a
practice sometimes called "deep stacking."' 8 2 The essential
premise of deep stacking is that most cases scheduled for trial on
a given date will settle, and the remaining one or two can then be
178 See FED. R. Civ. P. 43(e), which is incorporated in FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017
(stating that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court
may hear the matter on affidavits").
179 See FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a), which is incorporated in FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017
(requiring that "[i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in
open court"). See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7040 (providing for trials in adversary
proceedings). By contrast, Bankruptcy Rule 7040 is not one of the rules in Part VII
of the Bankruptcy Rules which Bankruptcy Rule 9014 lists as ordinarily applicable
in contested matters.
180 See supra note 158.
181 Pretrial conferences are governed by Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7016 which
incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 in adversary proceedings. See FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7016. Rule 16(a)(1)-(5) provides:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a
conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action; (2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of
management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; (4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation, and;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
Eighty-two percent of responding judges report that they generally conduct
pretrial conferences in adversary proceedings. See appendix 3, Questionnaire § III,
No. 1. Eighteen percent of responding judges, however, generally do not conduct
pretrial conferences because they consider such conferences to be a waste of time
in most adversary proceedings. See id.
182 Forty-seven percent of responding judges reported that they employ this
practice, and 52% reported that they do not. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § III,
No. 2. Most of the responding judges who use this practice reported that there are
limits to the number of trials which they will schedule for the same date. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § III, No. 3.
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tried on that date. This premise is not always proven correct on a
given date, however, and the result will then sometimes be inconvenience, additional expense and involuntary continuance of the
trial date.18 3 Successful use of deep stacking therefore requires
careful balancing by the court of factors including the degree of
backlog in cases awaiting trial and the potential expense in time
and money to litigants when an involuntary continuance is required due to overscheduling of matters for the same date. The
benefits of this practice derive from the fact that most cases do, in
fact, settle before trial. As such, the failure to schedule more
than one trial for the same date will therefore frequently result in
a vacancy on a judge's calendar which could have been used for
trial of another case which has not been settled. Moreover, in
bankruptcy courts with a high volume of adversary proceedings
and other contested matters requiring evidentiary hearings,
scheduling of multiple trials for the same date is necessary
to pre84
vent inordinate delays in receiving a trial date.1
Judicial review of the parties' papers in preparation for trial
can be very time-consuming. While most judges review all the
papers before the trial,' 85 one way that some judges are able to
conserve time is by not reviewing the papers before trial for certain types of matters, such as routine complaints to determine the
dischargeability of credit card debt, which tend to be simple and
6
8

very fact-sensitive. 1

Another method that some judges find very helpful is to require the parties to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions
of law and trial briefs before the trial, because they believe that
such requirement compels the attorney to focus on what must be
proven, which in turn tends to lessen presentation of unnecessary evidence. Some judges also require that all exhibits be
premarked for identification, and filed and served before trial in a
binder or notebook, because it tends to reduce delays for mark183 This problem was cited by the respondents who do not use this procedure as
the primary reason for declining to do so. See id.
184 For example, there were 360 adversary proceedings filed in my cases in 1992,
and 566 total adversary proceedings pending at the close of the calendar year. For
courts with that kind of volume, deep stacking of trials is essential. Under such
circumstances, occasional inconvenience and expense to litigants from waiting in
the courthouse for trial or involuntary continuance of the trial date is, regrettably,
one of the fortunes of war.
185 Eighty-eight percent of responding judges generally review briefs and related
papers before the trial. See appendix 3, Questionnaire § III, No. 4.
186 Eighteen percent of the responding judges employ this time-saving method.
See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § III, No. 5.
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ing of exhibits during the trial.1 8 7

For the purpose of expediency, many judges also place certain limitations on how the trial itself will be conducted. For in88
stance, a number of judges do not allow opening statements.
Other judges that do allow opening statements will nevertheless
place time limits on such statements. 18 9 Judges almost uniformly
permit closing arguments, although many will set time limits on
such arguments as well.' 90
Efficient use of trial time sometimes requires restrictions on
the presentation of evidence at trial.' 9 ' In fact, the court is required to exercise reasonable control toward this end. One technique which sometimes expedites trials is to require proofs on
the least time-consuming element of a cause of action or defense
first and the most time-consuming element last, in ascending order. Failure to prove any element of the claim or defense can
then result in the most expeditious ruling possible. This technique can not be used in every trial due to interconnection of the
proofs, disruption of the flow of evidence, or for other reasons.
It can often be helpful, however.
Another limitation that courts can impose is to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 92 Also, the judge
can require the parties to submit a summary of the contents of
voluminous writings, recordings or photographs in lieu of the
originals to streamline and expedite proofs. 19'
187 Id. I employ both of those practices, and have found them to be beneficial. I
got the idea for premarking exhibits from my colleague, Chief Bankruptcy Judge
William H. Gindin of the District of New Jersey.
188 Twelve percent of the judges generally do not allow opening statements.
Eighty-six percent of the judges generally permit opening statements. See appendix
3, Questionnaire, § III, No. 6.
189 Thirty-two percent, including myself, reported that they will set time limits on
opening statements. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § III, No. 7.
190 Ninety-one percent of judges reported that they generally permit closing arguments. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § 3, No. 12. Forty-one percent of the
judges, including myself, reported that they set time limits on closing arguments.
See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § 3, No. 13.
191 See supra note 158. See also infra note 192.
192 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that relevant evidence can be excluded "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
193 FED. R. EVID. 1006. The originals must be made available to other parties for
examination and/or copying. Id. The judge can order production of the originals
in court in addition to the summaries, to be available if needed. Id.
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Certain limitations on the manner in which testimony is
presented can also be very valuable tools for conserving time.
Some bankruptcy judges, most notably in the central and southern districts of California, follow a procedure entitled "trial by
declaration."' 9 4 Under this procedure, direct testimony of witnesses is submitted before trial by certification or "declaration."' 9 5 The witness must then be present in court and available
for cross-examination on the date of trial, or the declaration is
not admitted into evidence. This procedure can shorten trial
time in various ways.' 96 The time ordinarily required to present
194 See appendix 6, The Honorable Barry Russell, United States Bankruptcy
Judge for the Central District of California, Trial By Declarations[hereinafter Trial By
Declarations].
195 A declaration is defined as "an unsworn statement or narration of facts made
by party to the transaction, or by one who has an interest in the existence of the
facts recounted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 367 (5th ed. 1979). Section 1746 of
Title 28 of the United States Code, provides that an unsworn declaration may substitute for an affiant's oath if the declaration is made under penalty of perjury. See
28 U.S.C. § 1746 (stating that a "matter may . . . be supported, evidenced, established, or provided by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of
perjury, and dated.").
196 Id. See also S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, A GUIDE TO THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF
BANKRUPrCY MEGA-CASES 23-24 (Federal Judicial Center 1992) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY MEGA-CASES]. The primary advantage of the trial by declaration procedure
is conservation of trial time. Id. at 24. Despite the advantages, however, questions
arise as to how this procedure can be reconciled with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) and Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 802. Id. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 43(a) requires that "in all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by [the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court." FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). Federal Rule of Evidence
801(c) defines the term "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVtD. 801(c). Federal Rule of Evidence 802,
provides that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by [the Federal Rules
of Evidence] or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court." FED. R. EVID.
802. It has been suggested that trial by declaration may be inadmissible hearsay.
See BANKRUPTCY MEGA-CASES, supra, at 24. If the witness is present in court and
available to testify, however, it would seem that a hearsay objection would be without merit. The witness could simply adopt and incorporate by reference all statements made by declaration. Moreover, the purpose of the hearsay objection is to
preserve the Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination, and that purpose is met
by requiring the presence and availability of the witness for cross-examination. Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted
with the witnesses against him..."). See also Harries v. United States, 350 F.2d 231,
236 (9th Cir. 1965) (opining that "[t]he right to cross examine a witness is fundamental in our judicial system").
Further, the Ninth Circuit has upheld the bankruptcy court's practice of trial by
declaration. Adair v. Sunwest (In re Adair), 965 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1992). The Adair
court reasoned that the bankruptcy court's procedure does not raise due process
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direct testimony is eliminated and cross-examination of witnesses
tends to be more focused and less time-consuming.197 Additionally, this method facilitates pretrial settlement and enables the
judge to be more prepared for trial. 198 As a result, trial by declaration may be beneficial in small and medium-sized cases as well
as in mega-cases.
The judge can also expedite testimony by interrupting the
attorney or the witness if the question or answer does not appear
relevant to a fact in issue and requesting a proffer as to the significance of the testimony.' 9 9 If the proffer is not acceptable the
judge can bar the testimony to avoid wasting time. Additionally,
the judge can sometimes limit the number of witnesses which a
party may present at trial.2 ° ° Some judges who decline to limit
the number of witnesses are concerned that imposing such a limitation may create due process problems. 20 ' This practice is, however, sometimes an appropriate exercise of discretion under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.202 An example is where a witness
is called solely to establish facts which the judge considers established by prior witnesses.2 0 3 An alternative to limiting the
number of witnesses a party may present, or a supplement to
such practice, is to limit the length of time which each side has to
present its case.20 4 One way to do this is to require the attorneys
concerns because the practice allows for oral cross-examination and redirect examination in open court, which provides the judge with an opportunity to observe the
witness's credibility. Id. at 780.
197 BANKRUPTCY MEGA-CASES, supra note 196,. at 24. It should be noted that there
may be some resulting increase in the time spent preparing for trial in analyzing the
declarations. There will still be a net time savings, however, because it ordinarily
takes considerably less time to read a declaration than it takes to go through the
questions and answers orally on direct examination in open court.
198 Id.
199 See FED. R. EVID. 61 l(a)(2) (providing that "[tihe court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to . . .avoid needless consumption of time").
200 Twenty-six percent of responding judges stated that they will limit the
number of witnesses which a party may present at trial because of time considerations, and 69 percent stated that they will not. Five percent had no response. I will
limit witnesses in appropriate cases. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § II, No. 8.
201 Id.
202 See supra note 192 for text of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
203 Some of the judges who reported a willingness to consider limiting the
number of witnesses gave this example in support. See appendix 3, Questionnaire,
§ III, No. 9.
204 Forty-five percent of judges stated that they sometimes limit the length of
time which each side has to present its case. Fifty-two percent of judges reported,
however, that they do not impose such time limits. Three percent had no response.
See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § III, Nos. 10 & 11. Occasionally, I have had to
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to inform the court before trial as to how much time they will
need to present their case, and then hold them to that amount.
Such a practice can be an appropriate exercise of discretion
under Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (a) (2).
I am keenly aware that due process and fundamental fairness
are paramount in trials and all other court proceedings, and I
have no doubt that all of my colleagues who employ the time
conservation measures in question have that awareness as well.
It is therefore a given that if employment of a particular time conservation measure would deny due process or fundamental fairness in a given case, such measure cannot be used. Each case is
sui generis in many respects, and time conservation measures
which cannot be used in some cases will work very well in others.
All of the aforementioned practices will be proper and effective
in some cases. It must be remembered that the courts have a
mandate to avoid unjustifiable expense and delay.20 5
3.

Valuation of Property

Valuation of property is required in numerous circumstances
under the Bankruptcy Code. 20 6 Valuation can be very time-consuming, for two principal reasons. First, the testimony of appraisers or other experts is often required. Second, valuation is
often complex. For example, it often requires consideration of
both going concern value and liquidation value, and then a judicial choice as to which standard to use under the circumstances. 207 Examples of time saving methods are discussed
below.20 8
When the court is required to determine value, there are
several ways it can expedite the process. One method that some
judges use to simplify the process of valuation is to rule on disemploy this practice. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § III, No. 10. See also BANKRUPTrcY MEGA-CASES, supra note 196, at 23 (advocating the placement of strict time
limits on the duration of a trial as a method of streamlining trials).
205 See supra note 158. Responding judges reported various other practices which
are intended to conserve their time or expedite disposition of trials. Judges from
18 districts reported the existence of local rules for that purpose. See appendix 3,
Questionnaire, § III, Nos. 14 & 15.
206 See supra note 161.
207 See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32
UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1063-66 (1985) (defining "going concern value" and "liquidation value").
208 Judges from 17 districts reported local rules that are intended to conserve
judicial time spent on valuation of property. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § IV,
No. 4.
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putes regarding value solely on the basis of conflicting appraisals
or other documentary evidence. 20

9

A common example of this is

use of a N.A.D.A. Used Car Guide as conclusive evidence of the
value of a motor vehicle.21 ° Many such judges will, however, determine value in this manner only if the parties consent. 21 ' Also,
in chapter 13 cases where the value of residential property is contested between the debtor and a secured creditor, some judges
employ a practice in which the trustee will hire a disinterested
appraiser and the parties will split the cost or the loser will bear
it, and such appraiser's conclusion as to value will be dispositive.
Additionally, in circumstances where value is contested and a determination is required, use of the "trial by declaration" procedure can substantially reduce the time spent in open court on
appraisal testimony.21 2
Since value is frequently only one element of a claim or defense, the court can sometimes rule on the matter in question
without adjudicating value. This is a corollary of the principle,
mentioned previously, that the court may consider the least timeconsuming elements of a cause of action or request for relief
first. 21 3 For example, on a motion for relief from the automatic

stay under Code § 362(d)(2), it is unnecessary to determine
whether there is equity in the property if the court has already
determined that the property is necessary to an effective reorganization. 2 Another example of this is on motions under Code
§ 362(d)(1) for relief from the automatic stay due to lack of adequate protection. 2151 Here, value is relevant, but it is often not
necessary to determine the value of the property. Instead, it is
only necessary to determine whether such value, whatever it may
209 Forty-seven percent of responding judges reported that they will sometimes
employ this method. I am one of those. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § IV, No.
1.
210 See infra note 219 for specific local bankruptcy rules authorizing the use of
the N.A.D.A. Used Car Guide for expediting valuation in chapter 13 cases.
211 Fifty-one percent ofjudges never determine value without live testimony and
two percent had no response. Id.
212 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. See also appendix 6, Trial By
Declarations.
213 See supra sections IX(l) & IX(2).
214 See 11 U.S.C. 9§ 362(d)(2)(A) & (B). These sections are in the conjunctive
and, therefore, both must be proven. This will, however, only apply in chapter 11,
12 and 13 cases because section 362(d)(2)(B) is automatically proven in a chapter 7
case.
215 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). See also 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (providing that "the
court shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease [of property of the estate]
as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest [of a lienholder or
co-owner]").
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be, is decreasing. 2 16 Judges will sometimes decline to rule on
value on motions for relief from the automatic stay in favor of
imposing a deadline for sale of the property or confirmation of a
plan.2 t7
Lastly, the court should not overlook the possibility of obtaining a stipulation as to value, or at least as to lack of equity, in
appropriate cases. I typically ask the parties on a motion under
Code § 362(d), for example, if there is a dispute about equity for
purposes of that motion, and the parties will often put an oral
stipulation regarding equity on the record notwithstanding that
they had not done so in their papers.
4.

Chapter 13 Cases

The volume of chapter 13 cases varies greatly from district
to district. 218 As with other areas of bankruptcy practice, the extent of the need for practices to expedite chapter 13 cases is proportionate to the volume of such cases.219 In some districts the
judge has minimal involvement in chapter 13 cases unless there
216 See 11 U.S.C. § 361. Section 361 states that adequate protection can be provided by cash payment, additional or replacement lien, or other indubitable
equivalent to the extent that operation of § 362, 363 or 364 "results in a decrease in
the value of such entity's interest in such property." Id. (emphasis added).
217 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § IV, No. 2. This question could have been
stated more clearly, since some judges reported that they did not understand it.
218 The disparity among districts in the number of chapter 13 filings is wide. See
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, By Chapter
of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Twelve Month Period Ended Dec. 31, 1992, 23 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) No. 38, at A12-A15 (April 8, 1993). The five districts with the highest filings for 1992 were the Northern District of Georgia (16,160), the Central
District of California (14,090), the Western District of Tennessee (12,920), the
Northern District of Illinois (8064) and the Northern District of Texas (7864). See
id. In contrast, the five districts with the lowest filings for 1992 were the District of
Guam (2), the District of North Dakota (36), the Northern District of Iowa (75), the
District of Virgin Islands (40) and the District of Vermont (41). Id. The average
number of chapter 13 filings per district for 1992 was approximately 3000. Id.
219 Twenty-seven districts reported local rules to conserve judicial time or expedite disposition of chapter 13 cases. See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § V, No. 5. See
also E.D. ARK. BANKR. CT. R. 8(I) (allowing use of N.A.D.A. to expedite method of
valuation); W.D. ARK. BANKR. CT. R. 8(I) (authorizing use of N.A.D.A. to expedite
method of valuation); D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 31 (a) (providing that court can consider
modification of plan without notice to creditors and on short notice to trustee when
modification would not have adverse effect on creditors); D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 33
(authorizing allowance of fees up to $1500 at confirmation hearing without a separate application and hearing); S.D. OHIO BANKR. CT. R. 3.18.3(g) (permitting use of
N.A.D.A. to expedite method of valuation); E.D. VA. BANKR. CT. R. 313(E)(1) (authorizing confirmation of chapter 13 plan without a hearing if no objection filed
and other requirements of confirmation are met).
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is a dispute. 220
The court can conserve time in chapter 13 cases by making
the maximum possible use of the standing trustee. One example
of this is to permit the standing trustee to conduct uncontested
chapter 13 confirmation hearings without the judge's presence in
the courtroom to conserve bench time.2 2 ' Other practices involving the trustee include permitting the trustee to grant continuances of uncontested confirmation hearings and to dismiss
cases without the judge's presence unless contested. In addition,
the trustee may be able to mediate resolution
of contested mo22 2
tions for relief from the automatic stay.
Some of the time saving devices that were previously mentioned can also be particularly useful to courts with a high volume of chapter 13 filings. One example is deep stacking of
chapter 13 matters.2 23 Also, some judges confirm uncontested
chapter 13 plans en masse at the inception of a calendar to expedite disposition.22 4 Finally, some judges do not hold a confirmation hearing unless an objection is filed.2 2 5
220 Ten percent of responding judges stated that their involvement in chapter 13
cases is limited to contested confirmation hearings and other contested matters. See
appendix 3, Questionnaire, § V, No. 3. Customarily, uncontested confirmation
hearings are not put on the calendar by those judges and are confirmed without a
hearing. In some districts, the chapter 13 trustee is solely responsible for determining whether an uncontested plan will be confirmed.
221 Twenty-eight percent of responding judges, including myself, permit the
standing trustee to conduct uncontested chapter 13 confirmation hearings without
the judge's presence in the courtroom. Fifty-four percent do not employ this practice, and 18 percent had no response. See id.
222 Such mediation is being initiated by several judges in the District of New
Jersey on an experimental basis.
223 See appendix 3, Questionnaire, § V, No. 4.
224 Thirty-seven percent of responding judges reported that they confirm uncontested chapter 13 plans en masse at the inception of a calendar. Fifty-two percent of
judges do not employ this practice, and 11 percent had no response. See appendix
3, Questionnaire, § V, No. 2.
225 Id. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (providing that "[a]fter notice, the court shall
hold a hearing on confirmation of the plan") with 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (defining the
phrase "after notice and a hearing"). If a hearing is required to confirm all chapter
13 plans, this raises the question of what constitutes a "hearing." See supra note 60
and accompanying text for discussion of what constitutes a hearing. If a hearing is
required to confirm an uncontested chapter 13 plan, submission of the trustee's
recommendation for confirmation as reflected in the order of confirmation, should
be a sufficient "hearing." If the court can not rely on the trustee's recommendation
in those situations, a fundamental problem exists in the relation between the court
and the trustee.
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CONCLUSION

The lack of unanimity on any of the time conservation measures mentioned in this article suggests that some of them may be
controversial. In my opinion, however, no measure mentioned in
this article is per se improper or unlawful. To the contrary, I believe that they are all proper, although the circumstances of each
case and each court will dictate what is most appropriate therein.
To any colleagues who may have misgivings, or worse, about any
of these measures, I reiterate what I stated in the introduction to
the effect that I would not be so presumptuous or foolish as to
tell another court how it should conduct its business. I would
also add that if my caseload had not tripled in the last four years,
I probably would not have felt any need to consider many of
these measures. Unrelenting pressure, however, tends to cause
change. As a result, I now employ many of the measures mentioned in this article, and I will be trying others that my colleagues suggested in their answers to the questionnaire. I am not
aware of any injustices having resulted. Perhaps the best way to
close a discussion of these measures, therefore, is to recall the
old Indian prayer to refrain from judging others until we have
walked a mile in their moccasins.
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Appendix 2
L. RALPH MECHAM
DIRECTOR
JAMES E. MACKLIN, JR.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544
November 1, 1989

Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh
Attorney General
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
At our recent meeting with the Chief Justice and the
Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference, you requested
information regarding the position of the Judiciary on the U.S.
trustee programs.
The enclosed information memorandum outlines the
concerns of the Conference regarding the placement of the
bankruptcy estate administration oversight function in the
Department ofJustice, describes problems in the implementation
of the program as seen by those who use the bankruptcy system,
and details our reasons supporting placement of the program in
the judicial branch.
The memorandum makes reference to comments and
opinions of persons who use the bankruptcy system and others
who have examined specific aspects of the implementation and
operation of the U.S. trustee program. I believe these comments
and opinions are significant both as to the large number of
independent sources they reflect, and the many distinct aspects
of bankruptcy estate administration they address. These
independent views reinforce the long-held position of the
Judicial Conference that this function should be placed in the
Judiciary.
Please let me know if I can provide any additional
information or respond to any questions you may have.
Sincerely,

L. Ralph Mecham
Director
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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM OUTLINING THE POSITION OF THE
JUDICIARY ON THE PLACEMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM

A.

Introduction

The United States trustee program evolved from congressional intent to separate judicial from administrative functions in
the bankruptcy cases. Congress envisioned the bankruptcy
judges would be responsible primarily for the adjudication of factual and legal disputes, while United States trustees would oversee the administration of estates and supervise trustees and other
fiduciaries.
The Judicial Conference of the United States supports the
separation of administrative and judicial functions and the establishment of an effective United States trustee program. It has,
however, consistently opposed placing that program under the
Department ofJustice. Rather, the Conference believes that the
United States trustees should be reconstituted as independent
statutory officers in the Judicial Branch, akin to the federal public
defenders.
B.

Background

The Department of Justice opposed placement of a permanent nationwide United States trustee program in the Department until 1986. Its views thus coincided with those of the
Judicial Conference.'
In considering the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the
House and Senate could not agree on where the estate administration oversight function should be placed. Accordingly, a politI In 1977 the Department ofJustice pointed out that a serious conflict of interest was created by placing the administration of the United States trustees in the

Department. Since representatives of the Department often appear in bankruptcy
court as advocates on behalf of government clients, the Department could have

clients on both sides of litigation. The Judicial Conference concurred in the views
of the Department of Justice that same year, and formally opposed placing the
United States trustee program in the Department.

The concurrence of views between the Department of Justice and the Judicial
Conference is noted in the separate views of four congressmen expressed at page
542 of House Report No. 95-595: "The Attorney General believes that requiring
the United States Trustees to operate under his direction may result in a conflict of
interest. The Judicial Conference supports this position. The Attorney General is
responsible for presenting the government's claims, particularly tax claims, against
bankruptcy estates. He should not also supervise the trustee who administers these

claims ..

"
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ical compromise was reached under which the United States
trustee program was established on a pilot basis in 18 judicial
districts under the Attorney General. No statutory arrangement
was provided for the remaining 72 districts.
After enactment of the 1978 legislation, the Attorney General and the Judicial Conference continued their opposition to
placement of the United States trustee program in the Department of Justice, and the Attorney General did not seek funding
for the program.
Since 1978, theJudicial Conference has on several occasions
reaffirmed its views against placement of the program in the Department of Justice. In addition to questions regarding conflict
of interest, the Conference has been concerned about duplication of clerical and administrative efforts in bankruptcy cases, excessive costs, interference with court case management efforts,
politics in the selection of U.S. trustees and in the administration
of estates, and potential erosion of the separation of powers between the Executive and Judicial Branches (since the courts and
the United States trustees are both responsible for the same
case).
In 1986 Attorney General Edwin Meese and Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns reversed the Department of Justice's
position and endorsed legislation to continue the United States
trustee system on a permanent basis within the Department. The
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986 made the U.S. trustee pilot program permanent under the Department of Justice and expanded it to all
judicial districts except those in the states of Alabama and North
Carolina. In those two states the Judiciary based Bankruptcy Administrator program is authorized to perform similar functions
until October 1, 1992.
2 Reporting to the Congress in 1984, Attorney General William French Smith
stated that "our two principal concerns about the program continuing on as part of
the Department ofJustice are that its primary mission is different from that of the
Department and that it creates at least the potential for a conflict of interest." The
Attorney General went on to explain:
The potentialfor conflict of interest occurs because, in the bankruptcy arena, the
DepartmentofJustice wears two hats. The U.S. Attorneys and the Civil and Tax
Divisions represent the government in its claims against bankruptcy estates, while
the U.S. Trustees are charged with impartially administering cases. A U.S.
Trustee could take a position in a case adverse to that taken by a U.S.
Attorney....
United States Dep't. ofJustice, Report of the Attorney Generalon the United States Trustee
System Establishedin the Reform Act of 1978 For the PeriodOctober 1, 1979 to December 31,

1983, pp. 58-59.
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C. Concerns Expressed About the Performance of the U.S. Trustee
Program
Many of the problems foreseen by the Judicial Conference in
the placement of the U.S. trustee program outside the Judicial
Branch have become a reality. The consensus among the bankruptcyjudges and clerks of court and many representatives of the
bankruptcy bar is that the United States trustee system is not well
administered on a national basis, while local offices vary greatly
in quality.
1.

General Concerns Expressed by Members of the
Bankruptcy Community

The House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Economic and Commercial Law, held oversight hearings on the
U.S. trustee program on June 22, 1989. Although some witnesses testified in favor of the program, substantial concern was
expressed over its administration. The following problems in the
performance of the U.S. trustee program were noted in testimony by members of the bankruptcy community:

(A)

Politics in the selection of U.S. trustees and subordinate
employees

There is concern that U.S. trustees, assistant U.S. trustees, and
others in the U.S. trustee program have been selected for
political
reasons rather than experience in the bankruptcy
3
area.

(B)

Internal problems in the relationships between the Executive
Office for United States Trustees and local U.S. trustee
offices

There is a perception that internal relationships between the
Executive Office for United States Trustees and local U.S.
trustees have been marked by political strife and by animosity
which has affected the quality of operations among the various
U.S. trustee offices. 4
3 See testimony of Richard L. Levine, first Director and Counsel of the Executive Office for United States Trustees, and Leonard M. Rosen, Chairman of the
National Bankruptcy Conference.
4 See opening statement of Congressman Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, and testimony of Richard L. Levine, first Director and Counsel of the Executive Office for the United States Trustees.
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Bureaucracy, Inefficiency, and Rigidity

There is concern that the U.S. trustee program is overly
bureaucratic. 5 Witnesses testified, for example, that:
(1) Local U.S. trustees have developed guidelines
and forms in such numbers as to make compliance
by parties extremely burdensome, far outweighing
any benefits to be derived therefrom. Excessive reporting requirements and administrative paperwork
in particular have hampered the activity of chapter
7 trustees, and are more often seen by them as an
administrative burden than a source of guidance
and assistance.
(2) There has been a lack of response by the Executive Office for United States Trustees when serious
questions regarding the functions of local U.S.
trustees have been called to that offices' attention
by the practicing bar. There is a lack of a clear definition in the U.S. trustee program concerning what
matters are to be governed by local versus national
policy.
(3) Objections to fee applications by U.S. trustees
are too often reflexive, rather than based on merit.
(D)

Misplaced Prioritiesin Use of Resources and Excessive Costs

There is a perception that U.S. trustees have been failing to make the best use of limited resources, resulting
in a waste of taxpayers' funds. 6 Witnesses testified, for
example, that:
(1) The emphasis and resources of the U.S. trustee
program have shifted away from chapter 11 cases
and are too highly focused on chapter 7 trustees
and reporting requirements. Chapter 7 trustees report that they are often appointed to serve as trustees in converted chapter 11 cases in which assets
have been dissipated, creditors have been unreasonably delayed by obviously hopeless reorganiza5 See testimony of Gary Knostman, President of the National Association of
Bankruptcy Trustees; Richard L. Levine, first Director and Counsel of the Executive Office for United States Trustees; and Leonard Rosen, Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
6 Id.
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tion efforts, large unpaid administrative claims have
been incurred, and sometimes state and federal tax
returns and payments have not been made.
(2) With regard to U.S. trustee involvement in
chapter 7 cases, U.S. trustees too often are looking
for wrongdoing as their primary goal, rather than
attempting to assist the overwhelming majority of
trustees who are conscientiously attempting to perform their tasks.
(3) When U.S. trustees are involved in chapter 11
cases, the focus of involvement has too frequently
been on large chapter 11 cases with active creditors'
committees. This allocation of scarce resources is
unjustified given the enormous need to monitor
smaller chapter 11 cases in which there is frequently little or no creditor interest and a significant possibility of abuse.
(4) U.S. trustees too frequently get involved in substantive decisions in chapter 11 cases where there is
an active creditors' committee and the U.S. trustee
presence is neither necessary nor wanted.
2. Judiciary Concerns about the Performance of the U.S.
Trustee Program
The aforementioned problems reflect the concerns of experienced members of the bar and trustees with the current U.S.
trustee program as it affects their practice and the bankruptcy
system. While the Judiciary shares their concerns, it has experienced, in addition, its own set of problems with the performance
of the U.S. trustee program.
(A)

U.S. Trustee Challenges to JudicialAuthority and Attempts to
ArrogateJudicialAuthority

The Judiciary is concerned about: (1) U.S. trustee challenges to, or interference with, judicial decision-making
authority based on incorrect or exaggerated interpretations of U.S. trustees' authority, and (2) U.S. trustee attempts to use the courts for the limited purpose of
enforcing U.S. trustee guidelines, rather than for the
benefit of parties in interest.
Examples of U.S. trustee actions that challenge judicial
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decision-making authority include those which attempt
to:
(1) overturn, negate, or modify orders of the bankruptcy court (e.g., In Re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 Bankr.
767 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989));
(2) limit the power of the court to approve appointments of fiduciaries (e.g., In Re Plaza de Diego Shopping Center Inc., No. 88-02749 (D.P.R. July 20,
1989));
(3) pre-approve the court's approval of employment of professionals 7 ; and
(4) pre-approve the court's approval of trustee final
reports and accounts'.
Examples of U.S. trustee actions that seek to use the
courts for narrow U.S. trustee purposes (including rigid
interpretations of the law), rather than for the benefit of
estates, include those in which U.S. trustees have attempted to have the court:
(1) appoint fiduciaries, despite the opposition of all
parties in interest and facts that indicate such appointments are unnecessary or detrimental to reorganization (e.g., In Re Revco D.S. Inc., No. C88- 4392A, (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 21, 1989));
(2) enforce onerous and unnecessary U.S. trustee
reporting requirements (e.g., In the Matter of Crosby,
93 Bankr. 798 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. 1988)); and
7 The U.S. trustee office in one region follows a guideline which attempts to
prohibit a debtor from filing with the court an application to employ a professional
unless the debtor has first presented a copy of the application to the U.S. trustee at
least five days in advance. The guideline is designed to give the U.S. trustee sufficient time to object to the employment.
Bankruptcy judges have expressed their opposition to the guideline for the
following reasons: (a) the law does not require a debtor to wait five days after
service on the U.S. trustee before filing an application with the court; (b) such action is unduly burdensome and unnecessary, and interferes with the debtor's right
to legal representation; and (c) the U.S. trustee is attempting to pre-approve the
court's approval of employment, in effect usurping judicial authority.
8 Several U.S. trustees require that trustees file a final report and account with
the U.S. trustee before filing it with the bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy judges have
expressed their opposition to such guidelines on the grounds that it is in violation
of the Code (sections 704(9), 1106(a)(1), 1202(b)(1), and 1302(b)(1)) and represents an attempt to pre-approve the court's approval of the final report and
account.
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(3) use its contempt power as device for. the collection of U.S. trustee fees. (e.g., In Re Smith and Son
Septic and Sanitation Service, 88 Bankr. 375
(Bankr.D.Utah 1988)).
Inevitably, placement of the judicial and estate administration oversight functions in two separate branches of
the government fosters "turf" problems, despite the
good intentions of employees in both branches. These
turf problems would be reduced substantially without
jeopardizing congressional concern for separation of
administrative and judicial functions if the U.S. trustee
program were placed in the Judicial Branch.
(B)

Case Closing

United States trustees are responsible for appointing
and supervising case trustees, supervising the administration of estates, and monitoring applications for compensation pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code and 28
U.S.C. § 586(a). Auditing the reports and fees of case
trustees, monitoring the distribution of estate funds,
and certifying to the court that the case has been properly administered are logical extensions of the United
States trustee's enumerated statutory duties. To find
otherwise would inject bankruptcy judges into trustee
supervision and oversight of estate administration.
The ultimate authority to close a case, however, remains
a judicial responsibility. Section 350 of the Bankruptcy
Code and Bankruptcy Rule 5009 provide that the court
shall close a case after "an estate is fully administered"
and the court has discharged the trustee. Accordingly,
the court cannot perform its judicial function until it is
assured that trustees have performed their administrative responsibilities.
In 1987, the Executive Office for United States Trustees
and the Administrative Office jointly developed interim
guidelines regarding the appropriate division of administrative responsibilities between bankruptcy clerks and
local United States trustees. The guidelines were endorsed by the Bankruptcy Committee of the Judicial
Conference.
One of the key features agreed upon in the guidelines is
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that U.S. trustees will audit the final reports of case
trustees and certify that each case has been fully administered so the bankruptcy judge may order it closed.
Many bankruptcy courts report, however, that their local
U.S. trustees are not performing the duties agreed
upon, and are declining to certify the accuracy of trustee
reports to the courts. This practice has been promoted
by the Executive Office for United States Trustees in Directive T-0 16 [issued on June 1, 1989] which instructs
U.S. trustees not to certify reports of no distribution in
chapter 7 cases, except on a random basis. In addition,
they are instructed not to certify reports in cases under
chapters 11, 12, and 13.1
The failure of U.S. trustees to certify case trustee performance in individual cases delays case closings, interferes with court case management, and holds up
distributions to creditors. It also encourages continued
court involvement in the administration of estates and
contributes to the already severe workload strain on the
Judiciary's personnel resources.
TheJudiciary believes that the issue of the U.S. trustees'
failure to certify trustee performance to the courts is
largely one of priorities rather than resources. The Judicial Conference believes that the auditing of trustee
reports is a fundamental oversight function which demands greater priority by the U.S. trustee program.
The United States trustee system's budget for fiscal year
1989 was over $50 million, funded from the court's filing fees and from quarterly assessments levied on chap9 In a recent paper discussing the certification issue, three former Department
of Justice employees associated with the U.S. trustee program pointed out that:
It is difficult to see how an individual United States Trustee can certify the propriety of the distribution without an analysis of the particularfacts in the case.
Any pleadingsigned by a lawyer is, per se, a representationof the accuracy of the
facts recited therein.... [Bankruptcy Rule] 9011, Fed.R. Civ. P. 11. An assertion by an attorney that a representationin a pleading to the court was based on
a random sample of thefacts would hardly insulate the attorneyfrom the imposition of Fed. R. Civ.P. 11 sanctions in any other context.
J. Pearson, J. FitzSimon, and I. Picard, Sed Qui Custodet Ipsos Custodes, p.100 n.136
(Aug. 1989), presented at Sept. 18-19, 1989 Federal Judicial Center Workshop for
Chief Bankruptcy Judges. The Honorable John K. Pearson is a bankruptcy judge
for the District of Kansas and a former assistant U.S. trustee; Jean K. FitzSimon was
formerly with the Department of Justice; and Irving H. Picard is a former U.S.
trustee under the pilot U.S. trustee program.
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ter 11 debtors. For fiscal year 1990, almost $63 million
has been requested to operate the program. The
United States trustee system has a staff of about 900 50 percent more than the Executive Office estimated to
the Congress in 1986 that it would need. In addition, it
pays for the services of a substantial number of Department of Justice auditors. The staffing levels of the U.S.
trustee system are much greater than either the Bankruptcy Administrator program presently administered
by the Judiciary in six districts or the clerks' office total
estate administration, case closing, and auditing operations prior to 1986 (fewer than 300 employees in 72
districts).
(C) Transfer of Collateral
Without prior notification to the courts, the United
States trustees in at least three regions made overbroad
requests to Federal Reserve banks for the transfer of
collateral in ALL bankruptcy cases from bankruptcy
court accounts to United States trustee accounts. In
combination with administrative errors and a lack of
safeguards for the transfer of collateral in at least one
Federal Reserve bank, these requests in some districts
resulted in the improper transfer of collateral in bankruptcy cases outside United States trustee jurisdiction.
The above combination of factors resulted in a particularly serious situation for the bankruptcy court in at least
one district where ALL collateral pledged to the court,
regardless of the source of the original deposits, was
transferred to the U.S. trustee account. Thus, in addition to improperly transferring collateral from certain
types of bankruptcy estate funds deposited under Treasury Circular 154, the Federal Reserve transferred all
collateral pledged from funds deposited to the court's
registry account under Treasury Circular 176. This
could have exposed the court to serious liability.
The requests for transfer of collateral by local U.S.
trustee offices appear to have been accomplished with
the knowledge, and possibly at the direction, of the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
The Judiciary believes that the problems created by the
improper transfer of collateral-and the effort ex-
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pended to rectify these problems-could have been
avoided if the Executive Office for United States Trustees and local U.S. trustees had notified the courts in advance of taking action.
(D)

Automation

Section 310 of the 1986 Bankruptcy Act required the
Executive Office for United States Trustees, "in consultation with the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts," to establish an electronic
case management demonstration project in three judicial districts no later than one year after the effective
date of the Act (i.e., by October 26, 1987). The electronic system was supposed to meet the total information needs of four categories of users: (1) the
bankruptcy court (2) the local U.S. trustee; (3) other
federal agencies, including the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts and the Department ofJustice;
and (4) the public.
The Judiciary urged the Executive Office from the outset not to "reinvent the wheel" and to build on the solid
foundation of the Judiciary's BANCAP automated full
docketing and case management system. The Judiciary
further insisted that any system designed for the bankruptcy courts (and operated by the bankruptcy clerks)
must be compatible with other elements of the Judiciary's automation program. The Administrative Office of
the United States Courts made it clear that once the
demonstration was completed, it could not take over
support for any system that was either incompatible with
Judiciary standards or too expensive to operate.
The Executive Office, however, decided to build an expensive system that was not compatible with Judiciary
systems. The contract for hardware, software, and implementation of the Executive Office's system was advertised in the fall of 1988, with bids due on January 23,
1989. No vendor bid on the contract.
In the wake of its failure to meet the statutory obligation
for developing an electronic case management demonstration project, the Executive Office recently has reversed its position and has now agreed to develop an
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automated system that will be compatible with
BANCAP.
The Judiciary is pleased that the Executive Office has
taken this appropriate approach. A considerable
amount of time, effort, and money were needlessly
wasted, however, in attempting to develop an automated system from scratch that would have been incompatible with the Judiciary's existing automated system
and would have been overly costly.
(E) Performance or Non-Performance of Statutory Functions,
Generally
Most trustee oversight and estate administration functions are by statute discretionary with each local U.S.
trustee. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3). If the U.S. trustee does
not perform the 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) functions of supervising the performance of trustees, debtors in possession, and creditors' committees, the function simply
will not be performed at all because the Judiciary's responsibilities were transferred to the Department of
Justice by statute. Some of these discretionary U.S.
trustee functions relate directly to the court's ability to
process its workload in an expeditious manner, including the following:
(a) taking action to ensure that all reports, schedules, and statements are properly and timely filed
by the debtor;
(b) monitoring activity by debtors in possession
and creditors' committees in chapter 11 cases;
(c) monitoring the progress of cases and taking action to prevent undue delays;
(d) monitoring trustee reports;
(e) auditing trustee and fiduciary reports; and
(f) reviewing proposed distributions to creditors.
Many of these oversight functions are not being performed regularly or consistently. This lack of performance has a negative impact on the ability of some
bankruptcy courts to manage and expedite their
caseloads. Failure of case trustees to properly perform
their duties has resulted in extra docketing, scheduling,
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and paperwork for the clerks' offices. A larger portion
of scarce personnel resources in these clerks' offices has
had to be devoted to monitoring cases for inactivity than
otherwise would have been necessary if U.S. trustees
were properly monitoring the progress of cases to prevent undue delay.
Many judges and attorneys are also concerned about
rote filings by some U.S. trustees of certain types of motions - such as objections to fee and motions to dismiss
or convert for failure to pay U.S. trustee quarterly fees
and unnecessary pleadings filed with regard to disclosure statements and plans in chapter 11 cases with active
creditors' committees, which contribute to congestion
of court calendars.
3.

U.S. Trustee Conflict of Interest in the Administration
of Bankruptcy Cases

The potential for conflict of interest has long been a concern
of the Judicial Conference and previous Attorneys General. This
potential has been documented by independent sources.
The issue was raised at the June 22, 1989 oversight hearings
by House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks. Quoting
extensively from a June 1987 newspaper article, Mr. Brooks expressed concern that a bankruptcy judge had ruled in the INSLA W case that the Executive Office, which is supposed to be
independent and treat all debtors and creditors equally, had improperly attempted to force a software firm to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 and may have threatened retaliatory action
against the local U.S. trustee if he had failed to do so.
On September 29, 1989, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a staff report on its investigation of
the INSLA W matter. Although the subcommittee staff found no
explicit proof of a conspiracy within the Department of Justice to
force INSLAW into bankruptcy, they found that the Director of
the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees had improperly sought
special handling for INSLAW's bankruptcy proceeding in order
to secure continued support for his office from the Justice Department, a party to the proceedings.1"
Accordingly, the Staff Report concluded that:
10 Staff Study on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' Inquiry of the
INSLAW Matter, pp. 36-37.
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The inability of the EOUST to remain neutral in a case
where the Justice Department is a party suggests that there may
be a need to remove such cases to a more neutral and independent forum."
The Staff Report recommended that the General Accounting Office (GAO) review the operations of the Executive Office for the U.S. Trustees, and that the U.S.
trustee be prohibited from playing any part in bankruptcy cases wherein the Department of Justice is party
to the litigation:
The U.S. Trustee program, administered by the Department of Justice, is designed to be an independent office
to oversee the administration of bankruptcy cases in the
United States. The Staff found that the system can be
manipulated, resulting in the potential for biased handling of bankruptcy filings.
. . . Two avenues for correction exist: 1) remove the
Trustee program from the Executive Branch to preclude
the possibility of "special treatment" to any department,
agency, or office in the Executive Branch; or 2) legislate
a requirement that the Trustee recuse2 himself in cases in
which the Department is a creditor.'

Although the INSLA W case is perhaps the most latent example of
a conflict of interest which can occur with placement of the U.S.
trustee program in the Department of Justice, it is not the only
one. A paper written by three former Department of Justice officials points to the conflict of interest problems that have arisen in
the relationship between the Internal Revenue Service (and other
governmental creditor agencies) and the U.S. trustee due to
placement of the program in the Department of Justice:
The I.R.S. is traditionally represented by the Department of Justice. Situations have arisen where the Department of Justice has directed the United States
Trustee not to participate in cases in support of the case
trustee's position. The United States Trustee has an interest in and a duty to protect the system. Thus, arguably, the United States Trustee should support a cases
1 Staff Study on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' Inquiry of the
INSLAW Matter, p. 37.
12 Staff Study on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' Inquiry of the
INSLAW Matter, pp. 77, 78.
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trustee in a dispute with the I.R.S. where the outcome of
the dispute may have an effect on the overall administration of cases entrusted to panel trustees.' 3
The conflict of interest questions would be eliminated by transferring the U.S. trustee program to an independent office within
the Judicial Branch. The transfer would restore faith in the impartiality and integrity of the U.S. trustee program in the exercise
of its responsibilities.
D. Concluding Observations
1. Regarding the Judiciary's Lack of Confidence in the
Current U.S. Trustee Program
The Judiciary has attempted to work with Executive Office
for United States Trustees to fulfill the intent of the Congress in
creating a national U.S. trustee system. Every effort has been
made by the Judiciary to share information and provide the Executive Office with input. The Director of the Executive Office has
bene invited, for example, to participate fully in each meeting of
the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, and his input has
been sought regularly on administrative matters, such as the revision of the bankruptcy forms. He and his staff have been invited
to speak to judges and clerks at their conferences and seminars
and to participate in joint working groups to prepare guidelines
for local clerks of court and U.S. trustees.
Many bankruptcy judges and clerks, however, believe that
the Executive Office has not seriously attempted to work with the
Judiciary to address mutual concerns and resolve differences.
An independent survey of bankruptcy judges conducted by
the editors of Turnarounds & Workouts subsequent to the June
1989 congressional oversight hearing on the U.S. Trustee program produced the following noteworthy results:
(1) Only 27 percent of bankruptcy judges thought that
the U.S. trustee program should remain a section of the
Department of Justice. By way of contrast, 46 percent
thought that the program should be a section of the Administrative Office, 12 percent thought it should be an
independent agency, and 15 percent were undecided.
(2) Only 22 percent of bankruptcy judges agreed that
13 J. Pearson, J. FitzSimon, and I. Picard, Sed Qui Custodet Ipsos Custodes, p. 78
(Aug 1989). See Footnote 2.
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"management" by the Department of Justice has provided effective leadership during the nationwide implementation of the U.S. trustee program, compared with
39 percent of judges who disagreed and 39 percent who
were undecided.
(3) 50 percent of bankruptcy judges agreed that the
quality of the persons appointed U.S. trustees has suffered because the process is too politicized, compared
with 30 percent who disagreed and 20 percent who were
undecided.
(4) Over half the bankruptcy judges (54 percent) agreed
that the U.S. trustees have imposed excessively detailed
requirements on participants in the bankruptcy process,
compared with 36 percent who disagreed and 10 percent who were undecided.
(5) Only 16 percent of bankruptcy judges agreed that
U.S. trustees have improved the bankruptcy system by
more aggressively prosecuting bankruptcy crimes, compared with 51 percent who disagreed and 33 percent
who were undecided.
(6) While a majority of bankruptcy judges agreed that
overall the U.S. trustees have made worthwhile contributions to the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy
system (60 percent and 47 percent, respectively), a sizeable group of judges disagreed (30 percent and 39 percent, respectively).
2.

Regarding the Benefits of Placing the U.S. Trustee
Program in an Independent Office in the Judicial
Branch

The Judicial Conference believes that placing the U.S.
trustee program in the Judicial Branch would eliminate the aforementioned problems created by placement of the program in the
Department ofJustice. Moreover, transfer of the program to the
Judicial Branch could be accomplished with minimal disruption
while maintaining the desirable separation ofjudicial and administrative functions in processing bankruptcy cases. More specifically, reestablishing the program as an independent office within
the Judicial Branch would ensure more efficient administration of
the bankruptcy system by:
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(1) Eliminating politics in the appointment and supervision of personnel;
(2) Eliminating conflict of interest questions in estate
administration;
(3) Permitting more uniform performance in the estate
administration oversight function;
(4) Permitting the judicial councils of the circuits and
the Judicial Conference of the United States to resolve
procedural differences between the courts and U.S.
trustees; and
(5) Fostering more efficient use of personnel, eliminating unnecessary paperwork and reducing expenditures.
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Appendix 3
Questionnaire Regarding the Use of Time-Saving
Practices by Bankruptcy Judges
Name:
Address:

Phone No.
Fax No.
Year of Appointment:

I.

GENERAL

1. Has the number of cases filed in your district increased
over the four years from 1/1/89 to 12/31/92? Yes
No
Unknown
2. If known, state the number of cases filed in your district in
1988 and 1992 by chapter:
chapter

1988

1992

7
9
11
12
13
3. State the number of bankruptcy judges authorized in your
district:
4. Has the number of hours which you spend administering
your caseload increased over the past 4 years (or since you've
been on the bench, if less than 4 years)? Yes __
No __
5. If the answer to no. 4 is "yes," estimate the average
increase in hours spent administering your caseload from the
later of your date of appointment and 1/1/89 to 12/31/92:
Less than 5 hours per week
__
5-10 hours per week
More than 15 hours per week __
If more than 15 hours per
week, state amount
6. Estimate the average number of hours per week which
you spent administering your caseload in 1989 ( or your first year
on the bench, if later)
and in 1992
7. Estimate the average number of hours per week which
you spent on other judicial duties, such as administrative
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responsibilities, in 1989 (or your first year on the bench, if later)
_

. Summary of Answers:

and in 1992

The answers to questions 1 and 2 were sporadic. These
statistics are available from the Administrative Office of the
Courts. The answer to question 3 can be ascertained from 28
U.S.C. § 152 and The Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-361, 106 Stat. 965 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 152); Act of
Nov. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-587, 102 Stat. 2982 (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 152); Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat.
3088 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 152).
The answers to questions 4 through 7 indicated that there
was widespread misunderstanding or confusion as to the
intended meaning of the phrase "administering your caseload,"
and as to other aspects of these questions. Therefore, the
questions were not clear enough, and the answers are not being
reported.
II.

MOTION PRACTICE

1. Do you ever refuse to permit oral argument on motions
because of time considerations? Yes

explain:
ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response

#
50
69
01

No

If yes,

42
57
01

Summary of Comments:

The answers indicated that if the moving and responding papers are adequate, many judges will limit or dispense with oral
argument unless the parties request it. Some judges responded
that they will direct the argument toward particular issues. Some
judges referred to local rules regarding oral argument. Most
judges who refuse to permit oral argument cited docket congestion as the reason.
2. Do you set any time limits on oral arguments on motions?
Yes

No _

If yes, explain:

ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response

#
70
48
02

58
40
02

Summary of Comments:

The responding judges generally reported that they set time
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limits ranging from 7 minutes per attorney up to 1 hour, with the
most frequent answer being 15 minutes. These time limits are
determined based upon the complexity of the issues. Some
judges explained that they have no general rules for limiting
time, but indicated that the less serious the issue, the less time
allotted for argument. Other judges who failed to mention general rules on time limits, explained that they will simply cut off
attorneys when they become redundant or long-winded. Some
judges stated that they will stop an argument when they "have
heard enough." One judge submitted that experienced counsel
"know better," and are aware that they will be cut off if unduly
long.
Some judges asserted that they render a tentative ruling at
the beginning of a proceeding to focus the argument. Onejudge
asks parties to set estimates on time needed for argument, and
will then hold them to that estimate.
3. Do you generally permit live testimony on motions?
Yes
No
Comments:
ANSWER

#

70

67
56
Yes
42
No
50
02
No Response
03
Summary of Comments:
Most judges reported that affidavits are usually sufficient and
live testimony is rarely required. Some judges always permit live
testimony. Other judges will do so only when there is a dispute
as to material facts. Some judges only permit live testimony at a
final hearing, while others will set a separate trial date.
4. If the answer to 3 is yes, do you set any limits on the presentation of live testimony on motions because of time consideraNo _
If yes, explain.
tions? Yes
ANSWER

#

_0

Yes
39
33
41
34
No
40
33
No Response
Summary of Comments:
Some judges set time limits in advance based upon the parties' estimates of the time required or the exigencies of the
court's calendar on that day. Otherjudges will limit testimony of
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appraisers by admitting the appraisal into evidence as direct testimony and limiting live testimony to cross-examination.
5. Are there any types of motions which are automatically
granted if uncontested without your personal review of the moving papers? Yes

No

If yes, explain:

ANSWER
#
_0
Yes
77
64
No
42
35
No Response
01
01
Summary of Comments:
Some judges will automatically grant all or virtually all uncontested motions, while others will raise sua sponte objections
to any motion. Specific types of motions which some judges reported are automatically granted if uncontested include: Code
sections 362(d) and 522(b); extension of time to file schedules or
proofs of claim; motions to reopen; modification of chapter 13
plans; sale of property; objections to claims; abandonment of
property and fee applications.
6. If the answer to 5 is yes, does someone on your staff or in
the clerk's office review the moving papers on such motions
before they are granted? Yes

__

No

__

If yes, explain:

ANSWER
#:
Yes
78
65
No
05
04
No Response
37
31
Summary of Comments:
The position of the persons who perform this function vary.
Judges reported that one or more of the following perform this
function, depending upon the judge: law clerk; secretary; courtroom deputy; judicial assistant; administrative manager and
other personnel in the clerk's office.
7. Do you grant uncontested motions en masse at the inception of a motion calendar to expedite disposition? Yes
No
Comments:

ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response

#
28
86
06

_0
23
72
05

1993]

USE OF JUDICIAL TIME

1419

Summary of Comments:
Most judges reported that they do not employ this practice.
Many judges noted in response to this question that uncontested
motions are not put on the calendar at all and are summarily
granted. Judges who reported granting uncontested motions en
masse at the inception of the calendar did not have any particular
comments about the practice.
8. Do you generally review moving and responding papers
No __
before the hearing date? Yes
_

ANSWER

#

.0

Yes
95
79
No
22
18
No Response
03
03
Summary of Comments:
Some judges have their law clerk or courtroom deputy review and summarize the moving and responding papers, with the
judge reading only such summary on certain motions. Other
judges read the papers at or after the hearing.
9. If the answer to 8 is yes, are there any types of motions
which you do not ordinarily review before the hearing date because of time considerations? Yes __
No __
If yes, explain:
ANSWER

#

.0

Yes
46
38
No
50
42
No Response
24
20
Summary of Comments:
Some judges reiterated that they read all papers. As to those
judges who don't, one inference which can be drawn from the
responses to this question is that the more difficult or complex
the matter, the greater the likelihood that the judge will personally read the papers. The types of matters specifically mentioned
in response to this question include all uncontested matters, motions to lift stay, abandonment of property and chapter 13
matters.
10. Do you have any other practices regarding the scheduling of hearings on motions which are intended to conserve your
time or expedite disposition? Yes __
No
__
If yes, explain:
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ANSWER
#
70
Yes
88
73
No
19
16
No Response
13
11
Summary of Comments:
Many responses to this question are noted in the text.
Others include: pretrial conferences; status conferences; phone
conferences; docket call; only schedule hearing when timely objection is filed; use of tentative rulings to focus argument; cover
sheets on stay motions; setting hearings based on estimated
length.
11. Are there any local rules in your district which are intended to conserve your time or expedite the disposition of motions? Yes

__

No

__

If yes, identify rule numbers and

explain:
ANSWER
#
Yes
89
No
22
No Response
09
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 177 and accompanying test.
III.

70
74
18
08

ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS

1. Do you generally conduct pretrials in adversary proceedings? Yes

No

Comments:

ANSWER
#
_0
Yes
98
82
No
20
18
No Response
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Other comments
included: pretrial conferences are conducted by phone; the law
clerk conducts them; they are only conducted if it is a complex
case or if the parties believe that the trial will take more than one
day.
2. Do you engage in "deep stacking," i.e., the scheduling of
multiple trials in adversary proceedings on the same date?
Yes

No

Comments:
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ANSWER
#
.0
Yes
56
47
No
62
52
No Response
01
01
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Other comments
include: only deep stack if trial will last less than one day; only
for § 523(a)(2)(A) trials; only with out-of-town dockets; times are
staggered throughout the day.
3. If the answer to 2 is yes, do you set any limits on the
number of trials scheduled for the same date?
No
Comments:

Yes

ANSWER
._O
Yes
49
41
No
17
14
No Response
54
45
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Numerical limits
given ranged from 2 to 30.
4. Do you generally review any briefs or other papers related to the trial before the hearing date? Yes

__

No

__

ANSWER
#:
Yes
106
88
No
13
11
No Response
01
01
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
5. If the answer to 4 is yes, are there any types of trials in
which you do not review any papers before the hearing date because of time considerations? Yes

__

No

__

Explain:

ANSWER
#
Yes
21
No
84
No Response
15
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
6. Do you generally permit opening arguments? Yes

No

Comments:

18
70
12

__
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ANSWER
#
70
Yes
103
86
No
14
12
No Response
03
02
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
7. If the answer to 6 is yes, do you set any time limits on
opening arguments? Yes

__

No

__

Explain:

ANSWER
#
_0
Yes
38
32
No
64
53
No Response
18
15
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Some judges set
limits of 5 to 10 minutes. Other judges stated that limits vary
depending upon the complexity of the issues.
8. Do you ever limit the number of witnesses which a party
may present in a trial because of time considerations? Yes
No
Comments:

ANSWER
#:
Yes
31
No
83
No Response
06
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
9. If the answer to 8 is yes, do you have any general
or practices regarding such limitations? Yes

__

No

__

26
69
05

policies
__

If yes, explain:
ANSWER
#
_0
Yes
14
12
No
27
22
No Response
79
66
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 205 and accompanying text. Some judges
noted that they do not permit testimony on issues which are not
disputed, or as to which the correct outcome has clearly been
established by prior testimony.
10. Do you ever limit the length of time which each side has
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to present its case? Yes
ANSWER

_

No

_

#

1423
Comments:
.0

Yes
54
45
No
62
52
No Response
04
03
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 206 and accompanying text. Some judges
noted that they will only do this for emergency hearings.
11. If the answer to 10 is yes, do you have any general policies or practices regarding such limitations? Yes
No
If yes, explain:
ANSWER
.0
Yes
22
18
No
35
29
No Response
63
53
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 206 and accompanying text. Some judges
noted that the estimated length of trial is set at the pretrial conference, and then parties may only exceed such estimate for
cause. Other judges require equal sharing of available trial time.
12. Do you generally permit closing arguments? Yes __
No
Comments:
ANSWER

#

Yes
109
91
No
11
09
No Response
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
13. If the answer to 12 is yes, do you set any time limits on
closing arguments? Yes
No
Explain:
ANSWER
_7
Yes
49
41
No
60
50
No Response
11
09
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 192 and accompanying text. Some judges require the argument to focus on issues which they are still wrestling with.
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14. Do you have any other practices regarding trials which
are intended to conserve your time or expedite disposition? Yes
No

_

If yes, explain:

ANSWER
#
7
79
Yes
95
No
15
13
No Response
10
08
Summary of Comments:
See generally section IX(2) of article. In addition, some judges
believe that a liberal continuance policy conserves time, while
others believe that a very strict continuance policy expedites disposition. One judge stated that notes are taken on a personal
computer and examined in chambers at a later time.
15. Are there any local rules in your district which are intended to conserve your time or expedite the disposition of trials? Yes

_

No __

.

If yes, identify rule numbers and

explain:
ANSWER
#
Yes
43
No
53
No Response
24
Summary of Comments:
N.D. ALA. BANKR. CT. R. 21
C.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 119, 121(1) & (2), 122
E.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 703, 738, 739, 915 & 917
S.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 7016.4, 7016.10
N.D. GA. BANKR. CT. R. 220, 730
D. MD. BANKR. CT. R. 43
E.D. MicH. BANKR. CT. R. 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.19 & 2.20
E.D. Mo. BANKR. CT. R. 12, 13 & 15
E.D. PA. BANKR. CT. R. 3007.2, 7016.1 & 9019.2,
W.D. PA. BANKR. CT. R. 9001
D.R.I. BANKR. CT. R. 32 & 38
D.S.D. BANKR. CT. R. 309 & 310
W.D. TENN. BANKR. CT. R. 9, 14, 14(a)&(b) & 17
N.D. TEX. BANKR. CT. R. 2002, 4007, 9007 & 9014
W.D. TEX. BANKR. CT. R. 7016
D. UTAH BANKR. CT. R. 529 & 533
E.D. VA. BANKR. CT. R. 111 & 401-07
W.D. WASH. BANKR. CT. R. 16

.0
36
44
20
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VALUATION OF PROPERTY

1. Do you ever determine the value of property when such
value is contested without live testimony and based solely on
conflicting appraisals or other documentary evidence?
Yes

__

No

If yes, explain the circumstances under

_

which you will do this.
ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response

#
56
61
03

70
47
51
02

Summary of Comments:

See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
2. Do you have any practices or procedures to determine applications in which the value of property is contested (e.g. motions under Code § 362(d)) without determining such value, such
as by using alternative bases for your decision? Yes
No __
If yes, explain:

ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response

#:
28
77
15

23
64
13

Summary of Comments:

See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
3. Do you have any practices or procedures on applications
to determine the value of property which are intended to conserve the time which you must spend on such valuation?
Yes

_

No

__

ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response

If yes, explain:

#
59
49
12

_0
49
41
10

Summary of Comments:

See generally section IX(3) of article. Some judges stated that
they do not allow live testimony as to value unless absolutely necessary. One judge reported that if the parties disagree as to
value, the judge takes retail or loan value and amortizes by computer program.
4. Are there any local rules in your district regarding valuation of property which are intended to conserve judicial time
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If yes, explain:

spent on such valuations? Yes
ANSWER
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#

25
Yes
88
No
07
No Response
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.

70
21
73
06

(regarding evidence on mo-

C.D.

CAL. BANKR. CT.

R. 112(3)

E.D.

CAL. BANKR. CT.
GA. BANKR. CT.

R. 401, 914, 915 & 917

tions).
M.D.

R.

D. KAN. BANKR. CT. R.

W.D. LA.

BANKR. CT.

R. 2.2(a)(3)

(requiring that in chapter
12, the parties must exchange appraisals 5 days
before a hearing).
(valuing automobile and
other common goods absent special circumstances
at average of wholesale and
retail).

(allowing for relief from
stay when valuation requires
use of witness or appraisal).

E.D. MICH. BANKR. CT. R. 2.09
N.D. Miss. BANKR. CT. R.

S.D. OHio

BANKR. CT.

R. 17

(using average NADA trade
in value for autos in chapter
13's. Rule can be rebutted
by actual proof).

(providing for averaging the
wholesale and resale values
from NADA Official Used
Car Guide in chapter 13
cases and further requiring
that in chapter 13 cases
debtors submit written appraisals of real estate unless
the plan is a 100% dividend
or property was recently
purchased).

N.D.

TEX. BANKR. CT.

R. 4001(e)

(using preliminary hearing
to lift stay based on affidavits).
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(precluding a party from
calling more than one expert on same subject).

V.

CHAPTER

13

CASES

1. Approximately what percentage of your cases are under
chapter 13? _
7o
Answer: The answers were sporadic. These statistics are available
from the Administrative Office of the Courts.
2. Do you confirm uncontested chapter 13 plans en masse at
the inception of a calendar to expedite disposition? Yes
No
Comments:
ANSWER
#
.0
Yes
44
37
No
62
52
No Response
14
11
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
3. Do you permit the standing trustee to conduct uncontested chapter 13 confirmation hearings without your presence in
the courtroom to conserve bench time? Yes
No
Comments:
ANSWER
#
_0
Yes
33
28
No
65
54
No Response
22
18
Summary of Comments:
See supra notes 222, 223 and accompanying text.
4. Do you have any other practices regarding chapter 13
cases which are intended to conserve your time or expedite disposition? Yes
No
Explain:
ANSWER

#

_0

Yes
69
58
No
35
29
No Response
16
13
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
5. Are there any local rules in your district which are intended to conserve your time on or expedite the disposition of
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Explain:

ANSWER
#
Yes
36
No
60
No Response
24
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
VI.

70
30
50
20

SETrLEMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES

1. Do you actively encourage settlements as a means of conserving your available time? Yes
__
No _
Comments:

ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response
Summary of Comments:

#
102
18

70
85
15

-

-

See supra note 144 and accompanying text. One judge reported that the judge will never try a case without first trying to

achieve a settlement. Some judges reported the belief that refusing to grant continuances encourages settlement.
2. Do you sometimes participate in settlement negotiations
in your cases if all parties consent? Yes

No

__

__

Com-

ments:
ANSWER
#
_7
Yes
74
62
No
45
37
No Response
01
01
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
3. Do you ever employ arbitration, mediation or other alternative dispute resolution procedures? Yes
No __
If
_

yes, explain:

ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response

#0
35
84
01

29
70
01
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Summary of Comments:
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
4. Do you have any procedures in place for prompt notification by parties of settlements or withdrawal of applications so
your time is not wasted preparing for matters which have been
resolved? Yes

No

If yes, explain:

ANSWER
#
70
Yes
76
63
No
42
35
No Response
02
02
Summary of Comments:
See supra notes 151, 153 and accompanying text.
5. Do you have any other practices regarding settlements
which are intended to increase the likelihood of settlements? Yes
No

_

If yes, explain:

ANSWER
#
70
Yes
53
44
No
58
48
No Response
09
08
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 145 and accompanying text. All specific suggestions reported in the survey have been noted in this section or
elsewhere in the article, except that one judge noted that requiring the attendance of the parties at pretrial conferences increases
the possibility of settlement.
6. Are there any local rules in your district which are intended to facilitate settlements? Yes
identify rule numbers and explain:

__

No

__

ANSWER
#
Yes
26
No
84
No Response
10
Summary of Comments:
See supra notes 142, 143 and accompanying text.
VII.

If yes,

7.
22
70
08

LITIGATION IN ALTERNATIVE FORUMS

1. Do you ever abstain sua sponte from adjudicating matters
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to conserve your time? Yes
ANSWER

___

No

__

[Vol. 23:1329
If yes, explain:

#

Yes
41
34
No
78
65
No Response
01
01
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 139 and accompanying text. Some judges
stated that they will abstain sua sponte if matter is noncore; has
minimal impact on bankruptcy case; involves § 523(a)(3) or was
removed from state court to bankruptcy court without sufficient
cause.
2. Does the amount of time which it will take to adjudicate a
matter have any bearing on your decisions on applications for
abstention and/or for relief from the automatic stay to litigate in
another forum? Yes __
No
If yes, explain:
ANSWER

#0

Yes
44
37
No
72
60
No Response
04
03
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
3. Do you have any practices or policies regarding abstention and/or relief from the automatic stay for purposes of litigation (e.g. to liquidate claims or to determine liens) which are
intended to conserve your time? Yes
No
__
If yes,
explain:
ANSWER
#
Yes
25
21
No
91
76
No Response
04
03
Summary of Comments:
See generally section VII of article. One judge reported that if
it's a noncore matter and parties do not consent to final order by
a bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c), the judge abstains.
VIII.

APPLICATIONS

1. Do you have any policies or practices regarding the submission or processing of applications other than motions which
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No

__

If

yes, explain:
ANSWER
#
70
Yes
59
49
No
53
45
No Response
08
06
Summary of Comments:
Some such practices are noted at various places in the article. Other reported practices include: having U.S. trustee or
bankruptcy administrator review fee applications; having the
clerk's office review fee applications and applications to employ
professionals and having the courtroom deputy, law clerk or secretary review all applications.
2. Are there any local rules in your district which are intended to conserve the time which you must spend on such applications or to expedite their disposition?

Yes

__

If yes, explain:
ANSWER
#
Yes
33
No
72
No Response
15
Summary of Comments:
C.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. 111 & 118
D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 8 & 16
W.D. TENN. BANKR. CT. R. 6
N.D. TEX. BANKR. CT. R. 2016
W.D. TEX. BANKR. CT. R. 2014, 2016, 4001 & 9014
E.D. VA. BANKR. CT. R 308
D. UTAH BANKR. CT. R. 531 & 535
IX.

No

__

_0
28
60
12

ORDERS

1. Do you permit your clerk's office to prepare and sign any
orders under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9021 as a means of conserving
your time? Yes

__

orders.
ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response
Summary of Comments:

No

If yes, identify the types of

#:
75

62

38
07

32
06
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See generally section V of article.
2. Do you permit your chambers staff to sign any orders for
you as a means of conserving your time? Yes
If yes, identify the types of orders.

_

No __

ANSWER
#
70
Yes
39
33
No
77
64
No Response
04
03
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
3. Do you require parties to use a subpoena or notice to
schedule examinations under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 before applying to you for an order compelling such examinations? Yes
No

Comments:

ANSWER
70
Yes
38
32
No
73
61
No Response
09
07
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
4. Do you routinely sign orders granting adjournments or
continuances? Yes

No

Comments:

ANSWER
#
70
Yes
53
44
No
61
51
No Response
06
05
Summary of Comments:
This question could have been phrased more clearly. The
comments indicate that the responding judges thought the inquiry was as to their adjournment policy. The inquiry, however,
was intended to relate only to use of orders as evidence of an
adjournment. Therefore, the percentages reported are of questionable significance.
I do not believe that an order is ordinarily required to reflect
an adjournment or continuance, with the possible exception of
situations covered by Code § 362(e). See D.N.J. BANKR. CT. R.
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3(i)(4) (providing a means of dispensing with orders under
§ 362(e)).
5. Do you routinely sign orders reflecting the withdrawal of
motions or applications? Yes

__

No

Comments:

ANSWER
..
7
74
62
Yes
37
45
No
No Response
01
01
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
6. Do you routinely sign orders reflecting stipulations or settlements? Yes

No

Comments:

ANSWER
#
.0
Yes
102
85
10
12
No
No Response
06
05
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
7. Do you have any practices or policies regarding signing of
orders which were not mentioned above and which are intended
to reduce the number of orders which you must sign? Yes
No __
If yes, explain:

__

ANSWER
._7
Yes
24
20
No
88
73
No Response
08
07
Summary of Comments:
See generally section V of article. Northern District of Alabama Bankruptcy Court Rule 14 allows the judge to use initials as
the judge's official signature. See N.D. ALA. BANKR. CT. R. 14.

Although the District of New Jersey does not have such a rule, I
have been using initials as my signature on most orders which I
am personally signing. This practice saves time and writer's
cramp where there is a high volume of orders.
8. Do you routinely sign orders when requested by parties
on uncontested applications for which a certification from the
clerk of no objection is an alternative means of validation (e.g.

1434

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
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ments:
ANSWER
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No

Com-

# _.

Yes
64
53
No
49
41
No Response
07
06
Summary of Comments:
See supra notes 70, 78 and accompanying text. Severaljudges
noted that they sign "comfort orders" for title insurance companies and taxing authorities. While I sometimes do so as well, I
am very reluctant to do so. I do not believe that as a general rule
the bankruptcy court should permit title companies or others to
dictate practices which require us to take actions which are not
legally necessary. This is one conspicuous example of that
problem.
9. Are there any local rules in your district which are intended to reduce the number of orders which you must sign?
Yes
No __
If yes, identify rule numbers and explain
_

ANSWER
Yes
No
No Response
Summary of Comments:
See generally section V of article.
X.

L

_0

31
79
10

26
66
08

See also supra notes 95 & 96.

SUA SPONTE ACTIONS

1. State whether you are ordinarily willing to raise sua sponte
objections to any of the following:
Type
Yes
No
fee applications
motions to vacate automatic stay
motions to avoid liens
chapter 13 plans
chapter 11 plans
chapter 12 plans
motions to sell assets
default judgments
other (identify):
Summary of Comments:
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See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
2. If the answer to 2 is yes, describe the circumstances under
which you will raise such objections.

Summary of Comments:
See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
3. Do you find that you are less likely to raise objections or
bring up issues sua sponte as your workload increases? Yes
No
Comments:

ANSWER
#
Yes
50
No
63
No Response
07
Summary of Comments:
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
XI.

_0
42
52
06

SUPPORT STAFF

1. Describe any practices or procedures by which your secretary conserves your time.
Summary of Answers:
Secretaries play an important role in achieving judicial economy. Almost all judges reported that their secretary conserved
judicial resources by screening calls and visitors to chambers.
Some judges entrust duties to the secretary including preparing
form orders, setting the calendar, dating orders for the judge's
signature, using a signature stamp and calling parties before
scheduled hearing dates to ascertain the status of the case.
Summary of Representative Responses:
1. Screens mail, visitors, and telephone calls - reviews orders
and documents for clarity and sensibility - prioritizes the day's
activities - maintains an accurate filing system.
2. Reviews motions and orders for any inconsistencies or discrepancies; handles telephone inquiries; schedules court docket
and calendar.
3. Works up non-asset files for review, organizes the courtroom
calendar and makes certain all files are pulled.
4. Reviews and flags Chapter 13 plans of nominal percentage
payment to unsecured creditors, handles inquiries from lawyers
and parties as to hearing dates and status of hearings.
5. Dates orders before forwarding them for judge's signature.
6. Maintains decisions index guide, tracks matters under
advisement.
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7. Calls attorneys one week before trial to check on settlement;
continues cases over the phone according to established criteria;
checks with attorneys 10 to 15 minutes prior to trial to be sure
exhibits are marked and witnesses present.
8. Reviews all orders to ensure compliance with notes made at
motion terms; reviews all fee applications for mathematical
accuracy.
9. Verifies that proposed orders comport with bench decisions;
has authority to authorize consent adjournments by telephone.
10. Uses signature stamp, alerts judge to any matters which need
immediate attention.
11. Prepares dozens of set forms of orders with minimal
instruction.
12. Signature stamps orders - those reviewed by the judge and
not needing further review.
13. Reviews all pleadings brought to chambers and prepares
form orders on several.
14. Date stamps signature on orders. Notes hearing status or
ruling on incoming orders.
15. Reviews all orders submitted by attorneys, reviews all applications to employ professionals, drafts routine type orders from
work sheet or courtroom notes.
16. Reviews all incoming orders for conformity with number of
copies, envelopes, etc. Bounces nonconforming orders.
17. Reviews all chapter 13 cases and fills out an informational
form on them. Coordinates all follow-ups with the law clerk.
18. Prepares form orders, reviews incoming orders.
19. Contacts all parties before contested matters to check on status of matter. This helps the cases flow more smoothly.
20. Review of final drafts of opinions and orders.
21. Uses personal computer to generate standard orders and
opinion drafts.
22. Places macro on all orders which states that "inasmuch as the
Bankruptcy Judges sign more than 10,000 orders annually, the
Court reserves the right to make additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law at a later date."
23. Matches calendar notes with proposed orders.
24. Reviews all orders for apparent defects, reviews employment
applications for Rule 2014 compliance.
25. Handles all processing matters relating to adversary proceedings: receiving the first status reports; preparing standard
form scheduling orders (using computer macros); and scheduling pretrial conferences.
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2. Describe any practices or procedures by which your law
clerk conserves your time.
Summary of Answers:
Law clerks perform various important functions to aid bankruptcy judges in dealing efficiently with their caseloads. These
tasks include legal research, writing, reviewing the calendar and
acting as a go-between.
Most judges reported that the primary time saving functions
of a their law clerk are preparation of the calendar and review of
routine applications and pleadings prior to hearing. Customarily, law clerks summarize and outline the contents of these papers to enable the bankruptcy judge to quickly review the papers.
After a careful survey of the court calendar, law clerks identify
problem areas and flag non-routine matters for the judge's attention. Many judges have detailed forms or "work sheets" that
their law clerks complete regarding the content of various motions. Law clerks also check motions on the docket for proof of
service. Particularly, law clerks perform a preliminary analysis of
fee applications and review certain motions for merit, i.e., motions for summary judgment. Somejudges reported that they ask
their law clerks to make brief recommendations as to what action
should be taken on a particular motion. Additionally, some law
clerks enter routine uncontested orders.
The principal responsibility of a law clerk is legal research.
Prior to hearing and trial dates, most law clerks prepare detailed
bench memos on relevant case law pertaining to complex legal
issues and adversary proceedings. These memos permit bankruptcy judges to conserve time by allowing them to make quick
decisions or rule directly from the bench. Bankruptcy judges
also rely on their law clerks for computer research on Lexis and
Westlaw. Such legal research is sometimes needed on short notice, such as during a hearing or trial.
Another important task of a law clerk is handling attorney
inquiries regarding procedural and scheduling matters. Some
law clerks act as buffers and intercept telephone calls from lawyers and parties in interest. Some bankruptcy judges allow their
law clerks to contact attorneys to discuss various matters. Many
law clerks also conduct routine scheduling and pretrial conferences for complicated matters.
Writing is another vital function of a law clerk. Most judges
require their law clerks to draft opinions. Bankruptcy judges who
prefer to write their own opinions, however, often rely on their
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law clerks to proofread and check citation format. One judge
even reported having his law clerk assist in preparing speeches.
Some law clerks also draft routine correspondence.
Many law clerks also act as liaison between the judge, the
deputy clerk and other court personnel. They direct other staff
when necessary and attempt to resolve any problems that arise.
Moreover, law clerks help train new clerks, handle student interviews and supervise student interns and extern staffs. The utilization of student interns has been of great value in alleviating the
backlog in many bankruptcy courts.
Additionally, law clerks perform various other functions in
the bankruptcy court. Law clerks update chambers libraries and
keep the judges apprised of recent case law and developments in
the bankruptcy arena. For some judges the law clerk acts as a
"sounding board" in discussing issues before the court.
Several bankruptcy judges employ career law clerks for long
terms. Such judges believe that career law clerks are much more
helpful than a clerk with a one or two year term. In the Western
District of Tennessee, career law clerks serve for a term of seven
and a half years. Additionally, several bankruptcy judges prefer
law clerks with experience as private practitioners.
3. Describe any practices or procedures by which your
courtroom deputy conserves your time.

Summary of Answers:
Many courtroom deputies review orders and simple motions.
One judge reported that his deputy reviews only motions which
may be granted without a hearing. The courtroom deputy reviews orders for conformity with the ruling. One judge reported
using his courtroom deputy to review uncontested and contested
motions as well as applications for rules compliance and proper
procedure. The courtroom deputy is often responsible for ensuring that the files are available and complete for hearings and
that they are properly tabbed before the hearing. For many
judges the courtroom deputy is a liaison between attorneys and
the judge. One judge reported that his courtroom deputy contacts attorneys at least one day before the hearing is scheduled to
ascertain the status of the matter.
A few judges reported that the courtroom deputy is responsible for granting continuances and combining hearings, when
possible. Some judges reported that the courtroom deputy handles the scheduling of hearings, in consultation with the judge.
Some judges reported that the courtroom deputy is given discre-
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tion to grant continuances without consulting with the judge.
One judge reported that while his courtroom deputy is authorized to grant continuances on motions, the deputy may not do so
for trials.
Some judges reported that their courtroom deputy drafts
minutes of the hearing and follows up with the attorneys thereafter. SeveraIjudges reported that the courtroom deputy prepares
all orders which resulted from a courtroom proceeding. One
judge reported that the courtroom deputy collects exhibits after
the trial as well as the names and appearances for written
opinions.
Many judges reported that their courtroom deputy is in
charge of tracking due dates. Some judges have the courtroom
deputy appear in court on motion days to facilitate the handling
of papers and files. Some judges have the courtroom deputy verify that service was proper. One judge has her courtroom deputy
make sure that all the attorneys are present and ready before she
enters the courtroom. Many courtroom deputies handle telephone inquiries regarding case status or courtroom procedure.
Some courtroom deputies stamp the judge's signature on routine
orders. Four judges reported that they do not have a courtroom
deputy.
4. Describe any practices or procedures by which other
personnel in the clerks' office conserve your time.
Summary of Answers:

Several judges indicated that certain functions ordinarily
performed by the secretary, law clerk or courtroom deputy as
stated above are instead performed by other personnel in the
clerk's office.
XII.

OTHER REMARKS

Describe any other practices or procedures which you use to
conserve your time.
Summary of Answers:

Any responses to this question have been noted above or in
the text of the article.
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I do
do not
grant permission to disclose my
identity in connection with the answers given above.
If applicable, I grant permission to disclose my identity in
connection with all answers given above except the following
[identify section and question numbers]:
_

_

United States Bankruptcy Judge
Dated:

1993
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Appendix 4

I.

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA BANKRUPTCY COURT LOCAL
RULE 12

RULE 12 PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTIONS DELEGATED TO
CLERK
Any functions delegated by the United States Bankruptcy Court
or the Judges thereof to the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court may
be exercised or performed through the deputies of such Clerk.
In issuing any notice or order appropriate to the carrying out of
such delegated functions, the notice or order shall be issued in
the name of the Bankruptcy Judge or Judges before whom the
case is pending, by the Clerk of Deputy Clerk.

II.

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY BANKRUPTCY COURT LOCAL RULE

4

AND COMMENTS

RULE 4 JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
(a) Any order or judgment must be a separate document.
The title of an order or judgment shall identify the nature of the
relief granted.
(b) The Court may approve standard forms of order and
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9021. When a decision
by the Court is identical to that provided in any such standard
form of order or judgment, and includes no additional relief or
ruling, the clerk shall prepare, sign and enter an order or judgment on the appropriate form as directed by the Court. Where
use of a standard form of order or judgment is required under
this subdivision, there shall be no substitution for, or modification or supplementation of such form without the express consent of the Court.
Rules Committee Comment
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9021 incorporates by reference Fed. R.
Civ. P. 58, which provides in pertinent part that the clerk shall
prepare and sign a judgment (a) for a sum certain, (b) denying all
relief or (c) upon a general verdict of a jury. Rule 58 provides
that in all other cases, the court shall "approve the form" of the
judgment. Rule 58 provides further that attorneys shall not submit forms of judgment except upon direction of the court, and
that such directions shall not be given as a matter of course. Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9002(5) defines "judgment" to include any appealable order. The court is therefore authorized, if not required, to
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prepare its own forms of orders and judgments to the extent
possible.
Utilization of standard forms of orders and judgments serves
several salutary purposes. First, it expedites entry:
Rule 58 is designed to encourage all reasonable speed in
formulating and entering the judgment when the case has
been decided. Participation by the attorneys through the submission of forms of judgment involves needless expenditure
of time and effort and promotes delay, except in special cases
where counsel's assistance can be of real value. See Matteson v.
United States, 240 F.2d 517, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1956). Accordingly, the amended rule provides that attorneys shall not submit forms of judgment unless directed to do so by the court.
This applies to the judgments mentioned in clause (2) as well
as clause (1).
6AMoore's FederalPractice 58.01[8], at 58-12 (2d ed. 1987) (citing Committee Note of 1963 to Amended Rule 58).
The second salutary purpose of utilization of standard forms of
order and judgments is that it promotes uniformity and lessens the
possibility of an order becoming lost in the mail, being misplaced in
the clerk's office or being misdesignated by a party submitting the
order.
Thirdly, by having the clerk sign such orders there is a substantial savings in the judges' time. The caseload of the judges in this
district is very heavy, and continues to increase. It has been determined that bankruptcy judges spend 15% of their case-related time
reviewing and signing orders. Gordon Bermont, et al., "A Day in
the Life: The FederalJudicial Center's 1988-1989 Bankruptcy Court
Time Study," 65 Am. Bankr. LJ. 491, 512-13 (Summer 1991). This
is because of the tremendous volume of such orders. The bankruptcyjudges in this district signed an average of approximately 200
orders per week during the last six months of 1992. It is, however, a
waste of the judges' time to review and sign routine orders. Use of
standard orders in such situations both reduces the time spent by
judges on this ministerial function and eliminates the possibility that
the clerk will inadvertently sign an order that does not accurately
reflect the court's decision. The judges' time is better spent making
decisions than reviewing and signing routine orders.
The clerk's duty to prepare and sign orders and judgments is
ministerial and may be performed by a deputy clerk in the name of
the clerk. Moore's Federal Practice, supra, 58.01[8], at 58-12. The
court may issue standing instructions to the clerk to enter judgment
in certain situations without any formal interposition by the court.

1993]

USE OFJUDICIAL TIME

1443

Id. 58.04[1], at 58-30 (citations omitted). The preparation, signing and entry of the judgment is ministerial and not a usurpation of
58.04[4.2], at 58-45 (citations
the court's judicial powers. Id.
omitted).
The judges will continue to sign all other orders and judgments. Subdivisions (c) and (d) provide a procedure for settling
form in situations where the judge does not sign an order at the
time of ruling.
III.

GENERAL ORDER AND STANDARD FORMS OF ORDER UNDER

LOCAL RULE 4(B)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
In re:
GENERAL ORDER PROVIDING
FOR STANDARD FORMS OF
ORDER UNDER LOCAL RULE
4(b)
The revisions to the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
("Local Rules") shall become effective on or about April 15,
1993, subject to approval of the District Court. Local Rule 4(b)
authorizes this Court to adopt standard forms of order to be prepared and signed by the Clerk. This General Order provides for
such standard forms of order. In addition, this Order also provides for certain standard forms of order to be prepared by parties in interest.
day of March, 1993 OR__
Therefore, IT IS on this
DERED as follows:
1. Standard Orders 1 through 21 annexed hereto shall be
prepared and signed by the Clerk pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9021 and Local Rule 4(b) as directed by the Court. The Clerk
shall use a stamp of the judge's signature, with the deputy clerk's
initials, for this purpose.
2. Standard Orders 22, "Order Granting Allowances," and
23, "Order for Relief," shall be prepared by the Clerk and signed
by the Court.
3. Standard Order 24, "Order Confirming Chapter 13
Plan," shall be prepared by the chapter 13 trustee and signed by
the Clerk in the manner set forth in 1 above.
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4. Standard Order 25, "Order to Employer or Other Party
to Pay to the Trustee and Mortgagee(s)," shall be prepared by
the debtor's attorney and signed by the Clerk in the manner set
forth in 1 above.
5. Standard Orders 25, "Entry of Default," an 27, "Judgment by Default under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7055(b)(1)," shall be
prepared and signed by the Clerk, using the deputy clerk's signature only.
6. Standard Orders 28, "Order Vacating Automatic Stay as
to Personal Property," and 29, "Order Vacating Automatic Stay
as to Real Property," shall be prepared by the creditor's attorney.
Each judge will have discretion as to whether to sign such orders
or to direct the Clerk to do so in the manner set forth in 1 above.
7. The operation of this Order may be modified as needed
in a particular case in the discretion of the Court.
William H. Gindin
Chief Judge

Rosemary Gambardella
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Judith H. Wizmur
U.S Bankruptcy Judge

William A. Touhey
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Stephen A. Stripp
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Novalyn L. Winfield
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Gloria M. Burns
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

IV.

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY BANKRUPTCY COURT STANDARD
ORDERS, RULE 16 AND COMMENTS

United States Bankruptcy Court
District of New Jersey
List of Standard Orders
Standard Order 01:
Standard Order 02:

Order to Show Cause for Dismissal or
Conversion of Chapter 11 Proceeding
Order of Dismissal (case dismissed/discharge revoked)
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Order Converting Case from Chapter
to Chapter

-

-

Standard Order 04:
Standard Order 05:

Order Reopening Case
Order Respecting Amendment of List of
Creditors (Chapter 11)
Standard Order 06: Order Respecting Amendment of List of
Creditors (Chapter 13)
Standard Order 07: Order Respecting Amendment of List of
Creditors (Chapter 7)
Standard Order 08: Order to Show Cause for Failure to File
Schedules in an Involuntary Case
Standard Order 09: Order to Show Cause for Dismissal of
Adversary Proceeding for Lack of Prosecution
Standard Order 10: Order Closing Adversary Proceeding
(check list)
Standard Order 11: Order Vacating Discharge of Debtor(s)
(check list)
Standard Order 12: Order Vacating Final Decree
Standard Order 13: Order Extending Time to File a Complaint Objecting to Discharge and/or Determine Dischargeability of a Debt
Standard Order 14: Order Extending Debtor's Exclusive
Time to File a Plan
Standard Order 15: Order Approving Disclosure Statement
and Fixing Time for Filing Acceptances
or Rejection of Plan, Combined with
Notice Thereof
Standard Order 16: Final Judgment for Sum Certain and
Costs
Standard Order 17: Order Denying Motion or Application for
Entry of an Order to

Standard Order 18:

Order Denying Motion or Application for
Entry of an Order to

Standard Order 19:
Standard Order 20:
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

Order
Order
Order
Order
Order

-

(main case)

Order of Recusal (adversary case caption)
Order of Recusal (main case caption with
Adversary No. included)
Order Transferring Related Case
Order Granting Allowances
Order for Relief
Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan
Order to Employer or Other Party to Pay
to the Trustee and Mortgagee(s)
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Standard Order 26: Entry of Default
Standard Order 27: Judgment by Default
Standard Order 28: Order Vacating Automatic Stay as to
Personal Property
Standard Order 29: Order Vacating Automatic Stay as to Real
Property
RULE 16 RULE 2004 EXAMINATION
(a) If a party from whom an examination or document production is sought under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 agrees to appear
for examination or to produce documents voluntarily, no subpoena or court order is required.
(b) Any party in interest seeking to compel an examination
or production of documents shall serve a subpoena pursuant to
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(c) without filing a motion or obtaining an
order authorizing such examination or document production.
(c) A subpoena pursuant to subdivision (b) shall not set the
examination or document production for less than 14 days after
service of the subpoena except by agreement of the deponent.
(d) Upon motion of the deponent or any party in interest,
the Court may quash or modify a subpoena pursuant to subdivision (b) for cause shown. The filing of such a motion prior to the
date set for examination or document production shall stay the
subpoena until the Court rules on the motion.
(e) If a deponent fails or refuses to comply with a subpoena
served pursuant to subdivision (b) and has not filed a motion
pursuant to subdivision (d), the party who obtained the subpoena
may file a motion to hold the deponent in contempt pursuant to
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9016 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e), and for an order
directing such examination or document production under Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 2004(a).
Rules Committee Comment
The practice in this District has been to apply for an order
whenever a party desires to take an examination or compel document production under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004. However, such
orders are unnecessary in light of Rule 2004(c), which authorizes
examination or document production by subpoena, which is a
form of court order. Since subpoenas can be issued under Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9016, it imposes an unnecessary burden upon the
bankruptcy judges to apply routinely for an order under Rule
2004. Such orders shall henceforth be permitted only if the deponent fails to comply with the subpoena.
Moreover, as subdivision (a) recognizes, neither a subpoena
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nor an order is necessary if the deponent agrees to appear for
examination or to produce documents voluntarily.
As with all of the Local Rules, an application may be made
under Rule 1(b) to modify this Rule in appropriate cases.
V.

WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LOCAL RULE

BANKRUPTCY COURT

9013.4(5)(A)

Rule 9013.4
5. Filings With the Clerk -

Default

(a) If no written response, or a written response which does
not object to the Motion, is received timely by the Movant by the
date specified in the Notice (plus 3 additional days as required by
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(f) where service is by mail), not less than 7
calendar days before the scheduled hearing date,counsel shall file
with the Clerk
1) in duplicate, a proposed Default Order, one copy being loose and unbound,
2) a Certificate of Default (Local Bankr. Form No. 6),
3) a Certificate of Service (Local Bankr. Form No. 5),
4) the Notice of Hearing, and
5) the Motion,
whereupon the Clerk, on behalf of the judge, shall issue an order
by default against any defaulting party, in accordance with the
motion.'
VI.

DISTRICT OF UTAH BANKRUPTCY COURT LOCAL RULE

535

Rule 535
Orders and Judgments Grantable by the Clerk; Approval of
Bonds
(a) Orders andJudgments. The clerk is authorized to sign and
enter the following orders without further direction by the court:
(1) Orders entering default for failure to plead or
otherwise defend as provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055 (the clerk shall notify the court
forthwith);
(2) Orders on consent satisfying judgment; and
(3) Any other orders which under Fed.R.Civ.P. 77(c) do
not require allowance or order by the Court. The clerk
is also authorized to approve undertakings, bonds, and
I Draftsman's Comment: Items in 5(a) or 5(b) should be filed together and
may be attached for one combined filing, in the order indicated.
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stipulations for security given in the form and amount
prescribed by statute, by these rules, or by order of the
court where the same are executed by approved sureties, except those required by law to be approved by a
judge.
(b) Clerk's Action Reviewable. The actions of the clerk under
this rule may be reviewed, suspended, altered or rescinded by the
court upon good cause shown.
(c) Documents Signed or Imprinted by the Clerk. The clerk is authorized to sign or, as appropriate, imprint the court's facsimile
signature upon the following documents: subpoenas, summonses, notices, orders respecting meetings or creditors, discharges, and other documents as authorized by the court.
(d) Judgment by Default. Judgment by default may be signed
and entered by the clerk in such circumstances as are specified in
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055. The judgment
must be accompanied by an affidavit that the person against
whom judgment is sought is neither an infant or an incompetent
person, nor in the armed forces within the meaning of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.
§ 520(1). Upon application of any party, the clerk shall make and
file a certificate of default as to any party in default, for the convenience of the court or of the party applying for the default
judgment. When application is made to the court under Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055 for default judgment, unless
the court orders otherwise, the scheduling clerk upon request of
the moving party shall set a hearing for the taking of evidence
before the court. If the party against whom judgment by default
is sought has appeared in the proceeding, the party seeking the
default shall give due notice of the hearing to counsel for said
party as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055.
With leave of the court, proof may be submitted by affidavit, but
the court may order such further hearing as appears proper.
VII.

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA BANKRUPTCY COURT

LOCAL RULE

106

Rule 106 - Orders Grantable By The Clerk
The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court is hereby authorized and directed to grant and enter the following orders without further
direction by the Court, subject to suspension, alteration or rescission for cause shown:
(A) Orders RequiringAmended Petitions, Lists, etc.: In the event bank-
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ruptcy petitions, lists, schedules and statements are filed with the
Clerk and to the extent such filings are incomplete or otherwise
fail to comply with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or
with these Local Rules, on motion of a party in interest and after
direction of the Court, the Clerk is empowered and authorized to
direct the filing of amended petitioners, lists, schedules and
statements.
(B) Preliminary Order to Debtor: The Court has promulgated routine orders instructing debtors of certain duties under the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and Local
Rules. The Clerk is authorized and directed to issue such an order promptly upon commencement of the case and to serve the
same upon the debtor and the debtor's attorney.
(C) Noticefor Meeting of Creditors: All notices for meetings of creditors may be signed by the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy
Court.
(D) Dischargeof Debtor: The Clerk of the Court shall forthwith issue a discharge of the debtor and send notice of the same to the
debtor and all other interested parties upon determining that:
(1) no complaint objecting to the discharge of a chapter
7 debtor has been timely filed,
(2) no motion to dismiss the case under F.R.B.P.
1017(e) is pending, and that
(3) a chapter 12 or chapter 13 trustee has filed a final
report certifying that all payments have been made pursuant to the confirmed plan.
(E) Order Closing Case: The Clerk shall forthwith issue an order
closing a case upon determining that the case is administratively
ready for closure, and upon receipt of one of the following:
(1) a chapter 7 trustee's final report of no
distribution,
(2) a final report from a chapter 12 or chapter 13
trustee certifying that distribution in full has been
made pursuant to the confirmed plan, or
(3) entry of an order dismissing a case.
(F) Other orders grantableby Clerk: Any and all other orders grantable as a matter of course by the Clerk under the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or any federal statute, any Local Rule, or by direction of the Court.
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Appendix 5
I.

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BANKRUPTCY COURT
SPECIAL ORDER

87-1

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re:

)

)
Delegation of Duties to the )
Clerk of the Bankruptcy
)
Court and his Deputies
)

Special Order 87-1
Re: Sacramento Division Office

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Special Order 81-1, dated
March 3, 1981, is amended to read as follows:
RICHARD G. HELTZEL, the duly appointed Clerk of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of California and
his deputies shall have the same rights and powers, shall perform
the same functions and duties and shall be subject to the same
provisions of Title 28, United States Code, as a clerk and other
employees appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 751. Pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 956 and 11 U.S.C. § 105, in connection
with cases and proceedings commenced under the Bankruptcy
Code, and the provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules in connection
with cases pending or reopened under the Bankruptcy Act, the
clerk and such deputies as he may designate are authorized to
sign and enter without further direction the following orders
which are deemed to be of a ministerial, nondiscretionary, nonjudicial and/or administrative nature:
1. Orders and notices that establish trial, pre-trials, settlement conferences, meeting or examination dates required or requested under Title 11, United States Code, and continuances
thereto provided, however, that orders for examination pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 shall be on 30 days notice to the witness
and shall be held at a place within 100 miles of the residence or
place of business of the witness;
2. Orders fixing the last dates for the filing of objections to
discharge, objections to confirmation of plans, acceptance or rejection of plans, complaints to determine the dischargeability of
debts, proofs of claim, and amendments thereto;
3. Orders permitting the filing fee to be paid in installments
as provided by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure;
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4. Orders granting discharge of debtors in chapter 7 and 13
cases in which no objection to discharge is pending, and where
the debtor has not executed a waiver of discharge or been otherwise denied a discharge;
5. Orders reopening cases to administer assets pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 350;
6. Orders limiting notice pursuant to Rule 2002(h);
7. Orders shortening time to not less than 10 days for notices pursuant to Rule 2002(a)(2) and 2002(a)(3) involving the
sale of personal property or compromise of a controversy in
which the value of property is less than $2,500.00, wherein the
request is supported by a representation that persons receiving
notice will have sufficient time to respond and that cause for
shortened notice exists;
8. Orders appointing interim trustees from the panel of
trustees established in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 604, and fixing trustee bonds;
9. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, orders for distribution of dividends in a chapter 7 case (excluding orders wherein
trustee, attorney, or other professional fees are more than
$500.00 to any one applicant) and orders closing cases and discharging trustees wherein no objections are pending;
10. Orders closing cases deemed to be minimal funds cases
pursuant to Special Order 86-1 of this court;
11. Orders necessary to close cases filed under the Bankruptcy Act or Code including orders authorizing or directing
trustees, disbursing agents, or debtors to make distribution and
file accounts, and final decrees, after appropriate notice to parties
in interest, and no objections are pending;
12. Except orders presented pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 1307(b), which do not require notice, and where no objections
are pending, orders dismissing cases (i) under chapter 7, 11 and
12 after notice to the master mailing list and (ii) under chapter 13
to the debtor, debtor's attorney and trustee;
13. Orders converting cases (i) pursuant to a debtor's request under 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1 12(a), 11 U.S.C.
§ 1208(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) without notice and (ii) pursuant to other Code provisions after notice to the master mailing
list, and no objection pending;
14. Except with respect to priority claims, orders substituting the transferee for the original claimant on a proof of claim
pursuant to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure;
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15. Orders requiring refund of monies to claimant where
such monies were tendered to the court as undeliverable, or in
minimal amounts;
16. Orders permitting employment, association, or substitution of counsel or other professional persons pursuant to sections 327-330 of the Bankruptcy Code that do not include the
fixing or allowance of compensation; provided, however, that all
such orders conclude with the phrase "pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 326-§ 330";
17. Orders presented by the Chapter 13 Standing Trustee
ordering or releasing the debtor or any entity from whom the
debtor receives income to pay for all or part of such income to
the trustee;
18. Orders confirming or modifying a chapter 13 plan where
no objections to confirmation are pending and the trustee has
approved the plan as satisfying the requirements of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a);
19. Orders providing for notice to the creditor, the debtor
and trustee of a claim filed on behalf of a creditor as provided in
11 U.S.C. 501(c) and Bankruptcy Rule 3004.
20. Orders appointing creditors' committees, and amendments thereto;
21. Orders pursuant to stipulation excepting, however, orders allowing compensation, disbursement of funds from any
source whatsoever, approval of use, sale, or lease of property or
of compromise, orders of abandonment and orders vacating or
modifying the automatic stay.
22. Orders of the type specified in Rule 77(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (costs taxed against the losing party).
23. Orders dismissing adversary proceedings for lack of
prosecution after notice to the parties affording opportunity to
be heard and no request for a hearing having been filed.
24. Orders reopening an estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 350(b).
DATED: June 17, 1987

LOREN S. DAHL
Chief Judge
DAVID E. RUSSELL
Judge
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WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN BANKRUPTCY COURT
GENERAL ORDER

2

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
GENERAL ORDER 2
March 1, 1993
WHEREAS, the Bankruptcy Court is required to issue numerous routine, ministerial orders which require the exercise of
no judicial discretion, and
WHEREAS, it appears to this Court that the power to sign
such orders and notices can be delegated to the Clerk of the
Court and specific deputy clerks,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of this
Court, and those deputies designated by the Clerk shall have authority to sign the following notices and orders on behalf of this
Court:
1. Orders for Relief.
2. Orders and Notice of Stay - The Clerk is authorized to
sign and distribute the form which is attached to this
order.
3. Orders Allowing Installment Payments of Filing Fees.
4. Interim disbursement Orders - Provided that such orders are previously approved by the United States
Trustee and are for a sum of $500 or less.
5. Notice and Orders of Abandonment.
6. Final Decrees.
7. Orders Approving Claims (chapter 13 cases).
8. Orders to Employer to Pay Trustee.
9. Orders Reducing Claims when requested by a creditor
to reduce, disallow or withdraw that creditor's claim.
10. Orders Authorizing Debtor to Borrow Funds if previously approved by the standing trustee and if no judge is
available to sign the order.
11. Writs of Garnishment, Executions and Orders to Pay.
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12. Orders striking pleadings, motions or other documents
intended for filing which are defective because they fail
to meet requirements imposed by the Bankruptcy Code,
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, or these local rules.

Honorable Laurence E. Howard
Chief Bankruptcy Judge

Honorable James D. Gregg
Bankruptcy Judge

At Grand Rapids,

Michigan this first day
of February, 1993
III.

Honorable Jo Ann C. Stevenson
Bankruptcy Judge

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO BANKRUPTCY COURT ADMIN.

ORDER 588-28

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
IN RE:

ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 588-28
JUDGE WHITE-AKRON

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
TO SIGN AND ENTER CERTAIN
ORDERS
In the interest of judicial economy and the prompt disposition of matters not subject to contest, the Clerk of Bankruptcy
Court, from and after December 1, 1988, through regularly appointed deputies, may prepare, sign and enter orders as specified
below for the governance of cases filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Ohio, Akron, Ohio without
submission to a judge, unless otherwise directed by a judge of

the United States Bankruptcy Court sitting at Akron, Ohio:
1. Orders granting leave to pay filing fees in installments.
2. Orders extending the time to file schedules and statements of affairs or statements of intentions of individual
debtors; provided, however, that such filings must be
made by the close of business of the fourth working day
prior to the date on which the meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341 is first scheduled.
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3. Payment orders entered on the employer or the debtor in
chapter 13 cases.
4. Orders to appear and show cause why a case should not
be dismissed for debtor's failure (a) to pay filing fee installments, (b) to appear at a meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341,or (c) to file a plan within the time
required by Bankruptcy Rule 3015.
5. Orders releasing employer or debtor from making further
payments in Chapter 13 cases.
6. Orders directing compliance with Bankruptcy Rules 7008
and 7012 (core/non-core allegations) pursuant to General Order 88-2.
7. Orders relating to pre-trial conduct.
8. Such other orders as a judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court sitting in Akron, Ohio may from time to
time authorize to be entered consistent herewith.
The Clerk's action herein authorized shall be accomplished
by the affixing to such orders the following language:
ENTERED PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 588-28
BETH A. DICK, CLERK OF BANKRUPTCY COURT
BY
DEPUTY CLERK
Any party adversely affected by an order so entered shall be
entitled to reconsideration thereof by a judge of the United
States Bankruptcy Court sitting in Akron, Ohio if, within ten days
of service of notice of the entry of such order, such party files a
written motion for reconsideration, which motion or
memorandum attached shall state the grounds therefore, in
accordance with L. Civ. R. 3.01 of the United States District
Court, Northern District of Ohio, made applicable in cases
before this court pursuant to L. Civ. R. 1.01. Such motions for
reconsideration will ordinarily be considered by the court upon
the papers submitted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
H. F. White
Bankruptcy Judge
IV.

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA OMNIBUS ORDER

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

1456

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1329

OMNIBUS ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of January, 1989, it is ORDERED
that the Deputy Clerk in Charge of Reading Divisional Offices is
hereby directed and empowered, effective immediately, to affix
my official signature stamp to those proposed orders' of the
court which parties become entitled to by reason of the filing of a
certification of no response, a stipulation, a "consent order"
form as well as to forms of "ministerial" orders. Upon affixing
my signature stamp, as above, such proposed order shall become
an original order of this Court having the same legal effect as
though I had personally signed same.

Reading, Pa.
THOMAS M. TWARDOWSKI
Bankruptcy Judge
ORDERS AUTHORIZING USE OF FACSIMILE STAMP
Order for 341 Meeting of Creditors and Related Notice Order
Continuing 341 Meeting with Order to Show Cause
Order for Relief
Order of Consolidation
Order of Discharge
Bond of Trustee & Appointment
Confirmation of Chapter 13
Order to Show Cause-Abuse of Chapter 7 Provisions
Order on Disposition of Claims (After 20 days no opposition notice by Trustee)
Order to Receive Notices
Order Revoking and Rescinding Order for Discharge Hearing
when Debtor(s) have filed Waiver of Attendance
Notice of Continued Discharge Hearing and Order to Show

Cause
Order on 20 Day No Opposition Notice Where no Request for
Hearing was Filed
Order Setting Last Day to File Complaints regarding Discharge
in Chapter 13
Order to Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11 Cases (Per Local
Rule 4.1)
I Specific exceptions include Orders of Distribution, Applications for Confirmation, Motion for Use of Cash Collateral and Motions to Approve Compromises.
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Order Appointing Unsecured Creditors Committee in Chapter
11 Cases
Order for Hearing on Disclosure Statement in Chapter 11 Cases
Order for Hearing on Confirmation of Plan in Chapter 11 Cases
Order Authorizing Retention of Attorney for DIP in Chapter 11
Cases
Order for Payment of Filing Fees in Installments
Order Appointing Trustee in Cases Converted to Chapter 7
Notice and Order for Abandonment and Lifting of Stay
Order granting Discharge on cases where no reaffirmation or redemption agreement is filed
Final Decree
Order Approving Disclosure Statement, Fixing Time for Filing
Acceptances or Rejections of Plan, and Fixing Date for Confirmation Hearing, Combined with Notice Thereof
Order for Hearing on Disclosure Statement and Fixing Time for
Filing Objections to Approval of Disclosure Statement combined
with Notice Thereof
Order Appointing Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Order Relieving Trustee Appointing Successor Trustee Due to
Conflict
Order Closing Adversary Proceeding
Preliminary Pretrial Order
Order and Notice of Hearing on Confirmation and Fixing of
Time to File Objections
Order Converting Case under Chapter 13 to Case under Chapter
7 on Motion of Debtor
Order Dismissing Case on Motion of the Debtor (13)
Notice of Plan Completion and Order Setting Discharge
Order for Distribution
Order of Cancellation of Hearing on the Discharge Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. Section 524 Due to Failure of Debtor(s) to attend Section 341 (a) Meeting
Order to Show Cause for Dismissal for Failure to Pay the Miscellaneous Administrative Fee
Order Canceling Hearing on Order to Show Cause why Case
should not be Dismissed for Failure to Pay Filing Fees
Order to Show Cause why case should not be Dismissed for Failure to File Schedules
Order to Attorney for Debtor in Possession and Notice of Procedural Requirements in Chapter 12 Cases
Order to File Chapter 11 Post-Confirmation Report of Progress
or Final Account with Application for Final Decree
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Wage Deduction Order in Chapter 13
Chapter 13 Trustee's Motion to Withdraw His/Her Application
to Dismiss
Order Setting Complaints Bar Date and Setting Discharge Hearing Date
Order on Trustee's Motion for Transmittal and Deposit of Unclaimed Funds
V.

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA BANKRUPrCY COURT

ADMIN. ORDER

92-01

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
:
MISC. NO. 92-01 (HBG.)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day ofJanuary, 1992, IT IS ORDERED
that the following routine administrative orders shall be effective
and duly issued upon application of a facsimile signature stamp:
1. Order Appointing Debtor-In-Possession
2. Order for Payment of Filing Fee in Installments
3. Order for Extension of Time to File Schedules
4. Final Decree Orders
5. Order Closing Reopened Case
6. Order for Final Reports; Chapter 11 and 13
7. Order to File Final Report and Postpetition Debts;
Chapters 11 and 13
8. Order Directing Filing of Claims Incurred During Proceedings; Chapters 11 and 13
9. Order Converting. (restricted to absolute right cases
only)
10. Order for Dismissal. (All Chapters)
11. Order to Answer Motion to Assume/Reject Lease
12. Default Order/Lien Avoidance
13. Default Order/Automatic Stay
14. Order Approving Reduction of Notice Period
15. Discharge Order
16. Order for Deposit of Funds in Registry (unclaimed
funds)
17. Order/Trustee's Rule to Show Cause
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18. Appointment Order (after being held 5 days and no objections filed)
19. Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan (preprinted form
orders)
20. Order to Pay Trustee/Creditor (Chapter 13 wage
attachments)
This order shall be effective on the day of issuance.
BY THE COURT,
HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT J. WOODSIDE,
BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

VI.

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BANKRUPTCY COURT
GENERAL ORDER

91-2

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
IN RE:

§

AUTHORITY OF CLERK TO SIGN

§

GENERAL ORDER

CERTAIN ORDERS AND NOTICES

§

NUMBER 91-2

IN THE NAME OF THE COURT

§

§
§
§

After a review and consideration of the Court's practice regarding
the signing and entry of notices and orders, the Court finds certain notices and orders to be ministerial in nature, not generally subject to
opposition, and not to deprive any party of any right by virtue of the
absence of actual review. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)
and 956,
The Court authorizes the Clerk of the Court to sign and enter the
following Notices and Orders for the Court:
1. Notices which require appearances at meetings, hearings, conferences, or trials;
2. Notices to Trustees of Status Conferences
3. Notices of the Filing of Trustee's Final Reports, Applications
for Compensation, Proposed Distribution and Deadline for Filing Objections;
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4. Orders Discharging Trustee, Terminating Liability on Bond,
and Closing or Converting Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 Cases;
5. Orders Accepting Trustee's Report and Closing Estate in NoAsset Chapter 7 Cases where the Debtor has been discharged or
the case has been dismissed;
6. Orders to Show Cause, except for contempt or sanctions;
7. Orders Granting Applications to Pay Filing Fees in Installments;
8. Standing Scheduling Orders in Adversary Proceedings; and
9. Standing Scheduling Orders in Involuntary Cases.
The Court further authorizes the Clerk of Court to delegate to any
deputy clerk the authority to sign, on behalf of the Clerk, any of the
Notices and Orders the Clerk of Court is authorized by this Order to
sign. On any Order or Notice signed by the Clerk or on behalf of the
Clerk, there shall appear the legend FOR THE COURT above the signature line.
SO ORDERED, this the 13 day of June, 1991.
FOR THE COURT

Honorable Robert C. McGuire
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Northern District of Texas
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE, AMARILLO, LUBBOCK AND SAN ANGELO
DIVISIONS
IN RE:

§

AUTHORITY OF CLERK TO SIGN
CERTAIN ORDERS AND NOTICES
IN THE NAME OF THE COURT

§
§
§

§

GENERAL ORDER NO. 91-3
On June 13, 1991 the Honorable Robert C. McGuire, Chief United
States Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Texas, issued
General Order No. 91-2 authorizing the Clerk of the Court and deputy
clerks to sign various notices and orders.
In addition to the notices and orders described in General Order
No. 91-2, the Clerk of the Court and the deputy clerks in the Abilene,
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Amarillo, Lubbock and San Angelo Divisions are authorized to sign on
behalf of the court the following:
1. Orders discharging the Trustee and closing the estate in Chapter 7 asset cases.
2. Chapter 11 post-confirmation orders.
3. Orders upon conversion of Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 cases to
Chapter 7.
DATED: AUG 02 1991 Nunc pro tunc to July 18, 1991
JOHN C. AKARD, BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
VII.

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BANKRUFTCY COURT
AMENDED ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMENDED ORDER AUTHORIZING CLERK TO
SIGN CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 956, the
Clerk of each Court and his Deputies and Assistants can exercise
the powers and perform the duties assigned to them by the
Court. Accordingly, it is ordered that the Clerk or his designated
representative are authorized and directed to sign on behalf of
the Judges of this Court the orders and notices set forth below:
1. Order Combined with Notice of Commencement of
Case under Various Chapters of the Bankruptcy Code,
Meeting of Creditors, and Fixing of Dates.
2. Order Setting Bar Date for Filing Proofs of Claim or Interest, including authority of the Clerk to set a bar date
for filing proofs of claim or interest approximately
ninety (90) days after the First Meeting of Creditors.
3. Pay Order to Employers in Chapter 13 cases.
4. Order to Allow Claims in Chapter 13 cases.
5. Order to Allow Additional Claims in Chapter 13 cases.
6. Order Closing Estates and Discharging Trustees.
7. Order to Pay Fees in Installments.
8. Order Converting Cases as a Matter of Right.
9. Discharge Orders in Chapter 7 and 13 cases.
10. Order Relative to Pretrial in Adversary Proceedings.
11. Order to Obtain Service of Process in Adversary
Proceedings.
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12. Order to Seek Default Judgment in Adversary
Proceedings.
13. Order to Pay Small Dividends into Registry of the Court.
14. Order to Pay Unclaimed Funds into Registry of the
Court.
15. Order Granting Trustee Applications to Defer Filing
Fees in Adversary Proceedings until final disposition of
the bankruptcy case.
This Amended Order supersedes all previous Orders entered on this subject.
Signed this 26 day of November, 1991.
Larry E. Kelly
Chief Bankruptcy Judge

Leif M. Clark
United States Bankruptcy Judge

Ronald B. King
United States Bankruptcy Judge

Frank R. Monroe
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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Appendix 6
Trial by Declarations
Bary Russell
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
The attached "Order re Presentation of Evidence by Declarations for Court Trial . . ." concerns a procedure which I have
been using for several years with excellent results, in my opinion,
for Court trials. The second introductory paragraph of the Order states:
The purpose of this procedure is to ensure a fair and expeditious trial. The procedure is similar to a motion for summary judgment, except that the admissibility of a declaration is
dependent upon the presence of the declarant at trial subject
to cross-examination.
Using this procedure, I have been able to try matters that would
normally take one to two weeks in one-half to one or two days.
Since almost all direct testimony is admitted into evidence by the
witnesses' declarations, the in-court time for this testimony is generally eliminated. This procedure does not work well unless both
sides are represented by counsel.
Because counsel are forced to carefully prepare the declarations
that are admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, I have
found the declarations to be very brief and far more direct than if
the direct testimony were given orally in open court. I have also
found that cross-examination is much shorter and frequently
waived. I believe this may be due in part to the fact that many attorneys feel compelled to cross-examine witnesses, especially when the
client is present in Court, and after the other side's counsel has
spent considerable time questioning its witnesses on direct
examination.
This procedure is most beneficial to the Judge's needs. In addition to saving a great deal of time, I have found that I am much
better prepared to decide the matter. By requiring that briefs be
filed with the declarations, I am often ready to decide the matter on
the declarations submitted prior to trial. That is to say, in many
trials (usually the more simple matters) both sides submit on the
declarations without any cross-examination and without argument
(they have already argued in the pre-trial briefs).
Naturally, to make the procedure work, the Judge must take the
time to read the declarations and the briefs prior to trial. This can
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be done at the Judge's leisure, either in Chambers or at home relaxing by the pool, etc. An additional benefit is that by requiring the
parties to be fully prepared, they often settle matters which I believe
would otherwise have gone to trial.
The following comments relate to specific suggestions I have
concerning certain aspects of the attached Order.
1.

Declarations:

(a) Since this is a trial, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. I have found that "hearsay" and "irrelevant" are by far the most frequent objections and
are easily determined by this procedure. Try not to waste your
time by hearing arguments on these unless you are really unsure.
In any case, you will decide the relevancy when you render your
decision. I would suggest generally overruling objections relating to the form of the answer as opposed to those objections relating to substance. I have found that very few objections of any
kind are made to the declarations, and the objections made are
easily decided.
(b) Some counsel may hold back evidence that should have
been in their declarations as part of their case-in-chief and claim
it is merely rebuttal. If you strictly enforce your Order they will
soon learn that you will not tolerate such attempts to circumvent
your Order. I would stress this and other points at a status hearing with all counsel present.
(c) Requiring exhibits to be attached to the declaration
makes the reading of the declaration easier and more understandable. You may have to modify this requirement if there are
a large number of exhibits. In that case, the declarant should
refer to the exhibits which should be provided to the Court and
counsel as part of the Pre-trial Order.
(d) The filing of a declaration by counsel, concerning witnesses for whom declarations cannot be obtained, helps to reduce surprises and is important for the Judge and opposing
counsel to be aware of all the evidence to be presented by both
sides.
(e) It is important to strictly adhere to the requirements of
the Order. If a declarant does not appear at the trial, the declarant's declaration may not be introduced into evidence. The decision to continue the trial because of an unavailable witness is the
same as it would be at a trial without declarations.
In the beginning you may encounter some counsel, as I
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have, who don't believe you mean it and will appear at trial with
witnesses for whom they have not served and/or filed declarations. If you comply with your Order and refuse to allow the witnesses to testify, that particular counsel and others will quickly
realize that you really mean it.
2. Time for Filing Declarations, Etc.:
I generally set the time for filing the declarations so that the
last one is filed two weeks before the trial or pre-trial hearing. I
usually give the plaintiff about three to four weeks to file its declarations; defendant, two to three weeks to file its reply declarations; and the plaintiff, one to two weeks to reply. Any
evidentiary objections must be filed with that party's declarations
with the defendant filing its objections, if any, to plaintiff's reply
declarations, at least one week before trial or pre-trial.
3. Time for Filing Briefs:
I don't order the filing of briefs but I do order that if thy are
filed, they may only be filed in accordance with the Order. Almost all counsel file briefs and it is nice not to have them handed
to you as you start the trial.
4.

Pre-Trial Orders:
I almost always, except in the simplest matters when everyone knows what is in issue, require a Pre-trial Order. In Los Angeles, we have a Local Rule which spells out the requirements.
Many Judges issue their own order. In either case, I require the
Pre-trial Order to be filed on the same date as the plaintiff's declarations. I do that to force the parties to get together as soon as
possible.
5. Setting of Trial or Pre-Trial:
I generally order the reply declarations to be filed two weeks
prior to trial. If I don't have a good idea how long the trial will
take, I set it for a pre-trial hearing with the reply declarations to
be filed two weeks before the hearing. I have found it helps to
emphasize to counsel that you will try their two day trial in one
hour, or their one week trial in one half a day. There is no need
for opening statements, and closing arguments should be kept to
a minimum unless the cross-examinations have revealed new
facts.
I would advise issuing your Order at a status hearing with all
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counsel present to orally emphasize those points you wish to emphasize, and to answer any questions of counsel. This is especially important when you first initiate this procedure.

